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GENERAL	INTRODUCTION	
	
	
Cooperation	is	abundant	
We,	 the	 human	 species,	 build	 houses	 together,	 organize	 ourselves	 in	 unions	 and	
governments,	 and	as	 inhabitants	of	 a	 village	we	build	our	own	autarkic	 renewable	 energy	
plant	–	just	to	name	a	view	out	of	numerous	other	examples	of	cooperation.	In	fact,	we	are	
not	the	only	cooperative	species.	Throughout	the	animal	kingdom	we	find	various	forms	of	
cooperation	 (for	 reviews,	 see	 e.g.	Hammerstein	2003;	Pennisi	 2009).	There	 is	 cooperation	
between	such	simple	organisms	as	single‐cell	organisms	(e.g.	Santorelli	et	al.	2008).	Viruses	
cooperate	together	to	infect	cells	(Turner	&	Chao	1999).	Eusocial	insects	such	as	wasps,	ants,	
and	honeybees	show	very	high	levels	of	cooperation	and	possess	a	detailed	division	of	labor	
(Wilson	&	Hölldobler	 2005;	 Reeve	&	Hölldobler	 2007).	 Furthermore,	 pairs	 of	 fish	 inspect	
predators	together	(Milinski	et	al.	1990).	Social	non‐human	primates	support	each	other	in	
coalitions,	share	food	and	groom	each	other	(Barrett	et	al.	1999;	de	Waal	&	Brosnan	2006;	
Cheney	et	al.	2010;	Schino	&	Aureli	2010).		
As	 diverse	 as	 cooperative	 behavior	 is	 in	 nature,	 so	 are	 the	 fields	 studying	 cooperation,	
which	 highlights	 the	 general	 interest	 and	 broad	 scope	 needed	 to	 understand	 the	 ultimate	
and	 proximate	 mechanisms	 underlying	 cooperative	 behavior.	 Fields	 investigating	
cooperation	include	anthropology,	biology,	ecology,	sociology,	psychology,	political	sciences,	
mathematics,	and	even	physics.	While	studying	cooperation	one	fascinating	question	arises:	
why	 is	 human	 cooperation	 so	 fundamentally	 different	 from	 that	 of	 other	 species?	 As	
reviewed	 by	 van	 Schaik	 and	 Kappeler	 (2006;	 also	 see	 Melis	 &	 Semmann	 2010)	 human	
cooperation	stands	out,	because	(i)	we	much	more	often	cooperate	within	groups	(whereas	
most	 animals	 only	 engage	 in	 dyadic	 cooperation);	 (ii)	 we	 engage	 in	 extremely	 high‐risk	
cooperation	(e.g.	sophisticated	forms	of	warfare);	(iii)	we	tend	to	cooperate	more	with	non‐
kin	 than	 other	 primates;	 (iv)	 we	 are	 willing	 to	 punish	 non‐cooperating	 individuals	 even	
when	this	is	costly	(especially	striking	is	the	use	of	third‐party	punishment);	(v)	we	rely	on	
the	 use	 of	 reputation	 to	 establish	 cooperation	much	more	 than	 non‐human	primates;	 and	
(vi)	we	trade	goods	and	services	using	a	token‐based	exchange.	To	reach	these	high	levels	of	
cooperation	 we	 use	 language,	 we	 show	 remarkably	 emotional	 responses	 associated	 with	
cooperative	behavior,	and	we	use	culturally	transmitted	social	norms.	
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Cooperation	is	an	evolutionary	puzzle		
In	 evolutionary	 biology	 the	 focus	 lies	 in	 general	 on	 behavior,	 i.e.	 the	 particular	 processes	
within	the	psychological	“black	box”	are	usually	set	aside,	and	the	behavioral	consequences	
in	 terms	of	 fitness	benefits	or	 losses	are	 investigated.	Hence,	cooperation	 is	defined	as	 the	
“outcome	 of	 an	 interaction	 (or	 repeated	 interactions)	 where	 all	 participants	 on	 average	
increase	 their	 direct	 fitness”	 (Bshary	 2010,	 p.	 215).	 This	 means	 that	 even	 though	 one	
individual	could	engage	in	cooperative	behavior,	the	overall	outcome	of	the	interaction	with	
another	individual	does	not	have	to	be	cooperation.	The	cooperative	act	itself	is	a	behavior	
that	provides	on	average	a	direct	survival	benefit	to	other	individuals,	but	at	the	same	time	
incurs	on	average	survival	costs	to	the	actor	him‐	or	herself	(costs	are	somewhat	lower	than	
the	 produced	 benefits).	 Logically	 one	 would	 not	 expect	 to	 find	 cooperative	 behavior	 in	
nature,	 because	 of	 its	 negative	 selection	 pressures.	 Thus,	 in	 light	 of	 Darwin’s	 theory	 of	
evolution	the	abundance	of	cooperation	constitutes	a	puzzle.	In	fact	it	has	been	termed	“one	
of	the	great	puzzles	in	evolutionary	biology”	(Rand	et	al.	2010,	p.	624)	and	“one	of	the	most	
fundamental	 challenges	 to	 date”	 (Santos	 et	 al.	 2006c,	 p.	 51).	 In	 more	 general	 terms,	 the	
problem	 that	 cooperation	 faces	 lies	 in	 the	 threat	 of	 exploitation	 of	 mainly	 cooperative	
individuals	 (also	 termed	 cooperators,	 contributors,	 or	 helpers)	 by	 mainly	 uncooperative	
individuals	 (also	 termed	 defectors	 or	 non‐contributors).	 There	 are	 two	 ways	 in	 which	
exploitation	can	take	place.	First,	in	an	on‐going	exchange	of	helping	one	can	simply	refrain	
from	 returning	 the	 next	 favor.	 Within	 a	 dyadic	 context,	 this	 problem	 is	 captured	 by	 the	
iterated	 prisoner’s	 dilemma	 paradigm.	 Second,	 in	 a	 group	 endeavor	 one	 can	 enjoy	 the	
benefits	of	 a	public	 good	produced	by	 the	group	without	 contributing	 to	 its	provision	and	
maintenance.	Such	behavior	is	called	free‐riding	and	can	be	investigated	by	the	public	goods	
game	(for	more	details	see	below).	
	
Definition	of	common	concepts	
Before	moving	 on	 to	mechanisms	 leading	 to	 cooperation	 some	 common	 concepts	 shall	 be	
defined	(especially	as	 they	are	not	always	clearly	defined	 in	 the	associated	research	 fields;	
for	attempts,	see	Lehmann	&	Keller	2006;	West	et	al.	2007b;	Bshary	&	Bergmüller	2008).		
One	of	the	most	important	and	influential	concepts	was	introduced	by	Hamilton	(1964):	
the	inclusive	fitness.	Inclusive	fitness	is	composed	of	direct	fitness,	i.e.	fitness	gained	through	a	
behavior	that	affects	the	production	of	own	offspring,	and	indirect	fitness,	 i.e.	fitness	gained	
through	a	behavior	that	affects	the	reproductive	success	of	related	individuals.		
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Social	behavior	can	be	defined	on	the	basis	of	 inclusive	fitness1	(definitions	are	adopted	
from	Bshary	&	Bergmüller	2008;	Bshary	2010).	Social	acts	can	either	 increase	or	decrease	
the	direct	fitness	of	the	actor	and	affect	the	social	counterpart	(or	recipient)	by	increasing	or	
decreasing	his	or	her	direct	fitness	(see	summary	in	Tab.	1).	The	act	is	understood	as	helping	
or	prosocial	behavior	if	it	increases	the	direct	fitness	of	the	recipient.	This	can	occur	in	three	
forms:	(i)	 in	mutualistic	behavior	both	parties	have	an	immediate	direct	 fitness	benefit	and	
both	 gain	 a	 higher	 benefit	 from	 acting	 together	 than	 from	 acting	 alone	 (here	 actor	 and	
recipient	 are	 from	 the	 same	 species;	whereas	mutualism	 refers	 to	 such	 behavior	 between	
species);	(ii)	in	cooperative	behavior	the	actor	first	places	a	costly	investment	(and	decrease	
his	 or	 her	 immediate	 direct	 fitness),	 which	 on	 average	 increases	 the	 direct	 fitness	 of	 the	
recipient.	The	actor	can	only	receive	direct	fitness	benefits	in	the	long‐run,	for	instance	via	
reciprocity.	Cooperative	behavior	is	at	least	in	part	selected	because	of	the	benefits	towards	
the	recipient	(West	et	al.	2007a);	(iii)	in	altruistic	behavior2	the	direct	fitness	of	the	recipient	
is	on	average	increased	by	the	actor’s	costly	investment,	which	decreases	the	actor’s	direct	
fitness.	 This	 behavior	 is	 under	 positive	 selection	 only	 if	 the	 actor	 obtains	 indirect	 fitness	
benefits	 in	 the	 long‐run.	 Apart	 from	 prosocial	 behavior	 there	 is	 selfish	 behavior,	 which	
increases	 the	 actor’s	 direct	 fitness,	 but	 decreases	 the	 recipient’s	 direct	 fitness.	 Spiteful	
behavior	decreases	the	direct	fitness	of	both	the	actor	and	the	recipient.		
Furthermore,	 cooperative	 behavior	 needs	 to	 be	 distinguished	 from	 two	 other	 forms	 of	
behavior.	 Even	 though	 these	 forms	 can	 also	 produce	 a	 beneficial	 outcome,	 cheating	 is	
narrowed	 down.	 First,	 in	 by‐product	 mutualism	 (Brown	 1983)	 both	 the	 actor	 and	 the	
recipient	benefit.	In	contrast	to	mutualistic	behavior,	the	actor	has	immediate	benefits	from	
his	 or	 her	 behavior	 independent	 of	 the	 recipient’s	 behavior.	 Thus,	 the	 behavior	 is	 self‐
serving	 and	 the	 beneficial	 outcome	 for	 the	 recipient	 is	 merely	 a	 by‐product.	 Second,	 in	
pseudo‐reciprocity	 (Connor	 1986)	 the	 investment	 of	 the	 actor	 enables	 the	 recipient	 to	
perform	 a	 self‐serving	 behavior	 that	 benefits	 the	 actor	 as	 a	 by‐product	 in	 return.	 As	 the	
actor’s	first	needs	to	place	the	investment	to	receive	the	by‐product	benefits,	there	exists	a	
time	delay	between	the	two	acts	(this	contrasts	by‐product	mutualism	where	both	benefits	
are	immediately	received).		
	
                                                 
1		 Note	that	using	the	concept	of	inclusive	fitness	to	define	cooperative	behavior	is	not	meant	to	imply	that	direct	
and	 indirect	 fitness	 benefits	 of	 an	 individual	 are	 only	 affected	 by	 selection	 pressures	 on	 the	 individual	 itself	
(individual	level),	but	that	also	pressures	at	higher	levels	of	selection	can	operate.	
2	 This	 “biological	 altruism”	 is	 to	 be	 distinguished	 from	 “psychological	 altruism”,	 which	 does	 not	 rely	 on	 cost‐
benefit	 analyses,	 but	 is	 a	 prosocial	 behavior	 that	 is	 defined	 by	 its	 underlying	 psychological	 mechanisms,	 like	
perspective	taking	or	empathy.	
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Table	1	Forms	of	social	behavior	based	on	direct	fitness	consequences	(definitions	are	
adopted	from	Bshary	&	Bergmüller	2008;	Bshary	2010).	If	the	recipient	yields	positive	
direct	fitness	benefits	this	behavior	is	termed	helping	or	prosocial	behavior.	
 
	 	 Direct	fitness	effect	on	the	recipient	
	 	 + ‐
Direct	fitness	effect	
on	the	actor	
+	 mutualistic	behaviour
1	/		
cooperative	behaviour2	 selfish	behavior	
‐	 altruistic	behaviour3	 spiteful	behavior	
	
1		The	 actor	 and	 the	 recipient	 have	 an	 immediate	 direct	 fitness	 benefit	 and	 both	 gain	 a	 higher	
benefit	from	acting	together	than	from	acting	alone.	
2		The	actor	needs	to	place	an	investment,	which	is	costly	in	the	beginning,	and	receives	long‐term	
direct	benefits.	
3		The	actor	has	a	costly	 investment	and	benefits	the	recipient,	but	to	be	positively	selected	the	
behavior	needs	to	yield	(long‐term)	indirect	benefits.	
	
	
Mechanisms	to	solve	the	puzzle	
With	 the	 constant	 risk	 of	 being	 suckered	 cooperative	 behavior	 should	 not	 evolve	 under	
natural	selection.	Despite	this	challenge,	in	the	last	decades	much	effort	has	been	devoted	to	
understanding	 the	mechanisms	behind	 the	 evolution	of	 cooperation.	 It	was	demonstrated,	
that	 cooperative	 behavior	 can	 evolve	 under	 the	 condition	 that	 the	 inclusive	 fitness	 of	 the	
actor	is	increased	relative	to	the	average	fitness	in	the	population	(which	is	already	implied	
by	 the	 above	 definitions).	 The	 following	 mechanisms	 cause	 a	 higher	 inclusive	 fitness	 by	
either	increasing	the	direct	or	indirect	fitness	of	the	actor.	
Several	theoretical	mechanisms	leading	to	the	evolution	of	cooperation	were	reviewed	by	
Nowak	(2006b;	but	see	criticism	in	West	et	al.	2007a).	The	theory	of	kin	selection	(Hamilton	
1964)	 focuses	 on	 cooperation	 among	 closely	 related	 individuals,	 i.e.	 through	 cooperating	
with	 kin,	 individuals	 can	 increase	 their	 indirect	 fitness.	 Network	 reciprocity	 can	 sustain	
cooperation	via	the	impact	of	spatial	structures	(Nowak	&	May	1992;	Lieberman	et	al.	2005;	
Ohtsuki	 et	 al.	 2006;	 but	 see	 Hauert	 &	 Doebeli	 2004).	 Due	 to	 the	 spatial	 distribution	 of	
individuals	(e.g.	lattices,	cycles,	or	scale‐free	networks)	only	certain	individuals	or	neighbors	
interact	with	each	other,	which	then	can	promote	cooperation.	Mechanisms	of	group/multi‐
level	 selection	 support	 the	 evolution	 of	 cooperation	 (Wilson	 1975,	 1983;	 Sober	 &	Wilson	
1998;	Traulsen	&	Nowak	2006).	Here	the	selection	forces	do	not	only	act	on	the	individual	
level	but	 also	on	 the	group	 level	 (a	 group	of	 cooperators	might	be	more	 successful	 than	a	
group	 of	 defectors).	 The	 theories	 of	 direct	 reciprocity	 (Trivers	 1971;	 Axelrod	 &	 Hamilton	
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1981;	 Axelrod	 1984;	 Nowak	 &	 Sigmund	 1992,	 1993)	 and	 indirect	 reciprocity	 (Nowak	 &	
Sigmund	 1998,	 2005;	 Ohtsuki	 &	 Iwasa	 2006)	 rely	 on	 dyadic	 and	 triadic	 long‐term	
interactions	 to	 foster	 cooperation.	 In	 direct	 reciprocity	 recipients	 return	 favors	 received	
directly	 to	 the	 actor	 based	 on	 “you	 scratch	 my	 back	 and	 I’ll	 scratch	 yours”.	 In	 indirect	
reciprocity	 the	 actor	 provides	 a	 benefit	 to	 the	 recipient,	 but	 the	 beneficial	 return‐act	 is	
carried	out	by	a	third	party.	In	reciprocal	interactions,	behavior	is,	for	example,	influenced	by	
conditional	strategies	(Wedekind	&	Milinski	1996;	Milinski	&	Wedekind	1998),	reputational	
effects	(Milinski	et	al.	2002;	Semmann	et	al.	2005),	and	rewards	and	punishments	(Fehr	&	
Gächter	 2002;	 Sefton	 et	 al.	 2007;	 Rand	 et	 al.	 2009a).	 Apart	 from	 mechanisms	 of	 natural	
selection,	cultural	selection	is	a	strong	force	in	the	evolution	of	human	behavior	(Richerson	
et	al.	2003).	All	the	named	mechanisms	do	not	necessarily	exclude	each	other	and	needless	
to	say	interactions	between	them	can	arise.	
That	the	puzzle	of	cooperation	has	not	been	completely	resolved	yet	becomes	clear	with	
the	 currently	hotly	debated	value	of	 the	 concept	of	kin	 selection	 to	 explain	 cooperation	 in	
eusocial	 insects	 (e.g.	 Nowak	 et	al.	 2010;	 Abbot	 et	al.	 2011;	 Herre	&	Wcislo	 2011).	 Hence,	
despite	 the	 theoretical	 advances	much	more	 work,	 especially	 empirical	 and	 experimental	
results	 supporting	 theoretical	 assumptions,	 is	 needed	 to	 fully	understand	 the	mechanisms	
leading	to	cooperation.	
	
	
Evolutionary	game	theory	
Evolutionary	game	 theory	 (Maynard	Smith	&	Price	1973;	Maynard	Smith	1982)	provides	a	
framework	 to	 study	 the	 evolution	 of	 cooperation.	 The	 theory	 looks	 at	 (behavioral)	
phenotypes	and	how	these	are	distributed	 in	a	given	population	due	to	 individuals’	 fitness	
(Nowak	2006a).	But	fitness	is	not	an	absolute	parameter,	it	depends	on	what	other	kinds	of	
phenotypes	 are	 present	 in	 the	 population,	 i.e.	 fitness	 is	 frequency	 dependent.	 To	 study	
cooperation,	 a	 population	 of	 individuals	 with	 different	 (and	 usually	 fixed)	 strategies	 is	
considered.	A	strategy	 is	 the	 individual’s	phenotype	or	 in	more	general	 terms	 the	strategy	
specifies	what	the	individual	will	do	in	a	given	situation	(Maynard	Smith	1982).	Within	the	
population	individuals	interact	in	evolutionary	games	with	one	another;	usually	at	random.	
Each	 interaction	 results	 in	 a	 certain	 payoff	 for	 an	 individual	with	 a	 given	 strategy	 (cf.	 the	
payoff	matrix	of	the	two	strategies	in	the	prisoner’s	dilemma	in	Box	1	of	Chapter	2,	p.	36).	An	
individual’s	payoff	does	not	only	depend	on	its	own	strategy,	but	also	on	the	strategy	of	the	
opponent.	 Payoffs	 are	 understood	 as	 the	 fitness	 of	 individuals	 and	 fitness	 is	 positively	
correlated	with	reproductive	success.	Hence,	 strategies	 that	do	well	 in	evolutionary	games	
reproduce	 faster	 and	 outcompete	 other	 strategies	 that	 do	 less	 well.	 During	 frequency‐
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dependent	selection	dynamics	of	two	strategies	the	following	outcomes	are	possible	(Nowak	
2006a):	(i)	one	strategy	dominates	the	other,	meaning	that	eventually	the	whole	population	
adopts	the	dominate	strategy;	(ii)	the	strategies	are	bistable	(here,	the	outcome	depends	on	
the	initial	conditions,	leading	either	to	an	unstable	equilibrium	or	the	convergence	to	one	or	
the	other	strategy);	(iii)	both	strategies	coexist;	and	(iv)	both	strategies	are	neutral	to	each	
other,	so	that	selection	will	not	change	the	composition	of	strategies	within	the	population.	
Another	important	concept	of	evolutionary	game	theory	is	the	evolutionary	stable	strategy.	A	
strategy	 is	 thought	 to	be	evolutionary	stable,	 if	 it	yields	 the	highest	payoff	of	all	 strategies	
within	the	population	and	a	mutant	strategy	cannot	invade	the	population.		
Evolutionary	 game	 theory	 offers	 models	 like	 the	 prisoner’s	 dilemma	 (Rapoport	 &	
Chammah	1965;	Axelrod	1984)	and	the	public	goods	game	(Hardin	1968;	Ledyard	1995)	to	
illustrate	 the	 conflict	 between	 selfish	 and	 selfless	 behavior.	 The	 prisoner’s	 dilemma	 is	 set	
aside	here,	as	concise	descriptions	will	be	provided	in	Chapters	1	and	2	(see	p.	20	and	p.	36).	
The	 classic	 public	 goods	 game	 is	 made	 up	 of	 four	 players	 (e.g.	 Fehr	 &	 Gächter	 2002;	
Milinski	2006).	Each	receives	the	same	amount	of	money	with	the	opportunity	to	contribute	
this	money	 into	a	common	public	good.	Whatever	amount	entered	 the	public	good	will	be	
doubled,	 divided	 by	 the	 total	 number	 of	 players	 and	 evenly	 paid	 to	 everyone.	 Thereby,	 it	
does	not	matter	whether	a	player	contributed	or	not.	Now,	the	group	does	best	if	all	players	
contribute	 into	 the	public	 good.	However,	 a	 rational	 player	 should	never	 contribute	 at	 all,	
because	each	money	unit	paid	into	the	public	good	yields	only	a	return	of	a	half‐unit	to	the	
contributor.	 Hence,	 a	 social	 dilemma	 arises	 between	 the	 conflict	 of	 the	 individual’s	 self‐
interest	 and	 the	 group’s	 social‐interest.	 A	 player	 cannot	 direct	 his	 or	 her	 cooperative	
(defective)	 behavior	 towards	 specific	 individuals,	 like	 in	 the	 dyadic	 interactions	 of	 the	
prisoner’s	dilemma,	but	only	 towards	the	group	as	a	whole.	Usually,	players	start	off	quite	
cooperative,	 but	 cooperation	 soon	 collapses	 to	 almost	 full	 defection	 (Milinski	 et	 al.	 2002;	
Milinski	 2006).	 Examples	 of	 public	 goods	 include	 the	 overuse	 of	 fish	 stock,	 leaving	 public	
toilets	in	a	clean	way,	the	protection	of	the	environment,	and	the	compliance	to	pay	taxes.	
The	theoretical	background	of	my	thesis	rests	on	the	assumptions	of	evolutionary	game	
theory	and	its	associated	concepts.	Evolutionary	dynamics	provide	a	useful	tool	to	study	the	
conditions	 for	 the	 emergence	 and	 maintenance	 of	 cooperation.	 Here,	 I	 am	 interested	 in	
which	 “cooperative	 strategies”	 are	 found	 in	 humans,	 and	 thereby	 predictions	 are	 derived	
from	evolutionary	models.	
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Contents	of	the	thesis	
As	outlined	at	the	beginning,	human	cooperation	stands	out	from	all	other	forms	of	animal	
cooperation.	 Therefore	 humans	 provide	 an	 extremely	 interesting	 study	 species,	 but	 up	 to	
now	 many	 aspects	 of	 human	 cooperation	 are	 not	 fully	 understood.	 Profound	 conceptual	
overviews	 on	 the	 evolution	 of	 cooperation	 are	 provided	 by	 Hammerstein	 (2003)	 and	
Kappeler	 and	 van	 Schaik	 (2006).	 In	 general,	 the	 aim	 of	 this	 thesis	 is	 to	 investigate	 the	
conditions	(and	their	 interactions)	 that	help	humans	to	solve	cooperation	problems.	Three	
topics	 will	 be	 presented.	 On	 the	 one	 hand,	 the	 impact	 of	 the	 social	 environment	 on	
cooperative	behavior	 is	addressed.	Here,	 the	questions	are	raised	how	varying	numbers	of	
social	 partners	 affect	 cooperativity	 and	 how	 the	 structure	 of	 social	 networks	 influences	
cooperative	 behavior	 of	 individuals.	 On	 the	 other	 hand,	 the	 impact	 of	 punishment	 as	 a	
process	to	stabilize	cooperative	behavior	and	how	punishment	possibly	triggers	backlashes	
is	addressed.	
Generally,	 cooperative	 behavior	 will	 be	 examined	 in	 systematic	 experimental	
investigations	 using	 the	 prisoner’s	 dilemma	 and	 the	 public	 goods	 game.	 Naturally,	
experiments	 only	provide	 a	 rather	 limited	way	 to	 investigate	 social	 behavior.	However,	 at	
the	 same	 time	 experiments	 provide	 a	 useful	 and	 necessary	 opportunity	 to	 reduce	 the	
complexity	 of	 social	 interactions	 and	 to	 place	 these	 interactions	 in	 a	 more	 controllable	
environment.	 For	 instance,	 the	 degree	 of	 anonymity	 is	 a	 relevant	 factor	 in	 social	 settings	
(Kurzban	et	al.	2007).	However,	in	order	to	avoid	contextual	effects	caused	by	anonymity,	for	
instance	 reputational	 concerns	 of	 participants	 towards	 the	 experimenters,	 one	 has	 to	
provide	full	anonymity	in	experiments.	Additionally,	measurement	errors	can	be	avoided	by	
a	 computerized	 set‐up.	 How	 these	 and	 other	 confounding	 variables	 are	 controlled	will	 be	
described	 in	 more	 detail	 in	 the	 method	 sections	 of	 Chapters	 1	 to	 3.	 Needless	 to	 say	
laboratory	results	need	to	be	treated	carefully	and	need	not	to	be	overgeneralized.	
	
In	Chapter	1,	 I	will	 investigate	how	 the	number	of	 social	 counterparts	affects	 cooperative	
behavior.	 Our	 everyday	 lives	 are	made	 up	 of	 a	 countless	 number	 of	 social	 encounters,	 in	
which	we	interact	with	a	variety	of	partners.	For	example,	a	campaigning	mayor	of	a	 town	
interacts	with	nearly	all	inhabitants,	whereas	others	may	have	only	limited	interactions	(e.g.	
those	with	their	closest	neighbors).	The	fact	that	their	number	of	partners	varies	greatly	has	
been	widely	ignored	in	evolutionary	games.	
In	 this	 first	 experimental	 investigation,	 each	 participant	 will	 be	 involved	 in	 dyadic	
interactions	and	play	iterated	prisoner’s	dilemma.	Half	of	the	participants	will	play	a	single	
iterated	 prisoner’s	 dilemma,	 thus	 they	 have	 one	 partner.	 As	 a	 new	 feature,	 the	 other	
participants	will	 interact	 in	three	iterated	prisoner’s	dilemma	at	a	time;	meaning	that	each	
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participant	will	have	three	partners.	However,	the	three	games	are	not	linked	to	each	other	
and	different	decisions	can	be	made	for	each	partner.	Traditional	evolutionary	game	theory	
assumes	 independence	 of	 games,	 i.e.	 one	 game	 is	 played	 after	 the	 other	 and	 payoffs	 are	
added	up	(Maynard	Smith	1982;	Nowak	2006a).	Thus,	no	difference	is	expected	between	the	
two	 social	 settings.	 Nevertheless,	 individuals	 are	 constantly	 involved	 in	 several	
relationships,	 which	 take	 place	 at	 the	 same	 time.	 Thus,	 in	 principle	 experiences	 can	 be	
carried	 over	 from	 one	 relationship	 to	 another.	 So	 far	 there	 is	 hardly	 any	 experimental	
evidence	 of	 how	 humans	 behave	 when	 they	 interact	 with	 several	 partners	 in	 numerous	
cooperative	dilemmas	(for	an	exception	based	on	groups,	see	Falk	et	al.	2010).		
Here,	 I	will	 examine	whether	 the	assumption	of	 independent	games	holds	and	whether	
participants	behave	similar	to	multiple	partners.	Overall,	 I	expect	reciprocal	cooperation	in	
the	iterated	prisoner’s	dilemma	of	both	settings,	as	the	exact	endpoints	of	relationships	are	
unknown	 to	 participants.	 Thus,	 direct	 reciprocity	 is	 expected	 to	 operate	 (Trivers	 1971;	
Axelrod	&	Hamilton	1981).	This	puts	 individuals	 in	a	position	to	use	conditional	strategies	
like	 tit‐for‐tat	 (Axelrod	1984)	 or	win‐stay	 lose‐shift	 (Nowak	&	 Sigmund	1993).	Hence,	 the	
nature	of	strategic	behavior	will	be	investigated.	
	
Chapter	2	focuses	on	the	impact	of	social	structure	on	cooperativity,	as	social	networks	are	
an	essential	feature	of	human	societies	(Kossinets	&	Watts	2006).	Most	theoretical	analyses	
focus	on	investigating	cooperative	behavior	in	well‐mixed	populations,	i.e.	each	individual	is	
equally	 likely	 to	 interact	 with	 everybody	 else	 in	 the	 population.	 However,	 due	 to	 spatial	
conditions	 this	 assumption	 does	 not	 always	 hold	 and	 individuals	 primarily	 interact	 with	
neighbors	 close	 in	 proximity.	 Recently	 research	 has	 started	 to	 focus	 on	 structured	
populations.	It	has	been	demonstrated	that	certain	structures	of	static	networks	can	support	
the	evolution	of	cooperation	(Nowak	&	May	1992;	Lieberman	et	al.	2005;	Ohtsuki	et	al.	2006;	
but	see	Hauert	&	Doebeli	2004);	for	instance,	cooperation	prevails	in	spatial	lattices,	circles	
and	scale‐free	networks.	By	assorting	(i.e.	clusters	of	neighboring	individuals	performing	the	
same	behavioral	 strategy)	 cooperators	 can	 avoid	 interactions	with	 defectors,	 reducing	 the	
chance	of	being	exploited	(Nowak	&	May	1992;	Brauchli	et	al.	1999;	Ifti	et	al.	2004;	see	also	
Fletcher	 &	 Doebeli	 2009).	 However,	 social	 relationships	 are	 flexible	 generating	 dynamic	
networks.	 Here,	 not	 only	 behavior	 evolves	 but	 also	 the	 network	 structure	 is	 under	
evolutionary	pressure.	This	co‐evolutionary	process	favors	the	evolution	of	cooperation	(for	
reviews,	 see	Gross	&	Blasius	2008;	Perc	&	Szolnoki	2010).	Despite	 theoretical	advances	 in	
the	 last	 two	 decades,	 experimental	 evidence	 is	 scare	 or	 completely	 absent	 in	 the	 case	 of	
dynamic	networks.		
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Here,	 I	 will	 investigate	 cooperative	 behavior	 in	 static	 and	 dynamic	 social	 networks.	
Participants	will	 play	 iterated	 prisoner’s	 dilemma	with	 an	 unknown	 endpoint.	 In	 dynamic	
networks	participants	have	the	possibility	to	influence	their	social	relationships	based	on	an	
active‐link‐breaking	 mechanism	 (Pacheco	 et	 al.	 2006a,	 2006b,	 2008).	 Thus,	 in	 dynamic	
networks	an	interaction	can	arise	between	behavior	and	the	network	structure,	whereas	in	
static	 networks	 cooperation	 can	 only	 be	 influenced	 by	 direct	 reciprocity	 within	 the	
prisoner’s	 dilemma.	 As	 theory	 predicts,	 I	 expect	 higher	 levels	 of	 cooperation	 in	 dynamic	
networks	 (Perc	 &	 Szolnoki	 2010).	 Additionally,	 as	 assortment	 of	 individuals	 and	 also	
clustering	 have	 been	 suggested	 to	 be	 important	 factors	 to	 favor	 cooperation,	 topological	
changes	in	the	dynamic	networks	will	be	investigated.		
	
In	 Chapter	 3,	 the	 impact	 of	 punishment	 as	 a	 process	 to	 stabilize	 cooperation	 will	 be	
assessed.	Punishment	is	a	widely	spread	behavior	among	humans	and	animals	(for	reviews,	
see	 Clutton‐Brock	&	 Parker	 1995;	 Sigmund	 2007;	 Jensen	 2010)	 and	 it	 is	 very	 effective	 in	
promoting	cooperation	in	humans	(e.g.	Ostrom	et	al.	1992;	Fehr	&	Gächter	2002;	Gächter	et	
al.	2008;	but	see	Wu	et	al.	2009).	However,	punishment	 is	not	only	costly	 for	the	recipient	
but	 also	 for	 the	 actor	 (though	 costs	 to	 assign	 punishment	 are	 somewhat	 lower	 than	 the	
actual	 punishment	 fine).	 Now,	 the	 following	 problem	 arises:	 as	 punishment	 is	 costly	
individuals	should	avoid	 to	punish	(Dreber	et	al.	2008)	and	 thus	punishment	constitutes	a	
second‐order	 dilemma	 (Boyd	 &	 Richerson	 1992).	 The	 consequence	 is	 that	 punishment	
cannot	 be	 evolutionary	 stable	without	 additional	mechanisms	 (e.g.	 Henrich	&	 Boyd	 2001;	
Brandt	et	al.	2003;	Hauert	et	al.	2007).		
Previous	research	in	the	area	of	costly	punishment	has	mainly	concentrated	on	situations	
where	punishment	cannot	be	retaliated.	However,	under	most	natural	conditions	this	is	not	
true;	usually	punishment	can	be	avenged	by	victims.	Thus,	 the	possibility	 that	punishment	
can	escalate	into	vendettas	where	“I	punish	you,	because	you	punished	me;	but	you	already	
punished	 me,	 because	 I	 punished	 you	 before”	 and	 so	 on	 becomes	 relevant.	 Theoretical	
research	 shows	 that	 vendettas	 of	 punishment	 are	 not	 an	 evolutionary	 stable	 behavior	
(Janssen	&	Bushman	2008;	Rand	et	al.	2009b;	Wolff	2009).	
In	this	study,	I	will	allow	for	vendettas	by	combining	the	public	goods	game	with	multiple	
rounds	 of	 costly	 punishment.	 Studies	 of	 punishment	 –	 where	 vendettas	 are	 impossible	 –	
show	that	people	do	indeed	engage	in	costly	punishment,	which	then	stabilizes	public	goods	
contributions	(e.g.	Fehr	&	Gächter	2002).	Therefore,	albeit	the	high	costs	of	punishment	and	
the	 threat	 of	 being	 counter‐punished,	 I	 expect	 participants	 to	 engage	 in	 punishment.	
Additionally,	 I	 also	anticipate	 the	occurrence	of	vendettas	as	 they	are	observed	 in	 the	 real	
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world	 (Ericksen	 &	 Horton	 1992;	 İçli	 1994;	 Gould	 2000).	 Subsequently,	 it	 will	 be	 highly	
interesting	to	see	how	cooperative	behavior	in	the	public	goods	game	will	be	affected.	
	
	
Overall,	the	aim	of	this	thesis	is	to	evaluate	conditions	which	affect	cooperative	behavior	in	
dyadic	and	group	interactions.	By	doing	so,	this	thesis	will	contribute	a	piece	of	knowledge	
which	 eventually	 helps	 to	 achieve	 a	 better	 understanding	 of	 the	 evolution	 of	 (human)	
cooperation.	
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Abstract	
Humans	are	an	extraordinarily	social	 species.	Throughout	our	day‐to‐day	 lives	we	 interact	
with	 a	 variety	 of	 counterparts;	 some	 interact	 with	 many,	 others	 only	 with	 a	 few.	 In	 an	
experiment	with	human	participants,	we	investigate	how	the	number	of	interaction	partners	
impacts	 cooperative	 behavior	 in	 the	 iterated	 prisoner’s	 dilemma	 (IPD)	 with	 an	 unknown	
ending.	Half	of	 the	participants	played	a	single	IPD,	which	 is	 the	common	set‐up.	As	a	new	
feature,	 the	 other	 participants	 interacted	 in	 three	 IPDs	 at	 a	 time.	 Traditional	 evolutionary	
game	theory	assumes	independence	of	games	and	thus	no	difference	would	be	expected	in	
the	two	social	settings.	Contrary	to	this	assumption,	we	find	that	overall	cooperation	is	lower	
in	the	multiple‐games	setting.	In	fact,	these	participants	could	only	establish	one	cooperative	
relationship	 similar	 to	 the	 relationship	 of	 the	 single‐game	 setting,	 where	 cooperativity	
increased	over	time.	Moreover,	in	one	of	the	two	remaining	relationships	cooperation	could	
not	gain	a	 foothold,	although	cooperative	behavior	 is	expected	when	direct	reciprocity	can	
operate.	 In	addition,	 contradictory	 to	previous	 findings	participants	did	not	 rely	on	a	win‐
stay	lose‐shift	strategy;	they	used	reactive	strategies	that	close	to	generous	tit‐for‐tat.		
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Introduction	
Many	 daily	 activities,	 in	 which	 humans	 engage	 in,	 are	 profoundly	 social	 and	 throughout	
these	 humans	 encounter	 a	 variety	 of	 counterparts.	 However,	 within	 these	 relationships	
cooperative	behavior	constitutes	an	evolutionary	puzzle	(see	Box	1).	Despite	this	challenge,	
nature	abounds	with	many	examples	of	cooperativity	among	humans	as	well	as	animals	(for	
recent	reviews,	see	e.g.	Hammerstein	2003;	Pennisi	2009;	Melis	&	Semmann	2010).	Here,	we	
are	interested	in	how	the	number	of	social	partners	impacts	cooperative	behavior.	In	doing	
so,	we	use	the	framework	of	evolutionary	game	theory	and	the	iterated	prisoner’s	dilemma	
with	an	unknown	endpoint.		
Evolutionary	 game	 theory	 has	 concentrated	 on	 interactions	 where	 games	 are	
independent,	 or	 where	 one	 game	 is	 played	 after	 the	 other	 and	 payoffs	 are	 added	 up	
(Maynard	 Smith	 1982;	 Nowak	 2006a).	 Nevertheless,	 it	 is	 plausible	 to	 assume	 that	
individuals	 are	 constantly	 involved	 in	 more	 than	 one	 relationship.	 Thus,	 in	 principle	
experiences	 can	 be	 carried	 over	 from	 one	 relationship	 to	 another.	 This	 scenario	 is	 for	
instance	 important	 in	 structured	 populations,	 which	 have	 become	 a	 favorite	 topic	 for	
studying	the	evolution	of	cooperation	(e.g.	Nowak	&	May	1992;	Brauchli	et	al.	1999;	Hauert	
&	 Doebeli	 2004;	 Szabó	 &	 Fáth	 2007;	 Lion	 et	 al.	 2011).	 In	 many	 biological	 and	 social	
structured	 systems	 the	 interactions	 between	 individuals	 can	 be	 characterized	 as	
heterogeneous,	 scale‐free	 networks	 (Amaral	 et	 al.	 2000;	 Dorogotsev	 &	 Mendes	 2003).	
Furthermore,	recent	studies	show	that	within	heterogeneous	networks	cooperation	evolves	
(Santos	&	Pacheco	2005;	Santos	et	al.	2006b;	Fu	et	al.	2007;	Assenza	et	al.	2008;	Szolnoki	et	
al.	 2008;	 but	 see	 Konno	 2011).	 The	 essential	 characteristic	 within	 these	 networks	 is	 that	
some	 individuals	 have	 many	 more	 contacts	 than	 others.	 Consequently,	 the	 number	 of	
interactions	or	social	dilemmas	per	individual	varies	greatly.	
Theory	 provides	 only	 limited	 predictions	 for	 the	 effect	 of	 varying	 partner	 numbers	 on	
human	 cooperation.	 Within	 structured	 populations	 theory	 predicts	 that	 the	 number	 of	
interactions	 (this	 equals	 the	 number	 of	 social	 partners)	 is	 a	 central	 feature	 for	 natural	
selection	to	 favor	cooperation.	In	a	number	of	network	structures	the	general	rule	that	the	
cooperative‐benefits‐to‐costs	ratio	should	be	larger	than	the	average	number	of	partners	has	
been	identified	(Ohtsuki	et	al.	2006;	Ohtsuki	&	Nowak	2007).	Hence,	the	fewer	partners	one	
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has	 the	 easier	 cooperation	 can	 evolve	 (Ifti	 et	al.	 2004).	However,	 this	 view	has	 now	been	
challenged	(Szolnoki	et	al.	2008;	Chen	et	al.	2011;	Konno	2011;	Yamauchi	et	al.	2011)	and	
more	 research	 along	 these	 lines	 is	 needed.	 In	 general,	 a	 common	 assumption	 is	 that	
individuals	 play	 pairwise	 games,	 but	 can	 only	 adopt	 one	 strategy	 to	 all	 their	 partners,	 i.e.	
they	 behave	 unconditionally.	 This,	 however,	 intensifies	 the	 problem	 of	 the	 prisoner’s	
dilemma	and	rather	constitutes	a	public‐goods	situation.	This	differs	from	our	experimental	
setting	 (see	 Methods)	 where	 individuals	 play	 pairwise	 games,	 but	 can	 still	 choose	
independently	for	different	partners	–	they	can	use	conditional	strategies.	Therefore,	it	is	not	
clear	how	these	theoretical	predictions	relate	to	our	setting,	and	we	rely	on	the	traditional	
assumption	of	evolutionary	game	theory	that	games	are	independent.	
So	 far	 there	 is	 hardly	 any	 experimental	 evidence	 of	 how	 humans	 behave	 when	 they	
interact	with	several	partners	 in	numerous	cooperative	dilemmas.	However,	 this	 is	central	
for	understanding	how	diverse	social	settings	influence	the	evolution	of	cooperation.	There	
has	been	an	 increasing	awareness	of	 this	 issue	(Hauk	2003;	Ahn	et	al.	2009);	nonetheless,	
Falk	 and	 colleagues	 (2010)	 seem	 to	 provide	 the	 only	 experimental	 comparison	 of	
cooperation	in	an	one‐game	setting	with	a	multiple‐games	setting	(i.e.	individuals	participate	
in	 two,	 simultaneous	public	 goods	 games;	 a	 group	 game,	whereas	we	 investigate	 a	 dyadic	
game).	They	find	no	difference	between	the	settings	and	in	both	public‐goods	contributions	
follow	 the	 usual	 pattern.	 Additionally,	 the	 two	 simultaneous	 games	 do	 not	 influence	 each	
other.	There	are	also	studies	investigating	how	different	kinds	of	games	influence	each	other,	
which	show	effects	of	behavioral	spillover	from	one	type	of	game	to	the	other	(in	alternating	
games:	 Milinski	 et	 al.	 2002;	 Barclay	 2004;	 Semmann	 et	 al.	 2004;	 in	 simultaneous	 games:	
Bednar	et	al.	2010;	Cason	et	al.	2010;	Savikhin	&	Sheremeta	2010).	
In	this	experimental	study,	we	examine	whether	human	participants	are	affected	in	their	
cooperativity	 when	 placed	 in	 a	 setting	 of	 a	 single	 iterated	 prisoner’s	 dilemma	 (IPD;	 see	
Box	1)	in	comparison	to	a	setting	of	three,	simultaneously	played	IPDs.	In	both	settings	the	
precise	 number	 of	 rounds	 is	 unknown	 to	 participants.	 Games	 are	 understood	 as	
independent,	 we	 therefore	 expect	 no	 difference	 in	 cooperative	 behavior	 within	 the	 two	
settings.	 Derived	 from	 this	 assumption,	 participants	 in	 the	 multiple‐games	 setting	 should	
also	treat	all	three	partners	alike.	In	addition,	our	set‐up	allows	us	to	further	fill	the	gap	on	
long‐term	 interactions	 with	 an	 uncertain	 ending	 (cf.	 Box	 1).	 In	 accordance	 with	 previous	
theoretical	 and	 experimental	 literature	 (Trivers	 1971;	 Axelrod	 &	 Hamilton	 1981;	 Dal	 Bó	
2005;	 Duffy	 &	 Ochs	 2009),	 we	 expect	 a	 cooperative	 outcome	 in	 both	 settings	 as	 direct	
reciprocity	 can	 operate.	 In	 line	 with	 previous	 findings	 (Wedekind	 &	 Milinski	 1996),	 we	
conjecture	that	participants	use	strategies	similar	to	win‐stay	lose‐shift	(this	is	true	for	both	
settings,	 as	 we	 overcome	 constraints	 associated	with	working‐memory	 load,	 cf.	Methods).	
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Apart	 from	this,	 it	 is	still	unclear	how	specific	relationships	develop	over	time,	as	previous	
research	has	provided	evidence	that	within	a	relationship	cooperation	can	increase	(Dal	Bó	
2005)	 as	well	 as	decrease	 (Duffy	&	Ochs	2009,	 though	 cooperation	 increases	over	 several	
relationships	 played	 one	 after	 the	 other).	 In	 brief,	 (i)	 we	 address	 the	 impact	 of	 different	
numbers	of	social	partners	 in	IPDs,	(ii)	ask	whether	multiple	 interactions	are	independent,	
and	(iii)	examine	the	reciprocal	nature	of	the	game’s	outcome.		
	
	
Box	1		The	evolution	of	cooperation	and	the	prisoner’s	dilemma	
The	 abundance	 of	 human	 cooperation	 is	 an	 evolutionary	 puzzle	 when	 defectors	 benefit	
from	cooperative	interactions	without	bearing	the	associated	costs,	because	under	natural	
selection	and	without	any	other	mechanisms	one	expects	the	emergence	and	persistence	of	
defective	 behavior.	 The	 evolution	 of	 cooperation	 can	 be	 studied	 by	 the	 mathematical	
approach	of	evolutionary	game	theory	(Maynard	Smith	1982)	and	the	prisoner’s	dilemma	
(PD;	 Rapoport	 &	 Chammah	 1965;	 Axelrod	 1984).	 In	 the	 PD	 two	 individuals	 decide	
simultaneously	whether	to	cooperate	or	to	defect.	If	both	cooperate,	they	each	receive	the	
reward	payoff	(R).	If	one	defects	and	the	other	cooperates,	the	defector	gets	the	temptation	
payoff	(T)	and	the	cooperator	obtains	the	sucker’s	payoff	(S).	However,	if	both	defect,	they	
each	 receive	 the	 punishment	 payoff	 (P).	 The	 assumption	 T	>	R	>	 P	 >	 S	 must	 hold.	 If	 the	
individuals	cooperate,	both	do	better	than	if	they	both	would	have	defected.	But	for	a	single	
individual	it	 is	always	better	to	defect	no	matter	what	the	partner	does.	Thus,	defection	is	
the	evolutionary	stable	strategy	in	one‐shot	interactions.		
If	 the	PD	 is	 played	 repeatedly,	 the	 assumption	 2R	>	T	+	 S	must	 hold,	 because	 then	 the	
payoff	 of	 two	 individuals	 is	 higher	 when	 both	 cooperate	 than	 if	 they	 would	 alternately	
choose	 cooperation	 and	 defection.	 Next,	 the	 distinction	 of	 finitely	 or	 infinitely	 repeated	
games	 becomes	 important.	 If	 the	 individuals	 are	 aware	 of	 the	 PD’s	 ending,	 there	 is	 no	
incentive	 to	 cooperate	 in	 the	 last	 round	as	 the	partner	has	no	opportunity	 to	 reciprocate	
this	 defection,	 and	 no	 future	 gains	 will	 be	 lost	 if	 both	 would	 then	 drive	 into	 mutual	
defection.	However,	anticipating	that	one’s	counterpart	has	the	same	understanding	and	by	
using	 backwards	 induction	 it	 is	 then	 best	 to	 defect	 in	 the	 second	 last	 round	 as	 both	
individuals	 assume	 defection	 in	 the	 very	 last	 round.	 Following	 this	 line	 of	 thought,	 the	
individuals	should	end	up	in	mutual	defection	in	all	rounds.	A	large	amount	of	experimental	
research	partially	supports	this	assumption,	as	players	start	off	cooperating	but	turn	to	the	
predicted	 mutual	 defection	 towards	 the	 end	 of	 the	 game	 (e.g.	 Selten	 &	 Stoecker	 1986;	
Andreoni	&	Miller	1993;	Cooper	&	Ross	1996).		
On	the	contrary,	 in	 infinitely	 iterated	PD	reciprocal	cooperation	can	be	an	evolutionary	
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stable	strategy	when	 the	probability	 for	a	 continuous	 interaction	 is	 large	enough	(Trivers	
1971;	Axelrod	&	Hamilton	1981).	Among	strategies	frequently	discussed	in	the	theoretical	
literature	are	tit‐for‐tat	(Axelrod	1984),	generous	tit‐for‐tat	(Nowak	&	Sigmund	1992),	and	
win‐stay	lose‐shift	(Nowak	&	Sigmund	1993).	Humans	primarily	use	win‐stay	lose‐shift	like	
strategies	(Wedekind	&	Milinski	1996;	Milinski	&	Wedekind	1998).	However,	 they	turn	to	
the	simpler	generous	tit‐for‐tat	like	strategies	when	the	game	is	interfered	by	a	second	task	
(Milinski	&	Wedekind	1998).	Experimental	evidence	on	iterated	PD	with	unknown	endings	
(this	resembles	 the	 infinite	character	of	 the	game),	where	humans	continuously	play	with	
the	 same	 partner,	 and	 not	 against	 pseudo‐partners	 or	 computers	 with	 pre‐programmed	
strategies,	 and	 where	 real	 and	 adequate	 amounts	 of	 money	 are	 at	 stake,	 is	 scarce.	
Nonetheless,	 studies	 confirm	 the	 predicted	 cooperative	 outcome	 (Dal	 Bó	 2005;	 Aoyagi	 &	
Fréchette	2009;	Duffy	&	Ochs	2009;	Fehl	et	al.	2011),	except	when	additional	competitive	
incentives	 are	 provided	 (West	et	al.	 2006).	 Infinite	 relationships	 presumably	 constitute	 a	
more	 realistic	 setting	 of	 human	 and	 animal	 interactions,	 because	 individuals	 rarely	 can	
foresee	the	precise	endpoint	of	a	relationship.	
	
	
	
Method	
We	 recruited	 a	 total	 of	 200	 students	 from	 the	 University	 of	 Göttingen	 via	 the	 online	
recruitment	 system	 ORSEE	 (Greiner	 2004)	 in	 fall	 2009	 and	 2010.	 The	 students	 (49%	
females)	came	from	various	disciplines	and	were	on	average	23.36	±	2.79	(mean	±	SD)	years	
old.	 Upon	 arrival	 participants	 were	 randomly	 seated	 in	 front	 of	 touch‐screen	 computers;	
they	were	 visually	 separated	 by	 partitions,	 and	 received	written	 instructions.	 Participants	
interacted	 by	 means	 of	 a	 computer	 software;	 no	 other	 form	 of	 communication	 was	
permitted.	 Through	 assignment	 of	 aliases,	 i.e.	 names	 of	 moons	 of	 our	 solar	 system	 (e.g.	
Kallisto,	Leda,	Metis),	participants	were	ensured	that	their	decisions	were	made	completely	
anonymously	 towards	other	participants	and	 the	experimenters.	Aliases	were	also	used	 to	
carry	out	anonymous	payment	(as	described	in	Semmann	et	al.	2005;	participants	knew	this	
procedure	from	written	instructions	before	playing).		
We	 ran	 two	 treatments	 and	 each	 consisted	 of	 10	 sessions	with	 10	participants	 in	 each	
session.	 The	 first	 treatment	 consisted	 of	 the	 standard	 IPD	 with	 one	 partner.	 Pairs	 of	
participants	 were	 randomly	 assigned	 at	 the	 beginning	 of	 the	 experiment.	 The	 game	 was	
played	for	30	rounds,	which	was	unknown	to	participants.	For	each	round	participants	were	
asked	to	choose	between	two	options	(called	orange‐	or	blue‐option).	In	half	of	the	sessions	
orange	mimicked	cooperation	and	blue	defection,	in	the	other	half	the	reversed	pattern	was	
used;	hence,	prefixed	moral	pressure	to	choose	“cooperation”	due	to	wording	was	excluded.	
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There	was	no	impact	of	color	coding	on	cooperativity	(both	treatments,	Mann‐Whitney	test:	
U	 =	 35,	 n1,2	 =	 10,	 p	 =	 0.28).	 A	 list	 of	 the	 possible	 outcomes	with	 respective	 partners	was	
presented	to	the	participants	all	along	the	experiment.	The	respective	payoffs	were	0.40€	for	
the	temptation,	0.25€	for	the	reward,	0.00€	for	the	punishment	and	‐0.10€	for	the	sucker’s	
payoff	 (cf.	 Box	 1).	 After	 each	 interaction	 participants	were	 shown	 their	 own	 decision	 and	
their	 partner’s	 decision	 as	 well	 as	 the	 corresponding	 payoffs.	 Overall,	 while	 making	 30	
decisions	participants	attended	the	lab	for	about	60	minutes	and	were	given	a	5.00€‐starting	
amount.		
In	the	second	treatment	participants	played	the	same	IPD,	but	instead	of	having	only	one	
partner	they	had	three;	randomly	assigned	at	the	beginning	of	the	experiment.	Given	that	10	
participants	 attended	 one	 session	 the	 connections	 between	 them	 can	 be	 visualized	 as	 a	
structured	 population	 (see	 Fig.	 S1,	 in	 Electronic	 Supplementary	Material	 [ESM]).	 For	 each	
round,	participants	had	to	decide	for	each	partner	independently	whether	to	play	orange	or	
blue.	The	information	of	each	interaction	(i.e.	partner’s	decision	and	the	respective	payoffs	of	
a	pair)	was	displayed	on	the	same	screen.	Though	the	three	IPDs	were	played	at	a	time,	they	
were	completely	 independent	of	each	other,	 i.e.	a	decision	 in	one	game	did	not	change	the	
payoffs	 in	 another.	 Participants	 had	 to	 make	 90	 decisions	 and	 they	 attended	 the	 lab	 for	
approximately	 90	 minutes.	 They	 received	 a	 starting	 amount	 of	 3.00€	 (different	 starting	
amounts	were	chosen	to	achieve	similar	earnings	over	time,	see	ESM	for	further	details).		
Furthermore,	working‐memory	loads	can	affect	the	behavior	in	IPD	(Milinski	&	Wedekind	
1998;	 see	 also	 ESM).	 We	 reduced	 the	 influences	 of	 memory	 effects	 to	 a	 minimum	 when	
playing	in	a	single‐game	versus	a	multiple‐games	setting.	In	both	treatments,	we	set	no	time	
limit	for	the	decisions	to	be	made	and	the	feedback	information	of	the	IPD	outcomes	could	be	
viewed	at	individually	preferred	durations.	In	addition,	all	participants	were	provided	with	a	
blank	piece	of	paper	in	order	to	make	notes,	if	they	wished	to	do	so.	To	maintain	anonymity	
all	papers	were	destroyed	at	the	end	of	the	experiment,	and	neither	other	participants	nor	
the	experimenters	could	access	these	notes.		
For	statistical	analyses	SPSS	18.0.3	and	R	2.12.1	were	used.	Probabilities	are	reported	as	
two	 tailed	and	a	5%‐level	of	 significance	 is	used.	Furthermore,	 analyses	were	done	on	 the	
group	level	to	account	for	session	effects	(especially	in	the	multiple‐games	treatment).		
	
	
Results	
In	the	treatment	of	a	single	IPD	we	observed	an	average	cooperation	level	of	71.70%	±	7.73;	
whereas	the	average	cooperation	level	in	the	treatment	of	multiple	IPDs	was	54.91%	±	6.16.	
The	 difference	 in	 cooperation	 levels	 was	 significant	 (Mann‐Whitney	 test:	 U	=	4,	 n1,2	=	 10,	
Chapter	I					Interacting	in	Multiple	Prisoner’s	Dilemma 23
	
p	<	0.001).	To	assess	the	overall	difference	between	the	treatments,	we	further	examined	the	
behavior	 within	 the	 dyads	 of	 the	 multiple‐games	 treatment.	 We	 assigned	 participants	 a	
“cooperation	score”	 for	each	partner	by	giving	them	one	point	 for	every	cooperative	move	
towards	 a	 partner	 (theoretically	 taking	 values	 from	 0	 to	 30).	 We	 found	 that	 only	 3%	 of	
participants	had	equal	 cooperation	 scores	 in	 all	 relationships,	 i.e.	 they	 treated	all	partners	
alike.	 Eighteen	 per	 cent	 of	 participants	 had	 two	 similar	 cooperation	 scores.	 The	 great	
majority	 (79%)	of	participants,	however,	had	 three	different	 cooperation	 scores.	Based	on	
this	observation,	we	extracted	the	most‐,	middle‐,	and	least‐cooperative	relationship	of	each	
participant	(see	Fig.	1).	The	average	cooperation	level	of	the	most‐cooperative	relationship	
(71.27%	±	6.37)	did	not	differ	from	the	single‐game	treatment	(Mann‐Whitney	test:	U	=	48,	
n1,2	=	10,	 p	=	0.91).	 However,	 the	 other	 two	 relationships	 showed	 a	 significantly	 lower	
average	 cooperation	 level	 compared	 to	 the	 single‐game	 treatment	 (middle‐cooperative	
relationship:	 56.90%	±	7.13,	 U	=	6,	 n1,2	=	 10,	 p	<	0.001;	 least‐cooperative	 relationship:	
36.57%	±	7.16,	 U	=	0,	 n1,2	=	 10,	 p	<	0.001).	 In	 addition,	 a	 numerical	 analysis	 shows	 that	
different	cooperative	stationary	states	are	obtained	(see	Fig.	S3,	ESM).	
In	the	treatment	of	a	single	IPD,	and	in	the	most‐	and	middle‐cooperative	relationships	of	
the	 multiple‐games	 treatment	 we	 observed	 an	 increase	 in	 cooperativity	 over	 time	 when	
comparing	the	cooperation	levels	of	round	1	and	round	30	(see	Fig.	1;	Wilcoxon	signed‐rank	
test;	 single‐game	 IPD:	 Z	=	2.69,	 n	=	10,	 p	<	0.01;	 most‐cooperative	 relationship:	 Z	=	2.46,	
n	=	10,	 p	<	0.05;	 middle‐cooperative	 relationship:	 Z	=	2.53,	 n	=	10,	 p	<	0.01).	 Remarkably,	
there	was	no	difference	between	cooperation	 levels	 in	 round	1	and	 round	30	of	 the	 least‐
cooperative	relationship	of	the	multiple‐games	treatment	(Z	=	0.60,	n	=	10,	p	=	0.59).	
	
	
	
Figure	1	Cooperation	levels	of	 iterated	prisoner’s	dilemma	(IPD)	for	30	rounds	(the	endpoint	was	unknown	to	
participants).	 Participants	 either	 played	 a	 single	 game	 (1‐IPD;	 average	 SD	 =	 7.73)	 or	 they	 played	 with	 three	
partners	simultaneously,	though	independently	(3‐IPDs).	These	three	games	are	ranked	from	the	most‐,	middle‐,	
to	least‐cooperative	relationship	(average	SD	=	6.37,	7.13,	7.16,	respectively).	
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Theory	assumes	that	cooperation	is	reached	via	reciprocating	the	behavior	of	the	partner.	
The	relative	frequencies	of	cooperative	behavior	following	the	four	possible	outcomes	of	the	
previous	round	reveal	 the	behavioral	strategies	of	participants	(see	Fig.	2;	see	also	Fig.	S2,	
ESM).	The	cooperative	 choices	did	not	 significantly	differ	between	 treatments	 for	all	 cases	
except	 for	 mutual	 defection	 (Mann‐Whitney	 test;	 mutual	 cooperation:	 U	=	41,	 n1,2	 =	 10,	
p	=	0.53;	 the	participant	was	exploited:	U	=	42,	n1,2	=	10,	p	=	0.58;	 the	participant	exploited	
his	or	her	partner:	U	=	40,	n1,2	=	10,	p	=	0.48).	After	mutual	defection	marginal	significantly	
more	 participants	 defected	 in	 the	 multiple‐games	 treatment	 (U	 =	 28,	 n1,2	 =	 10,	 p	=	0.10).	
Furthermore,	to	cooperate	after	mutual	cooperation	and	to	once	in	a	while	cooperate	after	
defection	by	the	partner	fits	a	reactive	strategy	of	generous	tit‐for‐tat.	After	the	exploitation	
of	a	partner	the	cooperative	response	 is	well	below	the	expected	1	 for	generous	tit‐for‐tat,	
but	nevertheless	the	majority	cooperated	(see	Fig.	2).	Thus,	in	both	treatments	these	relative	
frequencies	 resemble	 reactive	 strategies	 close	 to	 generous	 tit‐for‐tat	 rather	 than	 the	
expected	win‐stay	lose‐shift.	
	
	
	
Figure	2	Relative	 frequency	 (pooled	over	all	 rounds)	of	 cooperative	behavior	 (+	SD)	after	mutual	 cooperation	
(CC),	when	the	participant	cooperated	and	the	partner	defected	(CD),	when	the	participant	exploited	his	or	her	
partner	(DC),	or	after	mutual	defection	(DD).	Participants	either	played	one	iterated	prisoner’s	dilemma	(1‐IPD;	
average	 occurrence	 of	 outcomes	 per	 round	 at	 an	 individual	 level	 [games	 =	 100]:	 CC	 =	 58,	 CD	 =	 13,	 DC	 =	 13,	
DD	=	16)	or	three	independent	games	at	a	time	(3‐IPDs;	average	n	per	round	[games	=	300]:	CC	=	116,	CD	=	47,	
DC	=	47,	DD	=	90).	
	
	
	
Discussion	
We	used	the	iterated	prisoner’s	dilemma	with	an	unknown	ending	in	an	experimental	setting	
with	human	participants	 to	 study	 the	 emergence	of	 cooperation.	 For	 the	 first	 time,	 to	 our	
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knowledge,	we	 compare	 the	 traditional	 IPD	with	one	partner	 to	 a	 setting	of	multiple	 IPDs	
played	with	different	partners	at	a	 time.	 In	general,	 independent	decisions	had	to	be	made	
and	 identical	 payoffs	 were	 used	 in	 each	 dyadic	 relationship.	 Hence,	 we	 can	 examine	 the	
impact	of	the	number	of	social	partners	on	cooperation.	We	show	that	having	more	partners	
leads	 to	 a	 significantly	 lower	 average	 cooperation	 level.	 Additionally,	 participants	 in	 the	
multiple‐games	 treatment	 tended	 to	 cooperate	 less	 often	 after	 mutual	 defection	 than	
participants	who	only	played	a	single	IPD.	Further	analysis	of	the	three	relationships	in	the	
multiple‐games	 setting	 showed	 that	participants	were,	 nevertheless,	 able	 to	 establish	high	
levels	of	 cooperation	 in	one	 dyadic	 interaction	 (i.e.	 there	was	no	difference	 in	 the	average	
cooperation	 level	 compared	 to	 the	 single‐game	 cooperation	 level	 and	 cooperativity	
increased	over	time);	whereas	the	two	remaining	relationships	exhibited	lower	on	average	
cooperation	 levels.	 Especially	 in	 the	 least‐cooperative	 relationships	 participants	 were	 not	
able	 to	 raise	 cooperativity	over	 time.	Here,	 cooperation	 levels	 remained	as	 low	as	30%	 to	
40%.	 Considering	 these	 observations	 in	 the	 multiple‐games	 treatment	 and	 results	 of	 the	
numerical	 analysis	 of	 behavior	 in	 the	 experiment,	we	 cannot	 support	 recent	 experimental	
findings	on	groups	 (Falk	et	al.	 2010)	and	 the	 traditional	 assumption	of	 evolutionary	game	
theory	of	game	independence.		
Several	mechanisms	could	be	responsible	for	the	differences	between	the	three	types	of	
relationships	 in	 the	 multiple‐games	 treatment.	 First,	 cooperative	 individuals	 face	 an	
increased	risk	of	exploitation	and	uncertainty	in	the	setting	of	multiple	IPDs.	Now	in	order	to	
avoid	 possible	 losses	 individuals	 would	 have	 to	 decrease	 their	 overall	 cooperativity	
(Kahneman	&	Tversky	1979;	but	see	Harinck	et	al.	2007).	Our	results	show	that	participants	
established	at	least	one	cooperative	and	trustworthy	relationship,	in	which	uncertainty	was	
most	likely	reduced.	However,	high	rates	of	defection	and	thus	a	greater	risk	of	exploitation	
was	found	in	one	relationship.	A	second	explanation	is	that	behavioral	spillovers	impact	the	
relationships.	 This	 has	 been	 demonstrated	 in	 other	 contexts	 (Milinski	 et	al.	 2002;	 Barclay	
2004;	 Semmann	 et	al.	 2004;	 Bednar	 et	al.	 2010;	 Cason	 et	al.	 2010;	 Savikhin	&	 Sheremeta	
2010).	 In	 our	 experiment	 the	 relationships	 of	 the	multiple‐games	 treatment	 are	 different;	
this	makes	at	 least	a	consistent	 influence	of	one	relationship	on	another	unlikely.	Third,	 in	
the	 setting	 of	multiple‐games	 the	 “temptation”	 to	 exploit	 others	 is	 enhanced.	 Participants	
had	one	partner	with	whom	cooperativity	was	high.	This,	however,	seem	to	be	enough	of	a	
secure	 income	 and	 participants	 were	 tempted	 to	 exploit	 another	 partner or	 participants	
reacted	more	likely	with	defection	to	defectors,	thereby	resulting	in	low	cooperation	in	one	
relationship.	This	explanation	appears	to	hold	best.	
We	 were	 interested	 in	 whether	 participants	 would	 establish	 cooperation	 via	 direct	
reciprocity	and	win‐stay	 lose‐shift	behavior	 (see	Box	1;	Trivers	1971;	Axelrod	&	Hamilton	
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1981;	Nowak	&	Sigmund	1993;	cf.	also	results	of	a	post‐questionnaire	in	ESM)	and	given	that	
results	 are	 so	 far	 inconclusive	 for	 the	 cooperativity	 development	 over	 time	 (Dal	Bó	 2005;	
Duffy	 &	 Ochs	 2009).	 In	 both	 treatments,	 most	 participants	 cooperated	 (i.e.	 average	
cooperation	levels	are	above	50%).	In	addition,	our	results	show	that	humans	interacting	in	
IPD	without	 clear	 endpoints	 can	 stabilize	 cooperative	 behavior	 and	 that	 the	majority	 can	
raise	cooperation	levels	over	time,	which	is	consistent	with	previous	research	(Dal	Bó	2005;	
but	 contrasts	Duffy	&	Ochs	2009).	There	are	 several	 results	 indicating	 that	participants	of	
both	 treatments	 behaved	 reciprocal.	 That	 is	 participants	 reacted	 selectively	 to	 previous	
outcomes	 and	 cooperated	 most	 when	 both	 members	 of	 a	 relationship	 cooperated	 in	 the	
previous	round;	 though	participants	who	played	multiple	 IPDs	tended	to	be	more	 likely	 to	
defect	after	mutual	defection,	overall	resulting	in	different	cooperative	states.	This	indicates	
that	these	participants	were	more	likely	to	write	off	a	relationship.	Furthermore,	we	found	
that	their	actions	in	the	IPD	followed	reactive	strategies	close	to	generous	tit‐for‐tat	(Nowak	
&	Sigmund	1992).	Our	results	do	not	replicate	earlier	 findings	where	humans	preferred	to	
use	 strategies	 similar	 to	 win‐stay	 lose‐shift	 in	 a	 IPD	 (Wedekind	 &	 Milinski	 1996).	 The	
simpler	generous	tit‐for‐tat	like	strategy	was	preferred	when	the	game	was	interfered	by	an	
additional	 task	 (Milinski	 &	 Wedekind	 1998).	 Here,	 we	 reduced	 such	 effects	 of	 working‐
memory	 load	 (see	Methods),	 and	 participants,	 nevertheless,	 applied	 strategies	 similar	 to	
generous	 tit‐for‐tat	 in	 both	 treatments.	 It	 is	 worthwhile	 to	 mention	 that	 both	 previous	
studies	 used	 pseudo‐partners,	 who	 used	 predetermined	 strategies,	 to	 effectively	 test	 for	
conditional	 behavior.	 In	 contrast,	 our	 results	 rest	 on	 free‐play	 behavior	 between	 real	
participants.	 Overall,	 results	 correspond	 with	 the	 classic	 understanding	 in	 evolutionary	
game	theory	of	the	emergence	of	human	cooperation	via	direct	reciprocity.	
An	 interesting	 field	 to	 which	 our	 results	 relate	 is	 the	 research	 on	 the	 evolution	 of	
cooperation	in	structured	populations,	for	instance	in	scale‐free	networks.	Here,	the	number	
of	interaction	partners	varies	greatly.	Theory	shows	that	an	increase	in	partners	and	thus	in	
interactions	can	hinder	cooperation	in	structured	populations	(Ifti	et	al.	2004;	Ohtsuki	et	al.	
2006;	 Ohtsuki	 &	 Nowak	 2007).	 This	 result	 applies	 to	 unconditional	 behavior	 where	
individuals	react	with	one	strategy	to	all	partners.	We	now	provide	experimental	support	for	
a	 setting	 where	 individuals	 can	 adjust	 their	 behavior	 conditionally	 to	 each	 partner	 and	
showed	 that	 with	 more	 partners	 overall	 cooperativity	 is	 lower.	 The	 problem	 of	 reduced	
cooperation	 with	 multiple	 partners	 can	 be	 overcome	 by	 allowing	 individuals	 to	 reject	
interaction	partners.	Thereby	a	dynamic	network	is	generated.	Both	theory	(Perc	&	Szolnoki	
2010)	 and	 recent	 experimental	 results	 (Fehl	 et	 al.	 2011)	 support	 this	 assumption	 by	
showing	 that	 cooperation	 is	enhanced	 in	dynamic	networks.	A	second	possibility,	which	 is	
not	 necessarily	 exclusive	 to	 the	 first	 one,	 is	 to	 let	 the	 number	 of	 partners	 vary	 among	
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individuals.	 Theory	 shows	 that	 in	 static‐heterogeneous	networks	where	 so‐call	 hubs	 exist,	
i.e.	 individuals	 that	 have	 many	 more	 relationships	 than	 others,	 cooperation	 can	 evolve	
(Santos	 et	 al.	 2006b;	 Santos	 &	 Pacheco	 2005,	 2006),	 but	 experimental	 results	 are	 still	
missing.	 Especially	 these	 hub	 individuals	 are	 found	 to	 be	 cooperative;	 even	 though	 our	
results	show	that	 to	cooperate	with	many	partners	might	be	difficult.	Essentially,	 this	calls	
for	 further	 studies	 on	 varying	 the	 partner	 numbers	 in	 evolutionary	 games	 within	
experiments,	 especially	 in	 heterogeneous,	 large‐scale	 social	 networks	 to	 further	 validate	
theoretical	assumptions	on	the	evolution	of	cooperation	in	complex	social	settings.	
In	summary,	we	would	like	to	emphasize	that	our	results	are	in	contrast	to	the	traditional	
assumption	of	evolutionary	game	theory	that	multiple	games	are	independent.	We	find	that	
there	 is	 an	 impact	 of	 playing	 several	 games	 that	 results	 in	 overall	 less	 cooperation.	
Participants	 in	 the	 multiple‐games	 setting	 only	 established	 one	 cooperative	 relationship,	
which	contrasts	with	another	of	their	relationships	where	cooperativity	remained	low.	Thus,	
even	though	an	identical	game	structure	was	provided,	participants	behaved	differently.	 In	
conclusion,	 a	 new	 type	 of	 models	 is	 required	 which	 account	 for	 behavioural	 differences	
within	 the	 relationships	 of	 a	 single	 individual.	 Theorists	 have	 begun	 to	 study	 cooperation	
within	heterogeneous	networks,	where	the	numbers	of	partners	vary.	The	standard	within	
these	 models	 is	 that	 individuals	 cannot	 strategically	 differentiate	 between	 partners.	
Nevertheless,	 our	 results	 show	 that	 this	 is	 essential	 to	 better	 understand	 cooperation	 in	
human	relationships.	
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APPENDIX	TO	CHAPTER	I	
	
Electronic	Supplementary	Information	
	
Experimental	set‐up:	Structure	of	interactions	
	
(A)        (B)  
 
	
Figure	S1	Overview	of	 interacting	partners	 in	the	treatment	of	one	 iterated	prisoner’s	dilemma	(A)	
and	in	the	treatment	of	three,	simultaneous	iterated	prisoner’s	dilemma	(B).	
	
	
Experimental	set‐up:	Starting	amounts	
We	chose	different	starting	amounts	for	the	two	treatments	in	order	to	control	for	different	
amounts	 of	 time	 spent	 in	 the	 lab	 (60	 minutes	 versus	 90	 minutes),	 and	 the	 fact	 that	 90	
decisions	 in	 the	 multiple‐games	 treatment	 provided	 more	 opportunities	 to	 earn	 money	
compared	 to	 30	 decisions	 of	 the	 single‐game	 treatment.	 The	 goal	 was	 that	 on	 average	
amounts	 would	 be	 earned	 that	 resemble	 the	 same	 students’	 hourly	 wages;	 thereby	
participants	 would	 make	 careful	 decision,	 because	 meaningful	 amounts	 were	 at	 stake.	
Nevertheless,	 all	 participants	 played	with	 the	 same	 prisoner’s	 dilemma	 payoff	matrix	 and	
thus	 the	 same	 formal	 incentive	 structure	 per	 interaction.	 To	 test	whether	 all	 participants	
earned	 comparable	 amounts	 of	 money	 (average	 total	 payoff:	 13.31€	±	2.99	 [mean	 ±	 SD])	
independent	of	the	treatment,	we	calculated	the	average	payoff	per	minute.	In	the	treatment	
of	a	single	IPD	participants	earned	on	average	0.18€	±	0.01	and	in	the	treatment	of	multiple	
games	participants	 earned	on	 average	0.18€	±	0.02.	There	was	no	 significant	difference	 in	
earnings	per	minute	(Mann‐Whitney	test:	U	=	45,	n1,2	=	10,	p	=	0.74).	
2 1 
4 3 
6 5 
8 7 
10 9 
2 
1 
5 
4 
3 
6 
10 9 
8 7 
Chapter	I					Interacting	in	Multiple	Prisoner’s	Dilemma 29
	
Effects	of	working‐memory	load	
The	 current	 load	 of	working	memory	 is	 known	 to	 effect	 cooperative	 behavior	 (Milinski	&	
Wedekind	 1998).	 In	 our	 experimental	 set‐up	 this	 could	 interfere	 with	 the	 effect	 of	
interacting	with	different	numbers	of	social	partners,	however,	we	reduced	the	influence	of	
the	working‐memory	effect	(i)	by	setting	no	time	limit	for	the	decisions	to	be	made,	(ii)	by	
individually	 preferred	 durations	 of	 the	 feedback	 information	 of	 the	 iterated	 prisoner’s	
dilemma	 (IPD)	outcomes,	 and	 (iii)	 by	providing	participants	with	blank	pieces	of	paper	 in	
order	to	make	notes	if	they	wished	to	do	so.		
In	addition,	 from	another	experiment	 (Fehl	et	al.	2011)	conducted	 in	our	 lab	under	 the	
very	 same	 conditions	 we	 know	 that	 participants	 are	 good	 at	 paying	 attention	 to	 their	
partners	 and	 at	 recalling	 social	 information.	 In	 one	 of	 the	 treatments	 of	 this	 experiment,	
participants	 also	 interacted	 in	 three	 simultaneous	 IPDs	 each	 lasting	 30	 rounds.	 However,	
they	could	change	partners	and	thereby	interact	with	up	to	nine	different	partners.	Here,	the	
working‐memory	 load	 should	 be	 even	 higher	 and	 the	 social	 setting	 is	more	 complex.	 In	 a	
computerized	 post‐questionnaire	 participants	 (n	 =	 100)	 were	 asked	 whether	 they	
remembered	 to	 have	 played	 with	 the	 different	 participants	 from	 their	 session.	 In	 total,	
89.9%	±	0.05	could	correctly	 identify	all	 their	partners	(by	aliases)	and	all	 the	participants	
they	have	not	interacted	with.	In	addition,	27.5%	±	0.11	stated	the	exact	number	of	rounds	
they	 interacted	 with	 their	 partners	 (59.0%	±	0.09	 correctly	 stated	 the	 number	 of	 rounds	
within	a	range	of	±	2).	These	percentages	are	remarkable	since	the	number	of	rounds	was	of	
no	relevance	to	participants,	i.e.	they	did	not	know	how	many	rounds	would	be	played,	and	
during	 the	 experiment	 the	 current	 round	 number	 was	 not	 presented	 to	 participants.	 In	
addition,	 to	use	reciprocal	strategies	only	the	outcome	of	 the	previous	round	is	of	 interest.	
Nevertheless,	 many	 participants	 could	 recall	 this	 information.	 Moreover,	 participants’	
statements	 of	 how	many	 rounds	 their	 partners	 had	 cooperated	 deviated	 only	 by	 11.3%	±	
0.06	from	the	actual	numbers	of	rounds	their	partner	had	cooperated	(all	interactions	where	
the	participants’	guessed	numbers	of	rounds	was	equal	to	the	actual	numbers	of	rounds).	In	
sum,	 as	 we	 used	 the	 exact	 same	 method	 in	 the	 present	 experiment,	 where	 the	 social	
complexity	 is	 lower,	we	 conclude	 to	have	 reliably	 reduced	 the	 impact	of	working‐memory	
load	 in	 the	 present	 experiment	 by	 providing	 additional	 tools.	 Therefore,	 the	 impact	 of	
working‐memory	load	when	interacting	with	one	partner	or	three	partners	is	of	no	or	little	
relevance	for	cooperative	decisions.		
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Cooperative	behavior:	Numerical	analysis	
The	 relative	 frequencies	 of	 cooperative	 behavior	 following	 the	 outcomes	 of	 the	 previous	
round	 reveal	 the	 behavioral	 strategies	 of	 participants,	 who	 either	 played	 a	 single	 IPD	 or	
played	with	different	partners	simultaneously	three	IPDs.	Possible	outcomes	within	the	IPDs	
are:	mutual	cooperation	(CC),	the	participant	cooperated	and	the	partner	defected	(CD),	the	
participant	exploited	his	or	her	partner	 (DC),	or	mutual	defection	 (DD;	 see	Fig.	 S2,	 cf.	 also	
Fig.	2).	
Based	on	the	strategy	choice	parameters	of	the	experiment	the	temporal	dynamics	in	the	
IPD	 were	 simulated.	 The	 relative	 frequencies	 to	 cooperate	 given	 the	 prisoner’s	 dilemma	
outcome	of	the	previous	round	(see	Fig.	S2)	and	the	initial	distribution	of	prisoner’s	dilemma	
outcomes	in	round	1	from	the	experiment	were	used.	The	probabilities	to	cooperate	after	the	
four	different	outcomes	(CC,	DC,	CD,	and	DD)	define	a	stochastic	strategy	in	the	IPD	(Nowak	
&	 Sigmund	 1990).	 For	 this	 strategy,	 one	 can	 construct	 a	 transition	 matrix	 between	 the	
different	 states,	 e.g.	 the	 probability	 to	 go	 from	 CC	 to	 CD	 is	 pcc(1‐pcc),	 where	 pcc	 is	 the	
probability	to	cooperate	after	a	round	of	mutual	cooperation.	The	level	of	cooperation	shown	
in	 the	 numerical	 analysis	 is	 the	 fraction	 of	 cooperative	 moves,	 starting	 from	 the	 initial	
condition	of	the	experiment	(see	Fig.	S3;	cf.	also	Fig.	1).	In	the	long‐run,	a	stationary	state	is	
reached,	in	which	the	probability	of	moves	is	given	by	the	first	eigenvector	of	the	stochastic	
transition	matrix.	
	
	
	
	
Figure	S2	Relative	frequency	(pooled	over	all	rounds)	of	cooperative	behavior	(+	SD)	after	mutual	cooperation	
(CC),	when	the	participant	cooperated	and	the	partner	defected	(CD),	when	the	participant	exploited	his	or	her	
partner	(DC),	or	after	mutual	defection	(DD).	Participants	either	played	one	iterated	prisoner’s	dilemma	(1‐IPD),	
or	three	independent	games	at	a	time	(3‐IPDs).	These	three	games	are	ranked	from	the	most‐,	middle‐,	to	 least‐	
cooperative	relationship.		
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Figure	S3	 Cooperation	 levels	 of	 iterated	 prisoner’s	 dilemma	 (IPD)	 for	 30	 rounds.	 Participants	 either	 played	 a	
single	game	(1‐IPD),	or	they	played	with	three	partners	simultaneously,	though	independently	(3‐IPDs;	lines	with	
symbols).	These	 three	games	are	ranked	 from	the	most‐,	middle‐,	 to	 least‐cooperative	relationship.	Continuous,	
bold	lines	are	cooperation	states	from	the	numerical	analysis.	
	
	
Results	of	the	post‐questionnaire		
At	 the	 end	 of	 the	 experiment	 participants	 were	 asked	 to	 fill	 out	 a	 computerized	
questionnaire,	which	provided	us	with	self‐reported	experiences	apart	from	the	behavioral	
responses	in	the	IPDs	(individual‐level	analysis).	Their	answers	concerning	their	motivation	
to	participate	showed	that	the	majority	(“yes”	=	67%)	wanted	to	earn	money	(see	Fig.	3a).	
This	 supports	 our	 choice	 of	 a	 payoff‐oriented	 set‐up	 to	 measure	 costly,	 but	 cooperative	
incentives.	Participants	in	both	treatments	reported	to	have	focused	on	reciprocal	decisions.	
In	the	multiple‐games	treatment	more	participants	(“yes”	=	76%)	reported	to	have	applied	
reciprocal	 strategies	 than	 in	 the	 single‐game	 treatment	 (59%;	 Chi‐square	 test:	 ²	=	 7.79,	
df	=	2,	p	<	0.05;	see	Fig.	3b).	Our	indirect	approach	(to	reduce	the	social	desirability	bias)	to	
reveal	whether	participants	exploited	others	via	the	statement	“before	others	could	exploit	
me,	 I	 rather	 did	 it”,	 shows	 that	 most	 participants	 answered	 “no”	 or	 “in	 parts”	 (85%;	 see	
Fig.	3c).	 This	 shows	 a	 general	 tendency	 to	 engage	 in	 costly	 cooperation,	 as	 they	 refrained	
from	exploiting	others.		
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Figure	 S4	 Results	 of	 the	 computerized	 post‐questionnaire	 in	 the	 treatment	 of	 a	 single	 iterated	 prisoner’s	
dilemma	(1‐IPD;	n	=	100)	or	of	 three	games	(3‐IPDs;	n	=	100).	 (a)	 “I	 tried	 to	earn	as	much	money	as	possible”	
(Chi‐square	 test:	 ²	=	0.77,	 df	 =	 2,	 p	=	 0.68).	 (b)	 “My	 decision	 (blue/orange)	 depended	 a	 lot	 on	 my	 partners	
previous	decisions”	 (²	=	7.79,	df	 =	2,	p	<	0.05).	 (c)	 “Before	 others	 could	 exploit	me,	 I	 rather	did	 it”	 (²	=	3.38,	
df	=	2,	p	=	0.18).		
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Abstract	
The	ubiquity	of	cooperation	 in	nature	 is	puzzling	because	cooperators	can	be	exploited	by	
defectors.	 Recent	 theoretical	 work	 shows	 that	 if	 dynamic	 networks	 define	 interactions	
between	 individuals,	 cooperation	 is	 favoured	 by	 natural	 selection.	 To	 address	 this,	 we	
compare	 cooperative	 behaviour	 in	 multiple	 but	 independent	 repeated	 games	 between	
participants	in	static	and	dynamic	networks.	In	the	latter,	participants	could	break	their	links	
after	each	social	 interaction.	As	predicted,	we	 find	higher	 levels	of	cooperation	 in	dynamic	
networks.	Through	biased	 link	breaking	(i.e.	 to	defectors)	participants	affected	 their	social	
environment.	 We	 show	 that	 this	 link‐breaking	 behaviour	 leads	 to	 substantial	 network	
clustering	 and	 we	 find	 primarily	 cooperators	 within	 these	 clusters.	 This	 assortment	 is	
remarkable	because	it	occurred	on	top	of	behavioural	assortment	through	direct	reciprocity	
and	 beyond	 the	 perception	 of	 participants,	 and	 represents	 a	 self‐organized	 pattern.	 Our	
results	highlight	the	importance	of	the	interaction	between	ecological	context	and	selective	
pressures	on	cooperation.	
	
	
                                                 
3*		This	article	has	been	published	in	British	English.	
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Introduction	
Cooperative	 behaviour	 is	widespread	 throughout	 the	 animal	 kingdom	 (for	 recent	 reviews,	
see	Pennisi	2009;	Melis	&	Semmann	2010).	Such	cooperation	occurs	within	social	animals,	
which	naturally	interact	in	networks,	for	instance	in	guppies	where	pairs	more	likely	inspect	
predators	when	they	have	strong	social	associations	with	the	partner	(Croft	et	al.	2006).	In	
primates	 and	 social	 insects,	 network	 structures	 affect	 the	 environment	 in	 which	 the	
individuals	 socially	 interact	 and	 also	 cooperate	 (Fewell	 2003;	 Voelkl	 &	 Kasper	 2009).	 In	
addition,	in	humans,	social	networks	are	an	essential	feature	of	social	behaviour	(Kossinets	
&	 Watts	 2006).	 However,	 from	 an	 evolutionary	 perspective,	 cooperative	 behaviour	 is	
puzzling.	 This	 is	 because	 given	 that	 cooperative	 behaviour	 benefits	 others	 and	 produces	
costs	 for	 the	 actor,	 there	 is	 the	 potential	 for	 exploitation	 of	 cooperative	 individuals	 by	
“cheaters”.	 Thus,	 those	 individuals	 enjoying	 cooperative	 benefits	 without	 performing	
cooperative	 acts	 themselves	 should	 be	 favoured	 by	 natural	 selection.	 To	 understand	 the	
evolution	of	cooperation,	particularly	in	relation	to	the	structure	of	animal	social	networks,	
is	therefore	a	challenge.	
Network	reciprocity	has	been	put	forward	as	a	mechanism	to	explain	how	the	structure	of	
static	networks	can	support	the	evolution	of	cooperation	(Nowak	&	May	1992;	Lieberman	et	
al.	 2005;	Ohtsuki	 et	al.	 2006;	 but	 see	Hauert	&	Doebeli	 2004).	 Cooperation	 can	 prevail	 in	
spatial	lattices,	because	by	assorting	(i.e.	clusters	of	neighbouring	individuals	performing	the	
same	behavioural	strategy)	cooperators	can	avoid	interactions	with	defectors,	reducing	the	
chance	of	being	exploited	(Nowak	&	May	1992;	Brauchli	et	al.	1999;	Ifti	et	al.	2004;	see	also	
Fletcher	&	Doebeli	2009).	In	line	with	this	theoretical	work,	evolutionary	simulations	based	
on	 social	 networks	 of	 non‐human	 primates	 show	 that	 these	 have	 the	 appropriate	 static	
structure	to	support	cooperation	(Voelkl	&	Kasper	2009).		
However,	in	relation	to	more	extensive	theoretical	work,	it	is	somewhat	surprising	that	so	
far,	experiments	with	humans	could	not	show	that	network	structure	promotes	cooperation.	
Both	spatial	lattices	and	other	network	topologies	either	caused	cooperation	to	decline	over	
time	(Grujić	et	al.	2010;	Traulsen	et	al.	2010)	or	could	not	convincingly	reveal	differences	in	
levels	of	cooperation	between	network	structures	(Cassar	2007;	Kirchkamp	&	Nagel	2007).		
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A	 potentially	 very	 important	 network	 property	 has,	 however,	 been	 neglected	 in	 these	
studies:	network	dynamics.	In	dynamic	networks,	not	only	do	strategies	evolve	but	also	the	
network	topology	 is	under	evolutionary	selection	pressure.	Recent	 theoretical	work	shows	
that	 such	 co‐evolution	 of	 behaviour	 and	 network	 structure	 favours	 the	 evolution	 of	
cooperation	(for	reviews,	see	Gross	&	Blasius	2008;	Perc	&	Szolnoki	2010).	In	particular,	the	
“active‐linking”	models	of	Pacheco	et	al.	 (2006a,	2006b,	2008)	show	that	when	 individuals	
playing	prisoner’s	dilemma	(PD;	see	Box	1)	are	allowed	to	control	 their	 interactions,	 i.e.	 to	
break	existing	links	and	to	form	new	links	with	random	partners,	cooperation	evolves.		
The	 defining	 feature	 of	 dynamic	 networks	 is	 the	 interaction	 between	 behaviour	 and	
network	structure.	Such	 interactions	allow	 feedback	 to	arise	allowing	 individuals	 to	assort	
on	 the	 network	 and	 to	 alter	 their	 social	 environment.	 This	 in	 turn	 can	 have	 an	 impact	 on	
individual	 fitness	and	hence	selection	pressures	on	behavioural	strategies	at	the	individual	
level.	 In	 general,	 such	 ecological	 interactions	 and	 the	 self‐organizing,	 or	 self‐structuring	
processes	 that	 they	 generate,	 have	 been	 suggested	 as	 fundamental	 to	 understanding	
evolution,	in	particular	that	of	cooperation	(Hauert	et	al.	2006;	Lion	&	van	Baalen	2008).	
In	general,	in	models	of	dynamic	linking	individuals	can	only	react	unconditionally	(same	
reaction	to	all	partners).	Such	models	have	been	used	to	show	that	network	reciprocity	can	
be	sufficient	to	support	cooperation	(Pacheco	et	al.	2006a,	2006b).	Cooperation	is	favoured	if	
the	 link‐breaking	 rate	 to	 defectors	 is	 high	 (Fu	 et	 al.	 2009;	 Wu	 et	 al.	 2010)	 and	 if	 links	
between	cooperators	are	long‐lived	(Pacheco	et	al.	2006a,	2006b;	Santos	et	al.	2006a;	Fu	et	
al.	2008,	2009;	Wu	et	al.	2010).	 In	addition,	 in	dynamic	networks	the	formation	of	clusters	
has	been	suggested	to	support	cooperation	(Jun	&	Sethi	2009;	but	see	Hanaki	et	al.	2007).	
Other	dynamic	network	models	include	the	possibility	for	reacting	conditionally	to	different	
partners,	allowing	the	feedback	between	conditional	behaviour	and	network	structure	to	be	
studied	(Pacheco	et	al.	2008).	In	this	way,	Pacheco	et	al.	(2008)	show	that	the	prediction	of	
breaking	links	to	defectors	may	not	hold.	Instead	it	might	be	better	to	maintain	links	to	avoid	
repeated	exploitation	by	the	same	individual.		
Here,	we	 focus	on	this	second	setting.	 In	 this	way	we	do	not	constrain	 the	solution	of	a	
social	dilemma	purely	to	network	reciprocity,	but	study	the	impact	of	network	dynamics	in	
light	of	 repeated	 interactions	and	 the	possibility	of	 cooperating	via	direct	 reciprocity.	This	
likely	constitutes	a	more	natural	setting	for	humans.	In	our	analysis,	we	focus	on	assortment	
(Fletcher	&	Doebeli	2009)	and	clustering	(Nowak	&	May	1992)	as	these	are	thought	to	be	the	
most	 important	 factors	 in	 the	evolution	of	 cooperation.	From	 this	perspective,	we	address	
empirically	 the	 question:	 does	 the	 co‐evolution	 (in	 the	 broad	 sense	 of	 the	 word)	 of	
cooperative	 or	 defective	 behaviour	 and	 network	 structure	 really	 make	 a	 difference?	
Participants	 play	 iterated	 PDs	 (see	 Box	 1),	 and	 only	 for	 dynamic	 networks	 they	 have	 the	
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possibility	 to	 influence	 their	 social	 relationships	 based	 on	 an	 active‐link‐breaking	
mechanism	 (Pacheco	 et	 al.	 2006a,	 2006b,	 2008).	 Thus,	 only	 in	 dynamic	 networks	 can	 an	
interaction	 arise	 between	 behaviour	 and	 the	 network,	 whereas	 in	 the	 static	 network,	
cooperation	can	only	be	influenced	by	direct	reciprocity.	Within	this	framework,	we	address	
the	impact	of	the	interaction	between	behaviour	and	network	by	focussing	on	the	following.	
(1)	In	relation	to	theoretical	work	(see	Perc	&	Szolnoki	2010),	we	expect	rates	of	cooperative	
behaviour	 to	 be	 greater	 in	 dynamic	 than	 in	 static	 networks.	 Moreover,	 given	 that	 our	
experiment	 allows	 conditional	 behaviour,	 with	 respect	 to	 link	 breaking	 we	 assess	 the	
prediction	that	 individuals	should	keep	 links	 to	defectors	and	reciprocate	defection	(based	
on	models	with	 conditional	 behaviour,	 Pacheco	 et	al.	 2008),	 rather	 than	 breaking	 links	 to	
defectors	 (as	 predicted	by	models	with	 unconditional	 behaviour;	 Fu	et	al.	 2009;	Wu	et	al.	
2010).	(2)	We	characterize	topological	changes	in	the	dynamic	network	in	terms	of	cluster	
formation.	(3)	We	examine	the	interrelation	of	individual	behaviour	and	network	topology,	
namely	 whether	 participants,	 not	 only	 start	 to	 match	 each	 other’s	 behaviour	 within	
relationships	 (behavioural	 assortment),	 but	 also	 assort	 on	 the	 network	 into	 clusters	
(network	assortment).	
	
	
Box	1		The	prisoner‘s	dilemma	
Within	pairwise	interactions,	reciprocity	has	been	put	forward	as	a	mechanism	to	maintain	
cooperation.	The	prisoner’s	dilemma	 (PD;	Rapoport	&	Chammah	1965;	Axelrod	1984)	has	
been	widely	used	to	study	the	evolution	of	cooperation	(for	a	recent	review,	see	Doebeli	&	
Hauert	2005).	 In	the	PD	two	individuals	simultaneously	decide	whether	to	cooperate	or	to	
defect.	 If	 both	 cooperate,	 they	 each	 receive	 a	 reward	 (R).	 If	 one	 defects	 and	 the	 other	
cooperates,	 the	 defector	 gets	 the	 temptation	 payoff	 (T)	 and	 the	 cooperator	 obtains	 the	
sucker’s	 payoff	 (S).	 However,	 if	 both	 defect,	 they	 each	 receive	 a	 punishment	 (P).	
Furthermore,	 the	 assumption	 T	>	R	>	 P	 >	 S	 must	 hold	 (and	 in	 addition,	 if	 the	 game	 is	
repeated	 2R	 >	 T	 +	 S).	 This	 is	 summarized	 by	 the	 payoff	 matrix	 which	 we	 applied	 in	 the	
experiment:	
	 			ܥ 												ܦܥ
ܦ ቀ	
0.25	€ െ0.10	€	
0.40	€ 			0.00	€	ቁ
	
	
If	the	individuals	cooperate,	both	do	better	than	if	they	both	would	have	defected.	But	for	a	
single	 individual	 it	 is	 always	 better	 to	 defect	 no	matter	what	 the	 opponent	 does.	 Thus,	 a	
social	 dilemma	 arises	 and	 mutual	 defection	 is	 the	 dominant	 outcome	 in	 a	 one‐shot	 PD.	
However,	 if	 the	 PD	 is	 played	 repeatedly,	 direct	 reciprocity	 (Trivers	 1971;	 Axelrod	 &	
Hamilton	 1981;	 Nowak	 &	 Sigmund	 1992,	 1993)	 is	 a	 mechanism	 for	 cooperation	 to	 be	
evolutionary	stable	and	supported	by	experimental	evidence	(reviewed	in	Dal	Bó	2005).	
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Materials	and	Methods	
The	participants	
We	 tested	 200	 participants	 who	 were	 recruited	 from	 the	 University	 of	 Göttingen	 via	 the	
online	recruitment	system	ORSEE	(Greiner	2004)	in	fall	2009.	The	students	(45%	males	and	
55%	 females)	 came	 from	 various	 disciplines	 and	 were	 on	 average	 23.0	 ±	 2.9	 years	
(mean	±	SD)	 old.	 Participants	 were	 ensured	 that	 their	 decisions	 were	 made	 completely	
anonymously	 towards	 other	 participants	 and	 the	 experimenters	 as	well	 as	 an	 anonymous	
payment	at	the	end	of	the	experiment.	Throughout	the	experiment,	which	lasted	c.	90	min,	
they	 earned	 on	 average	 17.64	 €	 ±	 4.67.	 The	 interaction	 took	 place	 via	 computers	 and	 no	
other	form	of	communication	was	permitted.	
	
Static	and	dynamic	network	treatment	
We	ran	two	treatments:	a	static	network	and	a	dynamic	network	treatment.	Each	treatment	
included	10	sessions	(randomly	assigned	but	corrected	for	sequential	and	time	effects)	with	
10	participants	in	each	session.	The	game	was	played	for	30	rounds;	however,	participants	
did	 not	 know	 the	 total	 number	 of	 rounds	 in	 order	 to	 avoid	 end‐round	 effects.	 The	 static	
network	treatment	only	consisted	of	the	iterated	PD	and	was	played	with	fixed	partners.	The	
dynamic	network	treatment	consisted	of	a	PD	stage	as	well	as	an	active‐link	breaking	stage	
(cf.	Pacheco	et	al.	2006a,	2006b,	2008;	see	Appendix	S1	for	more	details).		
Each	 participant	 was	 linked	 to	 three	 partners	 and	 played	 independently	 with	 each	
partner.	In	the	PD	stage	the	participants	were	asked	to	choose	between	two	options	(called	
ORANGE	 or	 BLUE	 option).	 In	 half	 of	 the	 sessions	 orange	mimicked	 cooperation	 and	 blue	
defection,	in	the	other	half	the	reversed	pattern	was	used.	Hence,	wording	like	“cooperate”,	
“defect”,	 or	 “collaborate”	 was	 avoided	 to	 exclude	 prefixed	 moral	 pressure	 to	 choose	
cooperation.	The	participants	were	shown	the	payoff	matrix	accordingly	(see	Box	1).	After	
each	 PD	 stage	 the	 participants	were	 shown	 their	 payoffs	 and	 the	 payoffs	 of	 their	 current	
partners.	Thus,	the	participants	knew	their	total	payoff	per	round.	However,	they	would	not	
receive	 any	 information	 on	 their	 partners’	 total	 payoffs	 just	 their	 partner’s	 payoff	 with	
respect	to	their	own	interaction	with	that	partner.		
In	the	dynamic	network	treatment	a	second	stage	followed.	The	participants	were	asked	
whether	they	wanted	to	continue	to	play	with	a	partner	(indicated	by	YES	or	NO	decisions).	
Afterwards,	 information	 was	 given	 to	 the	 participants	 whether	 one’s	 partners	 wished	 to	
continue	the	relationship	or	not.	If	a	linked	pair	agreed	to	do	so,	they	were	also	paired	in	the	
following	 round.	 If,	 however,	 at	 least	 one	 of	 them	 refused	 to	 keep	 playing,	 the	 link	 was	
broken	 off	 and	 both	 received	 new	partners,	 randomly	 chosen	 from	 all	 players	 looking	 for	
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partners	at	 that	 time	point.	There	was	a	chance	of	being	 linked	 to	 the	same	partner	again,	
which	was	higher	if	only	few	players	had	to	be	re‐linked.	The	participants	were	given	aliases	
to	ensure	anonymity.	Thus,	 they	were	able	 to	recognize	other	players	by	aliases	and	when	
meeting	a	player	again,	the	participants	were	in	the	position	to	recall	previous	interactions	
with	this	partner.		
	
Network	topology	
For	both	treatments	we	used	an	initial	network	topology	in	which	all	the	players	had	three	
links.	We	limited	the	maximum	number	of	links	per	player	to	three	because	it	is	reasonable	
to	 assume	 limited	 resources	 (e.g.	 time)	 for	 individuals.	 In	 the	 initial	 network	 two	 linked	
players	never	share	a	partner	(i.e.	there	are	no	clusters)	nor	does	a	player	have	two	partners	
who	 share	 another	 partner	 (see	 Fig.	 1a).	 The	 network	 remained	 the	 same	 in	 the	 static	
network	 treatment.	 The	 dynamic	 network	 treatment	 started	with	 this	 initial	 network,	 but	
from	 thereon	 links	 would	 be	 determined	 according	 to	 the	 active‐link‐breaking	 stage	 (see	
Fig.	1b).	 The	 initial	 position	 of	 participants,	 i.e.	 the	 node	 in	 the	 network,	 was	 randomly	
assigned.	Moreover,	at	no	point	in	time	did	participants	have	any	knowledge	of	the	overall	
network	topology.	
	
(A)    (B)      
	
Figure	1	Network	topology.	Circles	represent	individuals	and	lines	are	links	between	individuals	(i.e.	connections	
between	 individuals	 that	play	 iterated	prisoner’s	dilemmas).	There	are	15	 links	 in	 total.	 (a)	Graph	of	 the	static	
network	 treatment	 and	 initial	 configuration	 of	 the	 dynamic	 network	 treatment.	 (b)	 Example	 of	 active‐link	
breaking	in	the	dynamic	network	treatment	(grey	dotted	lines:	former	links;	bold	triangle:	cluster).	
	
	
Statistical	analyses	
For	statistical	analyses	SPSS	17.0.3	and	R	2.10.1	were	used.	Probabilities	are	reported	as	two	
tailed	and	a	5%	level	of	significance	is	used.	Furthermore,	analyses	were	done	on	the	group	
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level,	 except	 in	 the	 case	 of	 the	 generalized	 linear	mixed	models	where	 session	 effects	 are	
considered	in	terms	of	random	factors.	In	addition,	we	developed	an	agent‐based	model	and	
ran	simulations	to	assess	emergent	properties	in	the	dynamic	networks.	
 
 
Results	
Participants’	game	behaviour	
Our	primary	result	is	that	the	average	cooperation	level	was	significantly	greater	in	dynamic	
than	static	networks	(see	Fig.	2;	Mann‐Whitney	U‐test:	U	=	4,	n1,2	=	10,	p	<	0.001;	for	further	
analyses	see	Appendix	S2).	A	difference	was	already	present	in	the	very	first	round	of	the	PD	
(average	 cooperation	 level,	 dynamic	 network	 treatment:	 59.67	±	 9.36%;	 static	 network	
treatment:	48.33	±	8.64%;	Mann‐Whitney	U‐test:	U	=	21,	n1,2	=	10,	p	<	0.05).	
In	terms	of	link	breaking,	we	find	that	participants,	irrespective	whether	they	were	more	
cooperative	or	defective,	broke	links	to	defectors,	and	hence	newly	established	links	 lasted	
longer	when	both	participants	were	 cooperative.	Although	 the	 average	break	 rate	 of	 links	
was	 22.90	 ±	 8.76%,	 we	 observed	 a	 significant	 decrease	 of	 link	 breaking	 over	 rounds	
[comparing	 average	 link‐breaking	 rates	 in	 the	 first	 (50.67	±	8.43%)	 and	 last	 round	
(10.67	±	13.16%);	Wilcoxon	sign‐rank	 test:	T	=	0,	n	=	10,	p	<	0.01].	We	used	a	generalized	
linear	mixed	effect	model	to	model	the	participant’s	decision	to	break	a	link	as	a	function	of	
his	 or	 her	 partner’s	 decision	 in	 the	 PD	 stage:	 we	 included	 session	 as	 well	 as	 participant	
identity	nested	within	sessions	as	random	factors;	we	assumed	binomial‐distributed	errors;	
possible	 time	 effects	 were	 disregarded	 with	 all	 30	 rounds	 weighted	 equally.	 The	 model	
revealed	 a	 significant	 impact	 on	 the	 participant’s	 decision	 to	 cut	 the	 link	when	 his	 or	 her	
partner	defected	in	the	previous	PD	round	(β	=	3.47,	SE	=	0.10,	p	<	0.001;	see	also	Fig.	S6	in	
Appendix	S2).	Finally,	we	find	that	 if	participants	met	a	new	partner	the	 link	duration	was	
significantly	longer	if	both	players	cooperated	in	the	first	round	of	a	new	link	than	if	either	of	
them	defected	in	that	round	(see	Fig.	3;	sign	test,	CC	link	vs.	CD	link:	n	=	10,	p	<	0.01;	CC	link	
vs.	DD	link:	n	=	10,	p	<	0.01).	The	link	duration	did	not	differ	significantly	when	one	of	them	
defected	from	when	both	defected	(sign	test:	n	=	10,	p	=	0.11).	
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Figure	2	 Average	 cooperation	 levels	 (±	 SD)	 of	 30	
rounds	 of	 prisoner’s	 dilemmas	 played	 either	 with	
fixed	partners	on	a	static	network	or	with	possibly	
changing	 partners	 through	 an	 active‐linking‐
breaking	mechanism	on	a	dynamic	network	(Mann–
Whitney	U‐test:	U	=	4,	n1,2	=	10,	p	<	0.001).	
	
	
Figure	3	Duration	of	 links	in	the	dynamic	network	
treatment.	Bars	represent	average	duration	of	links	
(±	 SD)	 when	 paired	 participants	 could	 decide	 to	
cooperate,	 C,	 or	 defect,	 D,	 in	 their	 first	 prisoner’s	
dilemma	round.	Accordingly,	 they	either	 form	a	CC	
link,	 a	CD	 link	 (DC	 link,	 respectively),	 or	 a	DD	 link	
(Sign	 test;	 CC	 link	 vs.	 CD	 link:	n	=	 10,	p	 <	 0.01;	 CC	
link	vs.	DD	link:	n	=	10,	p	<	0.01;	CD	link	vs.	DD	link:	
n	=	10,	p	=	0.11).	
	
Assortment	on	the	dynamic	networks	
To	reveal	network	assortment	on	top	of	behavioural	assortment	within	 links	(cf.	 the	static	
network	 treatment	 with	 an	 average	 cooperation	 level	 of	 48%),	 we	 needed	 to	 show	
assortment	 into	clusters	 that	are	beyond	the	pair	 level	(i.e.	we	cannot	distinguish	between	
behavioural	 and	 network	 assortment	 at	 the	 pair	 level).	 Moreover,	 we	 needed	 to	 use	 a	
clustering	measure	that	 is	 independent	of	cooperative	behaviour	measures.	 In	this	way	we	
could	relate	cooperation	and	clustering	and	reveal	assortment	of	cooperators	into	clusters.	
	
Clustering	in	the	dynamic	networks	
We	find	a	greater	degree	of	clustering	in	the	dynamic	networks	than	would	be	expected	at	
random.	 To	 determine	 this,	we	 devised	 a	 clustering	 score	 to	 capture	 the	 degree	 to	which	
individuals	were	clustered	 into	 “cliques”	 (i.e.	 clusters,	where	“your	 friends	are	each	others	
friends”;	 from	here	 on	 “Friends	 of	 Friends”	 or	 FoF)	 and	 how	 stable	 this	 is	 over	 time	 (see	
Appendix	S3	for	details).	Next,	we	compared	whether	the	average	FoF	score	achieved	in	the	
experimental	 sessions	 (11.01	 ±	 4.24)	 differed	 from	 the	 FoF	 score	 under	 random	 link	
breaking.	 To	 generate	 an	 expectation	 for	 “random”	 network	 clustering,	 we	 developed	 an	
agent‐based	 model	 in	 which	 links	 where	 broken	 randomly	 (i.e.	 not	 conditional	 on	 the	
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
ave
rag
e	c
oo
pe
rat
ion
	lev
el	(
in	
%)
dynamic	network
static	network
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
18
20
22
du
rat
ion
	of
	lin
ks	
(in
	ro
un
ds)
CC‐link
CD‐link	(DC‐link)
DD‐link
Chapter	II					Cooperation	and	Self‐Organization	in	Networks 41
	
 
partner’s	 decision	 in	 the	 PD).	We	 ran	 agent‐based	 simulations	 based	 on	 our	 experimental	
sessions	(where	we	used	round	specific	breaking	rates	measured	in	the	experiment,	which	
accounted	for	the	effect	that	breaking	rates	decreased	over	time;	see	Appendix	S3).	We	then	
compared	 the	 FoF	 mean	 from	 the	 experiment	 to	 the	 distribution	 of	 FoF	 scores	 from	 the	
simulations.	The	FoF	mean	from	the	experiment	was	beyond	the	top	5%	of	the	distribution	
of	 FoF‐means	 obtained	 from	 random	 link	 breaking	 (11.01	 >	 5%	 threshold	 of	 7.92),	
demonstrating	 that	 the	 dynamic	 networks	 in	 the	 experiment	 indeed	 became	 significantly	
more	clustered	than	would	be	expected	for	random	link	breaking.		
	
Interrelation	between	game	behaviour	and	network	topology	
When	 analysing	 participants’	 behaviour	 in	 the	 PD	 in	 relation	 to	 the	 cluster	 formation,	we	
found	that	it	was	cooperative	participants	in	particular,	who	ended	up	in	clusters	(for	details	
on	 the	 cluster	 score	 see	 Appendix	 S3).	 We	 assigned	 participants	 “cooperation”	 scores	 by	
giving	 them	 one	 positive	 point	 for	 every	 cooperative	move	 towards	 any	 partner	 and	 one	
negative	point	for	every	defection	(theoretically	taking	values	from	‐90	to	90).	Participants’	
average	“cooperation”	score	was	39.36	±	43.46	(range:	‐78–90).	We	used	a	generalized	linear	
mix	 effect	model,	 in	which	we	 included	 sessions	 as	 random	 factors	 and	 assumed	Poisson‐
distributed	 errors,	 to	model	 cluster	 scores	 as	 a	 function	 of	 the	 participants’	 “cooperation”	
scores.	We	find	that	the	higher	the	participants’	“cooperation”	scores	the	higher	their	cluster	
scores	were	(intercept	=	1.96,	SE	=	0.16,	p	<	0.001;	β	=	0.0076,	SE	=	0.0008,	p	<	0.001).	
	
	
Discussion	
In	 this	 study	 we	 show	 that	 for	 human	 participants	 cooperating	 on	 social	 networks,	 the	
interrelatedness	of	behaviour	and	network	structure	matters.	The	level	of	cooperation	in	the	
iterated	 prisoner’s	 dilemma	 was	 significantly	 increased	 on	 dynamic	 networks	 relative	 to	
static	 networks.	 Thus,	 relative	 to	 reciprocity	 in	 static	 relationships,	 the	 ability	 to	 change	
partners	enhances	cooperation.		
Theory	predicts	 two	possible	 link‐breaking	behaviours:	 (i)	keeping	 links	 to	defectors	 to	
keep	track	of	them	in	a	model	with	conditional	PD	strategies	(Pacheco	et	al.	2008),	and	(ii)	
breaking	 links	 to	 defectors,	mainly	 for	models	with	 unconditional	 PD	 strategies	 (Fu	 et	al.	
2009;	Wu	et	al.	2010).	We	find	that	although	our	experiment	allows	conditional	behaviour,	
our	 link‐breaking	 results	 more	 closely	 match	 the	 predictions	 of	 unconditional	 models.	
Participants	broke	 links	 to	partners	who	defected	much	more	 likely	 than	 to	partners	who	
cooperated.	Hence,	 links	with	two	cooperative	participants	 lasted	much	longer	on	average.	
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Thus,	 our	 results	 provide	 experimental	 evidence	 for	 general	 conditions	 established	 in	
dynamic	network	models	(Pacheco	et	al.	2006a,	2006b;	Santos	et	al.	2006a;	Fu	et	al.	2009;	
Wu	 et	 al.	 2010).	 The	 most	 likely	 reason	 that	 our	 results	 do	 not	 match	 the	 prediction	 of	
“keeping	 links	 to	 defectors”	 is	 that	 in	 our	 experimental	 setting	 the	 number	 of	 links	 per	
individual	 was	 limited,	 in	 contrast	 to	 Pacheco	 et	 al.	 (2008).	 Thus	 in	 our	 experiment	
maintaining	 links	 to	 defectors	 implies	 a	 loss	 of	 opportunity	 to	 be	 connected	 to	 a	 more	
cooperative	 player.	 It	 is	 likely	 that	 such	 opportunity	 limitations	 play	 an	 important	 role	 in	
structuring	the	payoffs	of	behavioural	choices	in	natural	settings.	
The	 link	 breaking	 in	 relation	 to	 the	 PD	 is	 crucial	 for	 network	 dynamics,	 because	 it	
generates	the	interaction	between	behaviour	and	the	network	structure.	In	our	experiment,	
we	find	that	the	more	cooperative	a	participant	is	the	greater	its	cluster	score	is	likely	to	be.	
This	 happens	 because	 cooperative	 links	 are	 maintained	 while	 links	 with	 defectors	 are	
broken.	Through	random	re‐linking,	eventually	two	cooperative	participants	are	linked	and	
thus	became	assorted.	In	fact	the	assortment	occurred	in	the	form	of	“cooperative	cliques”,	
which	means	that	individuals	over	time	become	linked	to	the	“friends	of	their	friends”.	Thus	
the	link	breaking	and	link	keeping	feeds	back	on	the	network	structure	and	thereby	defines	
the	social	ecology	in	which	individuals	find	themselves.	As	a	consequence,	social	structures	
are	generated	in	which	behaviour	and	network	positions	are	interdependent.	
The	 formation	of	cooperative	clusters	 is	 remarkable	 if	one	considers	 that	 (i)	 it	 requires	
the	appropriate	type	of	link‐breaking	behaviour	(see	theoretical	prediction	for	keeping	links	
to	defectors),	(ii)	a	participant	could	also	assort	behaviourally	through	direct	reciprocity	(see	
cooperative	 outcome	 in	 the	 static	 networks)	 and	 (iii)	 our	 participants	 could	 never	 at	 any	
moment	 observe	 who	 the	 neighbours	 of	 their	 neighbours	 were.	 Thus,	 even	 if	 people	 use	
higher	 cognitive	 reasoning	 within	 the	 PD	 games,	 such	 reasoning	 would	 not	 include	
information	 on	 assortment	 and	 clustering	 because	 these	 processes	 occurred	 beyond	 the	
perception	of	participants.	We	can	therefore	only	understand	the	formation	of	“cooperative	
cliques”	 in	 terms	 of	 a	 self‐organized	 assortment	 process	 generated	 by	 the	 interaction	
between	PD	behaviour	and	link‐breaking	decisions.	
The	 cooperation‐enhancing	 effect	 of	 the	 interaction	 between	 behaviour	 and	 network	
structure	 possibly	 works	 at	 multiple	 levels.	 At	 the	 behavioural	 level,	 we	 can	 see	 that	
cooperation	already	increases	in	the	first	round.	Whether	this	is	because	of	“a	threat	of	link	
breaking”,	“the	possibility	to	get	rid	of	defectors”,	or	“the	possibility	to	stay	with	like‐minded	
partners”	 is	 beyond	 the	 scope	 of	 this	 experiment	 to	 determine.	 On	 the	 network	 level,	 we	
observe	the	assortment	processes,	which	allowed	cooperative	participants	to	find	each	other	
and	 form	 clusters.	 Whether	 the	 formation	 of	 these	 “cooperative	 cliques”	 then	 enhances	
cooperation	on	top	of	the	assortment	in	general	(i.e.	assortment	does	not	necessarily	imply	
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cliques)	is	impossible	to	disentangle	here.	Theoretical	work	done	on	static	graphs	indicates	
that	with	clustering,	higher	levels	of	cooperation	can	be	reached	(Santos	et	al.	2006c).	Here	
we	cannot	tease	apart	these	different	levels	of	explanations	because	they	are	all	 integrated	
within	the	same	process.	Future	work	will	have	to	determine	how	these	processes	interact	in	
more	detail.	
Our	 results	 could	 explain	why	 experiments	 conducted	 on	 spatially	 structured	 and	non‐
structured	 static	 networks	 have	 not	 found	 a	 cooperation‐enhancing	 effect	 of	 network	
structures	(Cassar	2007;	Kirchkamp	&	Nagel	2007;	Grujić	et	al.	2010;	Traulsen	et	al.	2010).	
In	our	dynamic	network	treatment,	the	structure	is	generated	by	behaviour	of	participants,	
and	the	participant’s	position	in	the	network	then	stands	in	relation	to	his	or	her	behavioural	
tendencies.	Hence,	the	fact	that	previous	experiments	impose	a	network	structure	may	play	
a	role.	 In	such	static	networks,	an	 individual’s	position	on	the	network	and	its	behavioural	
traits	do	not	necessarily	have	a	meaningful	 relationship	and	network	assortment	does	not	
occur.	 A	 possible	 explanation	 is	 that	 people	 do	 not	 simply	 imitate	 each	 other,	 which	 is	 a	
mechanism	 that	 allows	 assortment	 in	 models	 with	 static	 networks	 (Ohtsuki	 et	 al.	 2006).	
Another	 difference	 is	 that	 in	 our	 experiment,	 we	 do	 not	 use	 the	 scenario	 often	 used	 in	
evolutionary	 game	 theory	 on	 networks	 (but	 see	 Pacheco	 et	al.	 2008;	 Do	 et	al.	 2010)	 that	
social	interaction	decisions	are	fixed	across	all	links:	one	has	to	play	the	same	with	all	one’s	
partners,	 which	 creates	 a	 harsher	 social	 dilemma.	 This	 was	 the	 set‐up	 used	 in	 the	
experimental	 studies	 of	 cooperation	 on	 static	 networks	 (Cassar	 2007;	Kirchkamp	&	Nagel	
2007;	Grujić	et	al.	2010;	Traulsen	et	al.	2010).	Our	result	of	a	cooperation‐enhancing	effect	of	
network	 structure	 is	 therefore	 specific	 for	 a	 reciprocal	 setting.	 However,	 given	 our,	 and	
theoretical	 results	 (Perc	&	Szolnoki	2010)	we	would	predict	 that	even	 if	we	used	 the	“one	
strategy	 to	 all	 partners”	 scenario,	 it	 is	 likely	 only	 to	 find	 cooperation‐enhancing	 effects	 of	
network	structure	in	experiments	with	humans	on	networks	with	dynamism.	
In	 conclusion,	 we	 emphasize	 that	 the	 interaction	 between	 behaviour	 and	 network	
structure	 can	 significantly	 increase	 the	 level	 of	 cooperative	 behaviour	 in	 human	 social	
networks	beyond	that	of	direct	reciprocity	by	itself.	Crucial	is	the	biased	link	breaking,	which	
defines	 the	 interaction	 between	 behaviour	 and	 network.	 We	 show	 that	 even	 when	
individuals	 could	 establish	 cooperation	 via	 direct	 reciprocity	 (behavioural	 assortment),	
there	is	assortment	of	individuals	on	the	social	network.	Such	assorted	social	environments	
are	 similar	 to	 those	 suggested	 to	be	 important	 for	 the	evolution	of	 cooperation	 (Nowak	&	
May	1992;	Fletcher	&	Doebeli	2009;	 Jun	&	Sethi	2009).	Thus,	our	 results	 strongly	support	
theory	that	includes	co‐evolutionary	processes	and	their	cooperation‐enhancing	effects.	This	
fits	in	a	larger	tendency	to	give	ecological	interactions	and	feedback,	and	the	self‐organizing	
processes	 and	 emergent	 properties	 they	 generate,	 a	more	 central	 role	 in	 our	 attempts	 to	
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understand	evolution	(e.g.	Boerlijst	&	Hogeweg	1991;	Lion	&	van	Baalen	2008;	Nowak	et	al.	
2010),	 in	 particular	 that	 of	 cooperative	 behaviour	 (Fewell	 2003;	 Hauert	 et	 al.	 2006).	 In	
addition,	our	findings	may	provide	a	new	perspective	with	which	to	analyse	the	vast	amount	
of	observational	data	on	cooperative	behaviour	in	social	animals	and	also	other	behavioural	
traits	 that	 coevolve	 with	 network	 structures	 and	 thereby	 show	 an	 ecological	
interdependence.	
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APPENDIX	TO	CHAPTER	II	
	
Appendix	S1		Experimental	set‐up	
General	experimental	procedure		
Upon	 arrival	 participants	were	 randomly	 seated	 in	 front	 of	 touch	 screen	 computers;	 they	
were	 visually	 separated	 by	 partitions	 and	 received	 written	 instructions	 (original	 German	
version	available	from	authors	upon	request).	Participants	interacted	by	means	of	a	network	
computer	 software	 developed	 in	 our	 research	 group	 (in	 Java).	 Through	 assignment	 of	
aliases,	 i.e.	 names	of	moons	of	 our	 solar	 system	 (e.g.	Kallisto,	 Leda,	Metis)	 anonymity	was	
ensured.	 The	 aliases	 could	 not	 be	 connected	with	 the	 participants’	 real	 identities.	 Initially	
participants	received	an	endowment	of	3.00€.	Payment	was	carried	out	by	using	envelopes	
with	 the	 participants’	 aliases	 to	 ensure	 anonymity	 (as	 described	 in	 Semmann	 et	al.	 2005;	
participants	knew	this	procedure	from	the	written	instructions	before	playing).	
In	 the	 prisoner’s	 dilemma	 stage	 participants	 could	 choose	 between	 the	 ORANGE	 and	
BLUE	option.	In	half	of	the	experimental	sessions	orange	represented	cooperation	and	blue	
defection,	in	the	other	half	the	reversed	pattern	was	used.	There	was	no	obvious	difference	
in	the	average	total	cooperation	level	on	whether	cooperation	was	represented	by	orange	or	
blue	 (Mann‐Whitney	 U‐test;	 dynamic	 network	 treatment:	 U	 =	 8,	 n1,2	 =	 5,	 p	 =	 0.42;	 static	
network	treatment:	U	=	9,	n1,2	=	5,	p	=	0.55).	
	
Active	link	breaking	rules		
In	 the	 prisoner’s	 dilemma	 stage	 as	 well	 as	 during	 link	 breaking	 participants	 could	 make	
independent	 decisions,	 i.e.	 to	 make	 different	 decisions	 for	 different	 partners.	 In	 the	
prisoner’s	dilemma	this	contrasts	theoretical	model	assumptions	where	individuals	play	one	
strategy	against	all	partners	(Pacheco	et	al.	2006a,	2006b,	2008).	
In	 the	 active‐link‐breaking	 stage	 we	 assumed	 for	 simplicity	 that	 all	 individuals	 would	
have	the	same	propensity	to	look	for	new	links	(as	in	e.g.	Pacheco	et	al.	2006a).	Furthermore,	
due	 to	 the	 randomness	 of	 receiving	 new	 partners,	 it	 was	 possible	 that	 some	 participants	
were	left	with	only	two	or	one	partner.	Participants	knew	these	conditions	from	the	written	
instructions.	 If	 a	 link	was	 not	 occupied	 participants	 received	 no	 payoff,	 which	 equals	 the	
payoff	if	a	linked	pair	mutually	defects	(0.00	€	each).	
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Screenshots:	decision	making	during	the	experiment		
During	 the	 experiment	 participants	were	 confronted	with	 different	 decisions.	 In	 the	 static	
network	 treatment	 participants	 saw	 Fig.	 S1	 and	 Fig.	 S2	 (however,	 no	 decisions	 could	 be	
made	here).	In	the	dynamic	network	treatment	participants	were	provided	with	Fig.	S1‐S3.	
	
	
	
	
Figure	S1	 In	 the	 prisoner’s	 dilemma	 stage	 participants	were	 asked	whether	 to	 play	 “orange”	 (orange,	 in	 this	
particular	case	cooperation)	or	“blau”	(blue,	defection)	and	had	to	make	one	decision	for	every	linked	partner.		
	
	
	
	
	
Figure	S2	Participants	were	provided	the	outcome	of	the	prisoner’s	dilemma	stage	(the	third	row	indicates	the	
participant’s	 payoff	 and	 the	 fifth	 row	 the	 partner’s	 payoff).	 In	 the	 active	 link	 breaking	 stage	 of	 the	 dynamic	
network	treatment	participants	were	asked	whether	they	wanted	to	keep	play	with	a	partner	and	could	answer	
“ja”	(yes)	or	“nein”	(no).	They	had	to	make	one	decision	for	every	linked	partner.		
Chapter	II					Cooperation	and	Self‐Organization	in	Networks 47
	
 
	
	
Figure	 S3	 In	 the	 dynamic	 network	 treatment	 participants	 were	 provided	 with	 a	 summary	 of	 the	 active	 link	
breaking	stage.	Here,	the	participant	continues	to	play	with	Rhea	(alias);	Dione	declined	to	keep	playing	with	the	
participant;	and	in	the	case	of	Nereid	the	participant	declined	to	continue	the	relationship.	Thus,	the	participant	
would	receive	two	new,	randomly	chosen	partners.		
	
	
Appendix	S2		Additional	analyses	
The	evolution	of	cooperation	
If	the	frequency	of	cooperative	pairs	is	found	to	be	high,	cooperation	is	favoured	(Pacheco	et	
al.	2006a,	2006b,	2008).	Thus,	 the	number	of	 links	between	cooperators	should	be	high	 in	
comparison	to	links	including	defectors.	Our	analysis	revealed	a	significantly	higher	average	
number	 of	 cooperative	 pairs	 (8.92	 ±	 1.43	 [mean	±	 SD])	 than	 pairs	 with	 one	 defector	
(3.15	±	0.73;	 Sign	 test:	 n	=	 10,	 P	<	0.01)	 and	 than	 defective	 pairs	 (2.36	±	1.01;	 n	=	10,	
p	<	0.01).	There	was	no	difference	in	the	average	number	of	pairs	when	one	of	them	defected	
and	when	both	defected	(Sign	test:	n	=	10,	p	=	0.11).	
Additionally,	 earnings	 were	 significantly	 greater	 in	 dynamic	 networks	 (average	 final	
payoff,	dynamic	network	treatment:	19.22€	±	1.73;	static	network	treatment:	16.05€	±	1.39;	
Mann‐Whitney	 U‐test:	U	=	 8,	 n1,2	 =	 10,	 p	<	 0.001)	 where	 the	 cooperative	 norm	was	 more	
prevalent.		
	
Results	of	the	computerized	post‐questionnaire		
After	 participants	 played	 the	 iterated	prisoner’s	 dilemma	 arranged	on	 a	 static	 or	 dynamic	
network,	they	completed	a	short	computerized	questionnaire	concerning	their	motivation	to	
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participate	 and	 their	decisions	during	 the	game	 (see	Fig.	S4	–	S7).	Pooled	answers	of	both	
treatments	 are	 presented,	 unless	 the	 question	 was	 only	 asked	 in	 the	 dynamic	 network	
treatment.		
Our	 participants	 stated	 to	 be	 strongly	motivated	 to	 earn	money	during	 the	 experiment	
(see	Fig.	S4).	This	goal	can	best	be	achieved	by	obtaining	the	temptation	payoff	of	0.40	€	(cf.	
Box	 1).	 Nevertheless,	 especially	 our	 participants	 from	 the	 dynamic	 network	 treatment	
reached	 high	 levels	 of	 cooperation.	 In	 addition,	 participants	 seemed	 to	 follow	 reciprocal	
strategies,	as	they	answered	that	their	decisions	to	cooperate	or	to	defect	were	conditional	
on	previous	decisions	of	their	partners	(see	Fig.	S5).		
	
																						 	
Figure	S4	Answers	of	participants	of	the	static	and	
dynamic	network	treatments	to	“I	have	tried	to	earn	
as	much	money	as	possible”	(n	=	200).	
	
Figure	S5	Answers	of	participants	of	the	static	and	
dynamic	 network	 treatments	 to	 “Which	 strategy	
(blue,	 orange)	 I	 played,	 depended	 a	 lot	 on	 the	
previous	 decisions	 of	 the	 respective	 partner”	
(n	=	200).	
	
	
																						
Figure	S6	 Answers	 of	 participants	 of	 the	 dynamic	
network	treatment	to	“Whether	I	continued	to	play	
with	 a	 partner	 depended	 a	 lot	 on	 his	 previous	
decisions”	(n	=	100).	
Figure	S7	 Answers	 of	 participants	 of	 the	 dynamic	
network	 treatment	 to	 “Have	 you	 played	 with	
Oberon	 at	 least	 once?”.	 The	 alias	 “Oberon”	 was	
never	 given	 to	 any	 participant,	 thus	 the	 answer	
should	be	“no”	(n	=	100).	
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A	great	majority	 (88	%)	 in	 the	dynamic	network	 treatment	 answered	 to	have	used	 the	
previous	decisions	of	a	partner	to	determine	whether	they	would	keep	or	break	this	link	(see	
Fig.	 S6).	 Furthermore,	 we	 asked	 participants	 in	 the	 dynamic	 network	 treatment	 whether	
they	could	remember	to	have	played	with	a	particular	partner.	We	presented	them	different	
aliases;	 one	 of	 them	 was	 a	 moon	 name	 never	 used	 as	 a	 participant’s	 alias	 during	 the	
experiment	(i.e.	Oberon).	Thus,	if	participants	made	use	of	aliases	to	consider	whether	they	
have	met	this	particular	partner	before	and	then	which	decisions	to	make	in	the	prisoner’s	
dilemma,	 then	 they	 should	 be	 able	 to	 recall	 that	 they	 have	 not	 been	paired	with	 the	non‐
existing	player.	 In	 line	with	 this	assumption,	only	11	participants	out	of	100	considered	to	
have	played	with	the	non‐existing	player	(see	Fig.	S7).	
	
	
Appendix	 S3	 	 Dynamic	 networks:	 Clustering	 and	 agent‐based	
simulations	
Clustering	Score	
In	our	assessment	of	network	clustering	we	considered	a	clustering	score	per	individual	in	
terms	of	whether	 “your	 friends	are	each	others	 friends”	 (triangular	motifs	 in	 the	network;	
from	here	on	“Friends	of	Friends”	or	FoF).	We	calculated	FoF	as:	
	
FoFir	=	∑∑	Lijr	Likr	Ljkr	
	
where	 individual	 i	 can	 be	 linked	 to	 individuals	 j,	 and	 k	 in	 round	 r.	 The	 link	 status	 is	
represented	by	L.	Lijr	=	1	when	individuals	i	and	j	have	been	linked	for	more	than	one	round	
in	round	r,	otherwise	Lijr	=	0.	Per	round	FoF	can	therefore	be	maximally	3	(all	neighbours	are	
each	other’s	 neighbours).	We	 then	 cumulatively	 sum	FoF	 scores	over	 all	 rounds.	Thus	 the	
maximal	 cluster	 score	 is	 87,	 where	 individuals	 are	 maximally	 clustered	 on	 every	 round.	
Because	we	only	count	clustering	when	all	the	links	defining	them	are	older	than	one	round,	
the	 stability	 of	 clusters	 in	 time	 becomes	 important	 for	 the	 clustering	 score.	 As	 long	 as	 a	
cluster	 is	stable	we	increment	the	score,	but	as	soon	as	one	link	is	broken	any	new	cluster	
has	to	be	in	existence	for	at	least	one	round	for	the	score	to	increase	again.	Thus	the	breaking	
up	 of	 clusters	will	 decrease	 the	 clustering	 score.	 Individuals	with	 high	 cluster	 scores	will	
therefore	be	those	interacting	within	“cliques”	that	are	stable	over	time.	
	
Clustering	under	random	link	breaking:	agent‐based	simulations		
We	ran	simulations	with	a	simple	model	implemented	in	the	C	programming	language.	Each	
simulation	emulated	a	single	experimental	session	of	10	individuals	each	with	a	maximum	of	
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3	 links	 over	 30	 rounds	 (time	 steps)	 of	 prisoner’s	 dilemma	 games.	 Simulations	 were	
initialized	with	the	same	initial	network	configuration	as	the	experiment	(see	Fig.	1).	Links	
were	broken	randomly,	and	individuals	were	re‐linked	as	in	the	experiment:	any	individuals	
with	fewer	than	3	links	was	re‐linked	randomly	to	another	individuals	with	less	than	3	links	
until	there	were	no	more	individuals	that	could	be	linked.		
To	compare	the	simulation	results	with	experimental	conditions	we	simulated	the	model	
using	 the	 average	 link	 breaking	 rates	 of	 30	 rounds	 over	 time	 obtained	 from	 each	
experimental	group	of	the	dynamic	network	treatment.	These	breaking	rates	decreased	over	
time,	which	 could	 in	 itself	 affect	 the	 stability	 of	 network	 clusters	 (more	 stable	with	 lower	
breaking	 rates).	 We	 took	 this	 into	 account	 by	 including	 this	 decrease	 in	 the	 simulations	
directly.	Thus,	decisions	with	whom	to	break	links	were	random	and	actual	break	rates	were	
pre‐fixed.	We	then	simulated	1000000	“experiments”.	To	calculate	an	overall	“experiment”	
average	(identical	 to	 the	experimental	data),	we	calculated	one	average	FoF	score	 from	10	
random	 selected	 simulated	 groups	 giving	 us	 100000	 “experiment”	 data	 points	 for	 the	
average	FoF	 score	under	 random	 link	breaking.	 From	 this	we	obtained	 the	distribution	of	
clustering	scores	expected	for	random	link	breaking	(7.35	±	0.38),	and	thus	could	determine	
whether	 the	 average	 clustering	 score	 obtained	 from	 our	 experimental	 groups	 was	
significantly	 greater	 than	would	 be	 expected	 under	 random	 link	 breaking.	 In	 this	way	we	
reveal	 the	 impact	 of	 active	 link	 breaking	 on	 individual	 neighbour	 selection	 and	 network	
structure.	
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Abstract	
Everybody	has	heard	of	neighbors,	who	have	been	fighting	over	some	minor	topic	for	years.	
The	 fight	 goes	 back	 and	 forth,	 giving	 the	 neighbors	 a	 hard	 time.	 This	 kind	 of	 reciprocal	
punishment	 is	 known	 as	 vendettas	 and	 is	 a	 cross‐cultural	 phenomenon.	 In	 general,	
punishment	 is	 seen	 as	 a	 mechanism	 for	 maintaining	 cooperative	 behavior.	 However,	 this	
kind	 of	 punishment	 excludes	 vendettas	 a	 priori.	 Vendettas	 pose	 a	 special	 kind	 of	
evolutionary	problem,	since	they	incur	high	costs	on	individuals,	i.e.	costs	of	punishing	plus	
costs	 of	 being	 punished,	 without	 any	 benefits.	 Theoretically	 speaking	 vendettas	 do	 not	
evolve	under	natural	selection.	However,	we	find	that	under	experimental	conditions	human	
participants	retaliated	frequently	and	contradictory	to	theory	even	engaged	in	cost‐intense	
punishment	 vendettas,	 especially	 when	 punishment	 was	 unjustified	 or	 rather	 ambiguous.	
Punishment	 was	 targeted	 at	 defectors	 in	 the	 beginning,	 but	 soon	 provocations	 led	 to	
mushrooming	of	counter‐punishments.	Remarkably,	participants	were,	nevertheless,	able	to	
enhance	 cooperation	 levels	 in	 a	 public	 goods	 game.	 Some	 participants	 even	 seemed	 to	
anticipate	the	outbreak	of	costly	vendettas	and	delayed	their	punishment	to	the	last	possible	
moment.	 Overall,	 results	 indicate	 that	 current	 evolutionary	 models	 fail	 to	 consider	 an	
important	 aspect	 of	 interactions,	 which	 conjecturally	 include	 concerns	 of	 equity	 and	
reputation.	
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Introduction	
Many	species,	especially	humans,	 frequently	cooperate	and	provide	help	 to	each	other	(for	
recent	 reviews,	 see	 e.g.	 Pennisi	 2009;	 Melis	 &	 Semmann	 2010).	 Cooperative	 behavior	
prevails	despite	theoretical	problems	explaining	its	evolution.	That	is	why	cooperate	if	one	
could	 enjoy	 the	 benefits	 provided	 by	 others	 and	 refrain	 from	 costly	 cooperative	 behavior	
oneself?	 This	 is	 the	 so‐called	 free‐rider	 problem	 (Dawes	 1980).	 One	 hotly	 debated	
mechanism	to	prevent	free‐riding	is	punishment	–	a	widely	spread	behavior	among	humans	
and	 animals	 (for	 reviews,	 see	 Clutton‐Brock	&	 Parker	 1995;	 Sigmund	 2007;	 Jensen	 2010;	
Milinski	&	Rockenback	in	press).	However,	punishment	can	escalate	into	vendettas	where	“I	
punish	you,	because	you	punished	me;	but	you	already	punished	me,	because	I	punished	you	
before”,	and	so	on.	How	can	punishment	then	be	beneficial	for	cooperation?	
Punishment	 is	understood	as	a	behavior	 that	has	costs	 for	 the	opponent	and	somewhat	
lower	costs	to	the	punishing	individual	itself.	As	punishment	is	costly,	there	is	no	incentive	to	
do	 so.	 This	 situation	 is	 analogous	 to	 the	 free‐rider	 problem	 of	 cooperation,	whereby	 non‐
punishers	 represent	 second‐order	 free‐riders	 (Boyd	&	Richerson	1992).	The	 second‐order	
free‐rider	 problem	 has	 been	 investigated	 intensively	 and	 under	 certain	 conditions	
punishment	 is	 evolutionary	 stable	 (Henrich	 &	 Boyd	 2001;	 Boyd	 et	 al.	 2003;	 Brandt	 et	 al.	
2003;	Gintis	et	al.	2003;	Fowler	2005;	Hauert	et	al.	2007).	Moreover,	an	extensive	amount	of	
experimental	 research	 shows	 that	 humans	 employ	 costly	 punishment	 and	 that	 thereby	
cooperation	 is	 enhanced	 (e.g.	 Yamagishi	 1986;	 Ostrom	 et	 al.	 1992;	 Fehr	 &	 Gächter	 2002;	
Rockenbach	&	Milinski	2006;	Egas	&	Riedl	2008;	Gächter	et	al.	2008;	Herrmann	et	al.	2008;	
but	see	Wu	et	al.	2009).	Even	symbolic	gestures	of	punishment	(Masclet	et	al.	2003)	and	the	
mere	 threat	 of	 punishment	 (Fehr	 &	 Gächter	 2002)	 raise	 cooperation	 levels.	 However,	
earnings	 are	 usually	 negatively	 affected,	 because	 the	 costs	 of	 punishment	 cannot	 be	
compensated	by	higher	cooperative	benefits	(Ostrom	et	al.	1992;	Fehr	&	Gächter	2002;	Egas	
&	 Riedl	 2008).	 On	 the	 other	 hand,	 if	 interactions	 last	 very	 long,	 negative	 effects	 of	
punishment	costs	can	be	overcome	at	the	group	level	(Gächter	et	al.	2008).	
Previous	research	in	the	area	of	costly	punishment	has	mainly	concentrated	on	situations	
where	punishment	cannot	be	retaliated	 (e.g.	Henrich	&	Boyd	2001;	Fehr	&	Gächter	2002).	
Under	most	 natural	 conditions	 this	 is	 not	 true,	 i.e.	 usually	 punishment	 can	be	 avenged	by	
victims.	One	only	needs	to	look	at	the	epic	dramas	that	have	been	described	in	history	and	
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literature.	For	 instance,	 Shakespeare	 (1954)	wrote	about	 it	 in	Romeo	and	 Juliet	where	 the	
Montague	and	Capulet	 families	were	deeply	 involved	 in	a	 vendetta.	Vendettas	are	a	 cross‐
cultural	phenomenon	(Ericksen	&	Horton	1992).	There	are	blood	vendettas	between	Turkish	
farmers	lasting	as	long	as	60	years	(İçli	1994).	Vendettas	occurred	in	the	Mediterranean	area	
in	 the	 nineteenth‐century	 (Gould	 2000)	 and	 they	 proliferate	 in	 science	 (Hellman	 1998,	
2006).	 Sometimes	 these	 vendettas	 escalate	 and	 then	 one	 reads	 headlines	 like	 “A	 20‐year	
feud	 between	 two	 neighbors	 […]	 revved	 up	 this	 week,	 ending	 in	 bloodshed”	 (The	 Local	
2010).	 These	 yearlong	 vendettas	 often	 begin	 with	 a	 punishment	 of	 one	 party,	 which	 is	
perceived	 as	 unjustified	 by	 the	 victim	 (Stillwell	et	al.	 2008),	 and	 turn	 into	 a	more	 serious	
conflict.	
Recently,	there	has	been	growing	interest	in	the	effect	of	retaliation	on	cooperative	games	
with	 punishment	 (Denant‐Boemont	 et	 al.	 2007;	 Dreber	 et	 al.	 2008;	 Nikiforakis	 2008;	
Nicklisch	 &	 Wolff	 2009).	 They	 show	 that	 humans	 avenge	 punishment	 regardless	 of	 its	
negative	 effect	 on	 payoffs.	 However,	 in	 most	 cases	 cooperation	 cannot	 be	 sustained	 by	
revengeful	 punishment.	 Up	 to	 now	 the	 possibility	 that	 punishment	 can	 escalate	 into	
vendettas	 has	 been	 disregarded	 by	 restricting	 punishment	 to	 a	 single	 retaliation	 stage	
(Denant‐Boemont	et	al.	2007;	Janssen	&	Bushman	2008;	Nikiforakis	2008).	In	other	works,	
the	 focus	 lays	 on	 other	 topics	 neglecting	 the	 analysis	 of	 possible	 escalations	 (Denant‐
Boemont	 et	 al.	 2007;	 Dreber	 et	 al.	 2008;	 Nicklisch	 &	 Wolff	 2009).	 Only	 Nikiforakis	 and	
Engelmann	have	explicitly	studied	vendettas,	but	the	interpretation	of	their	results	remains	
unclear	due	 to	discrepancies	between	 two	paper	versions	(Nikiforakis	&	Engelmann	2008,	
2011).	 Their	 participant	 samples	 comes	 from	 different	 countries	 (i.e.	 London,	 UK	 and	
Melbourne,	Australia;	which	 include	differences	 in	 the	experimental	procedures,	e.g.	group	
size	differences),	but	vendettas	only	occur	in	Melbourne	(which	is	not	explicitly	stated	in	the	
2011	 version).	 This,	 however,	 seems	 crucial,	 as	 the	 occurrence	 (or	 non‐occurrence)	 of	
vendettas	 goes	 along	with	 different	 results	 and	 conclusions	 about	 the	 effect	 of	 escalating	
punishment	 on	 cooperation	 levels	 and	 earnings	 for	 the	 London‐sample	 (2008)	 and	 the	
combined	 samples	 (2011).	 Hence,	 while	 reporting	 no	 country	 differences	 for	 first‐stage	
punishment,	country	differences	for	vendettas	are	not	discussed	even	though	vendettas	are	
their	main	 focus.	Hence,	 the	 issue	of	whether	humans	engage	 in	 costly	punishment,	which	
can	escalate	into	vendettas,	and	how	cooperation	is	affected	remains	unanswered.	
Despite	the	vengefulness	observed	in	humans,	theoretical	research	shows	that	vendettas	
of	 punishment	 are	 not	 an	 evolutionary	 stable	 behavior.	 In	 repeated	 interactions	 the	 best	
respond	 to	 an	 opponent’s	 defection	 is	 defection	 and	 not	 punishment.	 On	 top	 of	 that,	
defection	 is	 preferred	 as	 a	 response	 to	 an	 opponent’s	 punishment	 (Rand	 et	al.	 2009b).	 In	
other	words,	one	expects	little	punishment	and	no	vendettas.	Furthermore,	though	a	single	
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stage	 of	 retaliation	 is	 not	 enough	 to	 stabilize	 cooperative	 behavior	 (Janssen	 &	 Bushman	
2008),	 it	 can	be	beneficial	 for	 the	evolution	of	 cooperation	based	on	a	 conformism	bias	 to	
have	more	 than	 three	opportunities	 to	punish	 and	punish	back	 (Wolff	 2009).	However,	 in	
either	 case	 individuals	 should	 abstain	 from	 counter‐punishing	 and	 let	 the	 mere	 threat	
operate.	 In	 line	 with	 this,	 concealing	 the	 punisher’s	 identity,	 and	 thus	 making	 retaliation	
harder,	 has	 positive	 effects	 on	 cooperation	 (Janssen	 &	 Bushman	 2008).	 Therefore	 from	 a	
theoretical	point	of	view,	one	does	not	expect	to	find	vendettas	of	punishment	in	cooperative	
games.	
In	 this	 study	we	 allow	 for	 vendettas	 by	 combining	 the	 public	 goods	 game	 (PG;	 Hardin	
1968;	 Ledyard	 1995)	 with	 multiple	 rounds	 of	 costly	 punishment.	 In	 this	 setting,	 we	 can	
investigate	 the	 occurrence	 of	 vendettas,	 as	 it	 is	more	 realistic	 to	 assume	 that	 victims	 can	
punish	 their	 punisher	 in	 the	 same	 way	 immediately	 or	 later.	 Rational	 choice	 theory,	
however,	 assumes	 that	people	 should	 take	 this	behavior	 into	 account.	They	 should	 reason	
that	if	they	punish	others	and	when	there	is	the	possibility	to	be	punished	back,	they	not	only	
will	have	to	pay	to	punish,	but	also	the	fine	imposed	on	them	due	to	being	punished	by	their	
victim.	This	leads	to	exaggerated	costs	of	punishment	that	should	be	avoided	by	the	rational	
individual.	Following	this	logic,	if	there	is	no	punishment,	then	there	is	no	incentive	to	invest	
in	 the	 PG	 anymore.	 Nevertheless,	 studies	 of	 costly	 punishment	 where	 vendettas	 are	
impossible	 show	 that	 people	 do	 indeed	 engage	 in	 punishment,	 which	 then	 stabilizes	 PG	
contributions	 (e.g.	 Fehr	 &	 Gächter	 2002).	 Therefore,	 albeit	 the	 high	 costs	 of	 possible	
vendettas,	we	expect	participants	to	engage	in	punishment.	Additionally,	we	also	anticipate	
the	occurrence	of	vendettas,	as	they	are	observed	in	the	real	world.	Subsequently,	it	will	be	
highly	 interesting	 to	 see	 how	 cooperative	 behavior	 and	 overall	 payoffs	 in	 the	 PG	 will	 be	
affected.	
	
	
Methods	
First‐semester	 biology	 students	 from	 the	 Universities	 of	 Kiel,	 Hamburg	 and	 Münster,	
Germany,	 as	 well	 as	 Vienna,	 Austria,	 joined	 the	 experiment	 voluntarily.	 A	 total	 of	 96	
participants	 were	 randomly	 assigned	 into	 6	 sessions	 of	 16	 participants	 each.	 In	 each	
experimental	session,	participants	were	randomly	seated	in	front	of	an	individual	computer	
with	 partitions	 between	 participants.	 In	 order	 not	 to	 disclose	 their	 real	 identity,	 but	 still	
allow	 for	 individual	 recognition	 within	 the	 game,	 participants	 received	 an	 alias	 at	 the	
beginning	of	 the	game.	Participants	were	 told	 that	 they	have	 to	make	decisions	during	 the	
experiment	whether	to	invest	their	money	or	not	in	different	situations.	A	short	introduction	
ensured	 that	 the	 participants	 understood	 how	 to	 handle	 the	 computer,	 that	 they	 are	
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completely	anonymous	throughout	and	after	the	game	concerning	their	behavior	within	the	
experiment,	 that	they	should	not	talk	to	one	another	or	draw	attention	to	them	during	the	
experiment	 and	 that	 they	 will	 receive	 all	 their	 earnings	 anonymously	 in	 cash.	 After	 the	
experiment,	each	participant	could	collect	her	earnings	out	of	an	envelope	entitled	with	her	
alias	 from	 behind	 partitions	 (as	 described	 in	 Semmann	 et	al.	 2005).	 Thus,	 the	 participant	
herself	 was	 the	 only	 person	 who	 knew	 her	 identity	 in	 the	 experiment.	 The	 experimental	
sessions	 lasted	 about	 60	 minutes	 and	 participants	 earned	 on	 average	 13.41€	 ±	 6.92	
(mean	±	SD).	
Our	 experimental	 design	 follows	 the	 one	 of	 Fehr	 and	 Gächter	 (2002)	 where	 the	
participants	were	 arranged	 into	 subgroups	 of	 four	 individuals	 each,	 and	 first	 played	 a	 PG	
round	 followed	 by	 the	 possibility	 to	 punish	 other	members	 of	 the	 subgroup.	 The	 starting	
money	was	 set	 to	20€	 for	 each	participant.	 In	 the	PG	 situation,	participants	had	 to	decide	
whether	 or	 not	 to	 contribute	 1.00€	 to	 a	 PG.	 They	 were	 informed	 that	 the	 sum	 of	 all	
contributions	will	be	multiplied	by	1.6	and	distributed	equally	among	all	subgroup	members	
irrespective	 of	 their	 contribution	 (0.00	 or	 1.00€;	 this	 is	 in	 contrast	 to	 the	 continuous	
contributions	in	Fehr	&	Gächter	2002).	With	a	group	size	of	four,	this	results	in	a	marginal	
PG	payoff	of	0.4.	 In	the	following	punishment	round,	participants	were	informed	about	the	
PG	investments	of	all	subgroup	members	and	could	then	assign	a	punishment	from	0	to	10	
units	 (each	unit	 represents	0.10€)	 for	 each	 subgroup	member	 separately.	 Following	again	
Fehr	and	Gächter,	each	point	of	punishment	assigned	resulted	in	a	threefold	fine	to	be	paid	
by	 the	 punished	 subgroup	member.	 If	 for	 instance	 a	 player	 invested	 0.30€	 (=	 3	 units)	 to	
punish	somebody,	the	account	of	the	punished	member	was	reduced	by	0.90€	(=	9	units).	
The	 difference	 to	 the	 previous	 study	 is	 that	 instead	 of	 just	 one,	 a	 sequence	 of	 five	
punishment	 rounds	 was	 played	 after	 the	 initial	 PG	 round.	 In	 these	 successive	 rounds	
participants	 were	 provided	 with	 complete	 information	 about	 previous	 punishment	
investments	 of	 all	 subgroup	members.	 Thus,	 in	 addition	 to	 the	 others’	 PG	 decisions,	 they	
knew	exactly	who	punished	whom	with	how	much	money	for	each	previous	round.	In	each	
experimental	session	16	participants	played	the	mentioned	sequence	of	rounds	(PG	followed	
by	 five	 punishment	 rounds)	 three	 times	 (=	 three	 periods).	 Between	 each	 period,	 the	
participants	were	reshuffled	into	new	subgroups	of	four	individuals	in	a	way	that	excluded	
any	kind	of	reputation	building	and	direct	reciprocity	between	periods.	No	participant,	being	
aware	of	this	condition,	did	ever	meet	a	previous	subgroup	member	in	later	periods	again.	
For	statistical	analyses	SPSS	18.0.2	and	R	2.12.1	were	used.	A	5%‐level	of	significance	is	
used	and	probabilities	are	reported	as	two	tailed.	Furthermore,	analyses	were	done	on	the	
session	 level,	 if	 not	 stated	 otherwise.	 Exceptions	 are	 the	 generalized	 linear	mixed	models	
where	session	effects	are	considered	in	terms	of	random	factors.	
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Results	
Cooperation	in	the	public	goods	game	
As	 the	 research	 design	 is	 adopted	 from	 Fehr	 and	 Gächter	 (2002),	 we	 also	 applied	 their	
statistical	analysis	where	this	is	feasible.	Our	results	show	that	the	level	of	cooperation	in	the	
PG	round	increased	(comparing	period	1	vs.	period	3;	Wilcoxon	signed‐rank	test:	Z	=	2.21,	
n	=	6,	p	<	0.05;	see	Fig.	1).	
	
	
	
Figure	1	Average	cooperation	in	the	public	goods	rounds	(+	SD).	Cooperation	levels	significantly	increased	over	
time	(comparing	period	1	vs.	period	3;	Wilcoxon	signed‐rank	test:	Z	=	2.21,	n	=	6,	p	<	0.05).		
	
Punishment	after	the	public	goods	round	
Punishment	was	 frequent.	 In	 overall	 15	 rounds	 of	 punishment	 and	with	 the	 possibility	 to	
punish	 up	 to	 three	 subgroup	members,	 85.4%	 of	 the	 participants	 punished	 at	 least	 once;	
52.1%	 at	 least	 five	 times;	 and	 21.9%	 at	 least	 10	 times.	 Within	 period	 1	 investment	 in	
punishment	did	not	change	over	 the	 five	 rounds	of	punishment	 (see	Fig.	2;	Friedman	 test:	
²	=	2.12,	df	=	4,	n	=	6,	p	=	0.71).	However,	we	found	significant	changes	in	periods	2	and	3	
(Friedman	test:	period	2,	²	=	11.42,	df	=	4,	n	=	6,	p	<	0.05;	period	3,	²	=	14.08,	df	=	4,	n	=	6,	
p	<	0.01).	 In	period	1,	participants	did	not	yet	know	 the	 total	number	of	 rounds	played	 in	
each	 period,	 afterwards	 they	 could	 guess.	 In	 periods	 2	 and	 3,	we	 observed	 an	 increase	 in	
punishment	 investment	 in	 the	 very	 last	 round.	 To	 analyze	 this	 last	 round	 effect,	 we	
compared	punishment	in	the	last	and	the	second‐last	round.	The	respective	differences	were	
significantly	different	 in	period	2	(Wilcoxon	signed‐rank	test:	Z	=	2.20,	n	=	6,	p	<	0.05)	and	
we	 found	a	 trend	 in	period	3	 (Z	=	1.58,	n	=	6,	p	=	0.12).	Further	analysis	 revealed	 that	 the	
high	punishment	investment	in	round	5	was	due	to	few	participants	(in	each	period:	10	out	
of	96),	who	invested	high	amounts	to	punish	(period	2:	0.85€	±	0.23;	period	3:	0.91€	±	0.19).	
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These	participants	 revenged	 their	punishment	of	 round	4	 (period	2:	30%;	period	3:	26%),	
but	also	delayed	their	revenge	of	being	punished	in	rounds	1	to	3	(period	2:	40%;	period	3:	
47%).		
		
	
	
Figure	2	Average	punishment	investment	(+	SD)	per	player.	In	each	of	the	three	periods	participants	played	one	
round	of	public	good	followed	by	five	rounds	of	punishment.	
	
Multiple	 rounds	of	 punishment	 allow	participants	 to	punish	back	 after	 receiving	 a	 fine.	
Indeed	on	average	up	to	80%	retaliated	their	punishment	(period	1:	0.80%	±	0.09;	period	2:	
0.58%	±	 0.20;	 period	3:	 0.42%	±	 0.17).	Within	 acts	 of	 punishment	 there	was	 a	 significant	
relationship	 between	 punishment	 investment	 by	 the	 punisher	 and	 counter‐punishment	
investment	 by	 the	 opponent.	 We	 used	 generalized	 linear	 mix	 effect	 models	 (GLMMs),	 in	
which	we	included	punisher	 identity	and	counter‐punisher	 identity	nested	within	sessions	as	
random	 factors,	 to	 model	 the	 received	 counter‐punishment	 (0	 to	 10	 units)	 in	 the	 current	
round	 as	 a	 function	 of	original	punishment	 (1	 to	 10	 units)	 in	 the	 previous	 round.	 GLMMs	
were	 fitted	 by	 Laplace	 approximation	 assuming	 Poisson	 error	 distribution.	We	 found	 that	
the	 higher	 the	 original	 fine	 the	 higher	 the	 counter‐punishment	 (round	 1	 –	 round	 2:																
intercept	 =	 ‐0.85,	 SE	 =	 0.25,	 p	 <	 0.001;	 β	 =	 0.15,	 SE	 =	 0.06,	 p	 <	 0.05;	 round	 2	 –	 round	3:	
intercept	 =	 ‐0.61,	 SE	=	0.24,	 p	 <	 0.05;	 β	 =	 0.18,	 SE	 =	 0.06,	 p	 <	 0.01;	 round	 3	 –	 round	4:	
intercept	 =	 ‐0.75,	SE	=	0.21,	p	 <	 0.001;	β	 =	 0.23,	SE	 =	 0.04,	p	 <	 0.001;	 round	 4	 –	 round	 5:	
intercept	=	‐1.03,	SE	=	0.30,	p	<	0.001;	β	=	0.17,	SE	=	0.04,	p	<	0.001).		
To	analyze	the	motives	of	participants	to	punish	we	used	GLMMs	to	model	punishment	(0	
to	10	units)	as	a	function	of	participant’s	and	opponent’s	PG	decisions,	subgroup	members’	PG	
decisions,	and	provocation	 (i.e.	 in	punishment	rounds	2	to	5	the	punishment	 investment	by	
the	 opponent	 in	 the	 previous	 round).	 We	 controlled	 for	 differences	 in	 periods	 and	 in	
participants,	 who	 are	 nested	 within	 experimental	 sessions,	 and	 included	 these	 as	 random	
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factors.	 We	 looked	 at	 the	 given	 models	 for	 each	 punishment	 round	 separately;	 hereby	
allowing	motives	 for	punishment	 to	differ	between	rounds.	GLMMs	were	 fitted	by	Laplace	
approximation	assuming	Poisson	error	distribution.	The	variance	inflation	factors	are	all	less	
than	1.25,	which	indicates	that	multicollinearity	is	not	a	problem	in	the	models’	estimations	
(Greene	2008).	In	punishment	round	1	the	participant’s	and	her	opponent’s	behavior	in	the	
PG	 predicted	 the	 punishment	 investment	 of	 the	 participant,	 i.e.	 if	 both	 contributed	 then	
punishment	 became	 less	 likely	 (see	 Tab.	 1).	 In	 subsequent	 rounds	 of	 punishment	 the	
importance	 of	 the	 PG	 behavior	 varies.	 However,	 the	 behavior	 of	 the	 two	 other	 subgroup	
members	is	now	important,	as	the	more	of	them	contributed,	the	more	likely	punishment	of	
the	remaining	subgroup	member	became.	 In	addition,	 the	previous	amount	of	punishment	
by	 the	 opponent	 significantly	 increased	 investments	 by	 the	 participant	 to	 punish	 the	
opponent	in	the	current	round.		
	
	Table	1	Results	of	the	generalized	linear	mixed	models	to	model	punishment	investment.		
	
	 round	1	 round	2	 round	3	 round	4	 round	5	
intercept	 ‐3.36	***	(0.33)	
‐3.45	***	
(0.43)	
‐3.64	***	
(0.49)	
‐3.52	***	
(0.38)	
‐2.97	***	
(0.35)	
P	contributed	and	O	did	
not	contribute	into	the	PG	1	
	2.55	***	
(0.20)	
	0.71	**	
(0.25)	
	1.07	***	
(0.24)	
‐0.20		
(0.24)	
‐0.02		
(0.17)	
P	did	not	contribute	and	O	
contributed	into	the	PG	1	
	0.72	**	
(0.27)	
	0.82	***	
(0.22)	
	0.83	***	
(0.23)	
	0.39		
(0.23)	
‐0.47	***	
(0.14)	
P	and	O	did	not	contribute	
into	the	PG	1	
	1.33	***	
(0.26)	
	0.72	**	
(0.26)	
	0.84	***	
(0.24)	
‐0.61	*	
(0.28)	
‐0.17	
(0.18)	
other	two	subgroup	
members’	behavior	in	PG	2	
	0.17		
(0.10)	
	0.22	*	
(0.11)	
	0.28	**	
(0.11)	
	0.47	***	
(0.12)	
	0.30	***	
(0.09)	
provocation	 	n/a	 	0.48	***	(0.04)	
	0.42	***	
(0.03)	
	0.43	***	
(0.03)	
	0.20	***	
(0.02)	
	
Note:	Provided	are	the	estimates,	the	standard	errors	in	brackets	and	the	p‐values	as	*	p	<	0.05,	**	p	<	0.01,	***	p	<	0.001.	
The	period,	 the	participant’s	 identity	and	the	experimental	session	were	added	as	random	factor	in	all	models	(n	=	864,	 in	
each	round	96	participants	could	punish	up	to	3	subgroup	members	in	3	periods).	For	punishment	in	round	1	no	previous	
provocation	(in	terms	of	punishment	investment	by	the	opponent	in	the	previous	round)	is	possible.		
1	 The	contribution	of	both,	the	participant	(P)	and	her	opponent	(O),	into	the	public	good	(PG)	served	as	reference	group	of	
the	categorical	fixed	factor	participant’s	and	opponent’s	PG	decisions.	
2		The	behavior	of	the	remaining	two	subgroup	members	was	coded	as	0,	1,	or	both	contributed	into	the	PG.	
	
In	 line	 with	 the	 results	 from	 the	 GLMMs	 for	 punishment	 round	 1,	 punishment	 was	
directed	 at	 non‐contributing	 (i.e.	 defecting)	 participants.	 In	 particular,	 contributors,	 who	
punished	 defectors,	 spend	 the	 most	 money	 on	 punishment	 (see	 Fig.	 3;	 punishment	
significantly	differs	between	outcomes	of	PG	behavior	of	punisher	and	opponent:	Friedman	
test,	²	=	12.2,	df	=	3,	n	=	6,	p	<	0.01).	 In	all	subsequent	rounds	the	punishment	investment	
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did	 not	 differ	 according	 to	 the	 PG	 behavior	 of	 the	 punisher	 and	 the	 opponent	 (see	
Supplementary	Information,	Fig.	S1).	This	is	in	line	with	the	GLMMs,	as	they	showed	that	now	
the	behavior	of	other	subgroup	members	and	provocations	gained	importance.	
	
	 								 	
Figure	3	Average	punishment	investment	(+	SD)	in	
the	 first	 round	 of	 punishment	 (pooled	 over	 all	
periods).	 Participants	 could	 either	 contribute	 into	
the	 public	 good,	 C,	 or	 defect,	 D.	 Hence,	 in	 CD	 a	
contributor	 punished	 a	 defector	 (CC,	 DC,	 DD,	
respectively;	Friedman	test:	²	=	12.2,	df	=	3,	n	=	6,	
p	<	0.01).		
 
	
Figure	4	Frequencies	where	a	participant	punished	
a	 subgroup	 member	 in	 punishment	 round	 1	 and	
either	 a	 vendetta	 or	 no	 vendetta	 occurred	 (pooled	
over	 all	 periods).	 Punishment	 was	 classified	 as	
justified	 if	 a	 contributing	 participant	 punished	 a	
non‐contributor	 (n	 =	 106,	 individual	 level);	 it	 was	
termed	unjustified	if	a	non‐contributing	participant	
punished	 a	 contributor	 (n	 =	 26);	 all	 other	 cases	
were	 rather	 ambiguous	 and	 not	 further	 classified	
(n	=	42).	
	
	
Vendettas	of	costly	punishment		
A	minimum	of	three	sequential	punishments	was	defined	as	a	vendetta,	i.e.	player	A	started	
by	punishing	player	B,	who	retaliated	this	punishment,	and	was	again	punished	by	player	A	
in	 the	 next	 round.	 In	 the	 experiment,	 we	 observed	 71	 vendettas	 in	 total.	 On	 average	
participants	 were	 involved	 in	 1.48	 ±	 0.88	 vendettas	 and	 vendettas	 lasted	 on	 average	
3.89	±	0.39	 rounds.	 In	 addition,	 a	 clear	 pattern	 arises	 when	 looking	 at	 punishments	 in	
round	1	and	whether	a	vendetta	developed	or	not	on	the	level	of	individual	interactions	(see	
Fig.	 4).	 Justified	punishment	of	 a	non‐contributor	by	a	 contributor	was	most	 frequent,	 but	
did	 not	 lead	 to	 vendettas	 in	 most	 cases	 (77%).	 All	 other	 punishments,	 i.e.	 unjustified	
punishment	of	a	contributor	by	a	non‐contributing	participant	and	ambiguous	punishment	
(a	 contributor	 punished	 a	 contributor;	 or	 non‐contributor	 punished	 a	 non‐contributor),	
triggered	a	vendetta	in	about	50%	of	the	time.	Those	players	engaging	in	vendettas	pay	large	
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costs,	 since	 it	 includes	 their	 punishment	 investment	 and	 counter‐punishment	 fines.	
Comparing	average	payoffs	of	participants	that	were	involved	in	vendettas	(10.44€	±	4.25)	
and	 participants	 that	 were	 never	 involved	 in	 a	 vendetta	 (i.e.	 neither	 started	 one	 nor	 did	
counter‐punish	 that	 resulted	 in	 a	 vendetta;	 17.05€	±	 1.29)	 showed,	 that	 the	 latter	 earned	
significantly	more	money	(sign	test:	n	=	6,	p	<	0.05).	This	 is	also	true	for	players	retaliating	
punishment	(11.87€	±	2.84)	versus	players	refraining	completely	from	retaliating	(17.15€	±	
1.34;	sign	test:	n	=	6,	p	<	0.05).	
	
	
Discussion	
Just	as	vendettas	occur	under	natural	conditions	(Ericksen	&	Horton	1992;	İçli	1994;	Gould	
2000),	so	did	the	participants	in	our	experiment	of	a	public	goods	game	with	five	rounds	of	
punishment	frequently	engage	in	vendettas.	This	happened	even	though	vendettas	are	cost‐
intense,	 as	one	has	 to	pay	 costs	 for	punishing	 and	 costs	 for	being	punished;	multiplied	by	
several	 instances.	Nevertheless,	we	 find	 that	participants	 frequently	 retaliated	punishment	
and	 that	 each	 participant	 was	 involved	 in	 on	 average	 1.5	 vendettas,	 i.e.	 at	 least	 three	
sequential	rounds	of	punishment,	during	the	experiment.	Despite	the	costliness	of	vendettas	
(i.e.	 they	 significantly	 reduced	 earnings	 compared	 to	 players,	 who	 abstained	 completely	
from	vendettas)	we	observed	an‐eye‐for‐an‐eye	counter‐punishment.	This	supports	the	view	
that	counter‐punishment	possibly	escalating	 into	vendettas	 is	due	to	an	attempt	 to	restore	
equity	between	participants	(Adams	1965;	Fehr	&	Schmidt	1999;	Dawes	et	al.	2007;	Stillwell	
et	al.	2008;	Brosnan	et	al.	2010).	In	the	example	of	fighting	neighbors,	both	see	themselves	as	
victims	and	both	go	on	to	restore	(subjective)	justice.	The	durations	of	vendettas	were	rather	
long.	 In	 fact,	 participants’	 vendettas	 lasted	 on	 average	 about	 four	 out	 of	 five	 rounds.	
Vendettas	normally	started	with	an	unjustified	punishment	(i.e.	a	non‐contributor	punished	
a	 contributor),	 or	 when	 the	 meaning	 of	 the	 punishment	 was	 rather	 ambiguous	 (i.e.	 a	
contributor	punished	a	contributor;	or	non‐contributor	punished	a	non‐contributor).	When	
the	 punished	 individual	 had	 defected	 and	 was	 “properly”	 punished	 by	 a	 cooperative	
participant	then	vendettas	seldomly	started	(i.e.	only	in	23%	of	all	cases).	The	initial	social	
interaction	 of	 the	 PG	 was	 relevant	 for	 the	 first	 punishment,	 i.e.	 defectors	 attracted	 the	
highest	 punishment.	 In	 later	 rounds	 players	 primarily	 reacted	 to	 provocations	 (previous	
punishment).	In	addition,	participants	relied	on	the	behavior	of	other	subgroup	members	as	
a	social	reference	point:	the	more	those	cooperated	the	more	likely	the	remaining	subgroup	
member	deserved	punishment.	
Despite	 the	 frequency	 of	 costly	 punishment,	 retaliations,	 and	 even	 vendettas	
cooperativity	 increased	 over	 time.	 This	 occurred	 even	 though	 direct	 reciprocity	 and	
Chapter	III					Vendettas	of	Costly	Punishment 61
	
 
reputation	building	between	PG	rounds	was	excluded.	Results	contradict	earlier	findings	of	
revengeful	 punishment	 where	 cooperation	 is	 not	 sustained	 (Denant‐Boemont	 et	 al.	 2007;	
Nikiforakis	 2008).	 The	 increase	 of	 cooperation	 is	 presumably	 due	 to	 the	 effect	 of	 the	 first	
punishment	 round	 where	 high	 amounts	 of	 punishment	 were	 targeted	 at	 defecting	
participants.	Punishment	of	non‐contributors	as	a	direct	response	to	their	defection	(though	
without	the	possibility	of	escalating	punishments)	is	also	observed	in	previous	studies	(Fehr	
&	 Gächter	 2002;	 Egas	 &	 Riedl	 2008).	 Nevertheless,	 in	 experiments	 earnings	 are	 usually	
negatively	affected	(e.g.	Fehr	&	Gächter	2002;	Egas	&	Riedl	2008),	which	is	especially	true	for	
participants,	 who	 engaged	 in	 retaliation	 and	 vendettas.	 This	 makes	 punishment	 as	 a	
mechanism	to	solve	 the	 free‐rider	problems	 in	PG	situations	unlikely	 (Dreber	et	al.	 2008).	
Furthermore,	just	as	we	so	do	experimental	studies	report	of	unjustified	punishment,	which	
in	general	has	been	termed	anti‐social	punishment	(Wu	et	al.	2009;	Denant‐Boemont	et	al.	
2007;	Nikiforakis	 2008;	Dreber	 et	al.	 2008).	However,	 the	 evolution	 of	 cooperation	 is	 not	
supported	in	the	presence	of	anti‐social	punishment	(Gächter	et	al.	2010;	Rand	et	al.	2010).	
In	 our	 study,	 anti‐social	 punishment	 acts	 frequently	 led	 to	 vendettas,	making	 the	 original	
unjustified	 or	 anti‐social	 punishment	 very	 costly.	 Given	 that	punishment	 can	 escalate,	 this	
could	serve	as	means	to	reduce	anti‐social	punishment	to	a	minimum	over	time.		
Remarkably,	 by	 quickly	 adjusting	 to	 the	 given	 experimental	 set‐up	 some	 participants	
were	able	 to	avoid	 costly	vendettas	 (as	 soon	as	 they	could	guess	 the	number	of	 rounds	 in	
later	 periods).	 As	 an	 indication	 for	 avoiding	 retaliation	 and	 the	 possible	 anticipation	 of	
outbreaks	 of	 costly	 vendettas,	 is	 the	 behavior	 of	 some	 participants,	 who	 delayed	 their	
punishment	to	the	very	last	round.	In	addition,	these	participants	invested	high	amounts	to	
punish,	 indicating	 a	 final	 revenge	 for	 being	 punished	 in	 previous	 rounds	 where	 they	
patiently	 refrained	 from	 immediate	 counter‐punishment	 to	 avoid	 the	 danger	 of	 paying	
counter‐punishment	fines.	
Our	results	are	in	accordance	with	earlier	findings	that	humans	are	willing	to	punish	and	
retaliate	 (e.g.	 Denant‐Boemont	 et	 al.	 2007;	 Egas	 &	 Riedl	 2008;	 Nikiforakis	 2008;	 Jensen	
2010).	We	extended	 this	 line	of	 research	by	 showing	 that	 acts	of	punishment	 can	escalate	
into	vendettas.	However,	 the	behavior	of	our	participants	 is	 in	contradiction	 to	 theoretical	
postulations	 that	 vendettas	 should	not	 occur	 under	 natural	 selection	 (Janssen	&	Bushman	
2008;	Wolff	2009),	as	defection	is	the	proper	response	evolving	after	provoking	punishment	
(Rand	 et	 al.	 2009b).	 Nevertheless,	 a	 tendency	 to	 avenge	 can	 also	 be	 found	 in	 animals	
(Clutton‐Brock	 &	 Parker	 1995;	 Jensen	 et	 al.	 2007).	 For	 instance,	 Japanese	 macaques	
sometimes	 use	 indirect	 revenge	 against	 an	 aggressor’s	 kin	 (Aureli	 et	 al.	 1992).	 These	
counter‐aggressive	acts	seem	to	have	regulatory	effects,	as	 they	happen	 in	 the	presence	of	
the	aggressor,	who	however	is	unable	to	intervene,	and	thus	these	acts	can	serve	as	means	to	
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reduce	 the	 likelihood	 of	 further	 attacks	 of	 the	 aggressor	 against	 the	 revenging	 individual.	
Vendettas	 in	 human	 societies	 are	 also	 attributed	 a	 functional	 quality	 (Elster	 1990;	 Gould	
2000).	For	one,	vendettas	are	 thought	 to	provide	rules	 for	escalating	conflicts	and	 thereby	
they	 might	 reduce	 the	 likelihood	 of	 full	 escalation.	 Additionally,	 social	 norms	 prescribe	
which	kind	of	behavior	is	to	be	avenged.	Here,	we	also	found	that	vendettas	occur	only	under	
certain	circumstances:	after	unjustified	or	ambiguous	punishment,	but	rarely	after	justified	
punishment.	Such	counter‐punishments	could	relate	to	social	norms	like	“showing	strength”	
or	 “avoiding	 to	 losing	 face”.	 Furthermore,	 “natural”	 vendettas	 occur	 more	 frequently	 in	
regions	where	the	institutional	law	is	rather	weak	or	absent	(Elster	1990).	Considering	real‐
world	observations,	we	find	 it	worthwhile	to	 investigate	multiple	rounds	of	punishment	 in	
an	 experimental	 setting	 where	 punishment	 can	 be	 peer‐based,	 but	 in	 addition	
institutionalized.	 Due	 to	 assured	 institutionalized	 punishment,	 peer‐punishment	 might	
become	 less	 important,	 resulting	 in	 a	 reduced	 likelihood	of	 vendettas.	 That	 cooperation	 is	
promoted	by	institutional	punishment	has	been	shown	theoretically	(Sigmund	et	al.	2010),	
but	whether	this	inhibits	vendettas	on	the	peer‐level	remains	to	future	research.	
The	aim	of	our	study	was	to	examine	whether	vendettas	of	punishment	occur,	and	to	test	
how	 the	 existence	 of	 vendettas	 then	 would	 affect	 cooperation.	 Here,	 punishers	 are	 not	
protected,	 in	 the	 sense	 that	 they	 had	 to	 take	 on	 the	 consequences	 of	 their	 punishing	
behavior.	 As	 punishment	 is	 costly	 and	 negative	 for	 individuals	 (Dreber	 et	 al.	 2008),	 it	 is	
better	 to	 abstain	 from	 it.	 This	 is	 especially	 true	 in	 our	 setting	 where	 punishment	 could	
escalate	into	cost‐intense	vendettas.	Nevertheless,	our	participants	engaged	quite	frequently	
in	vendettas.	In	conclusion,	these	results	indicate	that	evolutionary	models	so	far	neglected	
important	aspects	of	real‐life	interactions,	like	equity	and	reputational	concerns,	as	animals	
and	humans	frequently	retaliate	and	as	vendettas	occur	across	human	societies.		
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APPENDIX	TO	CHAPTER	III	
	
Average	punishment	investment	
 
							 	
	
							 	
	
Figure	S1	Average	punishment	 investment	(+	SD)	 in	 the	(a)	second,	(b)	 third,	 (c)	 fourth	and	(d)	 fifth	round	of	
punishment	(pooled	over	all	periods).	Participants	could	either	contribute	 into	 the	public	good,	C,	or	defect,	D.	
Hence,	in	CD	a	contributor	punished	a	defector	(CC,	DC,	DD,	respectively;	Friedman	test:	(a)	²	=	5.0,	df	=	3,	n	=	6,	
p	=	0.17;	(b)	²	=	2.95,	df	=	3,	n	=	6,	p	=	0.40;	(c)	²	=	2.29,	df	=	3,	n	=	6,	p	=	0.52;	(d)	²	=	2.6,	df	=	3,	n	=	6,	p	=	0.46).		
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GENERAL	DISCUSSION	
	
	
Is	cooperation	abundant?	
The	major	aim	of	this	thesis	is	to	determine	conditions	under	which	cooperative	behavior	is	
established	 and	maintained.	To	do	 so,	predictions	 from	evolutionary	models	were	derived	
and	human	behavior	was	investigated	in	experimental	settings.	In	the	introduction	I	outlined	
examples	of	 cooperation	 in	humans	and	animals	 (see	also	Hammerstein	2003;	Kappeler	&	
van	 Schaik	 2006).	 The	 present	 thesis	 contributes	 further	 empirical	 evidence	 to	 the	 list	 of	
cooperative	endeavors.	 In	the	experiments,	 the	majority	of	participants	cooperated,	 i.e.	 the	
levels	 of	 cooperation	 in	 the	 iterated	 prisoner’s	 dilemma	 and	 the	 public	 goods	 game	were	
hardly	ever	below	50%.	Nevertheless,	 the	question	whether	“cooperation	 is	abundant”	can	
only	 in	 parts	 be	 answered	 with	 yes	 (cf.	 Chapter	 1).	 Before	 outlining	 the	 conditions	 of	
cooperative	behavior	in	regard	to	this	thesis	and	presenting	an	outlook	on	future	research,	I	
will	summarize	the	results	of	cooperation	in	humans.	
In	 Chapter	 1,	 I	 investigated	 for	 the	 first	 time,	 to	 my	 knowledge,	 whether	 different	
numbers	of	social	partners	affect	cooperativity.	Participants	interacted	either	in	one	iterated	
prisoner’s	dilemma	(cf.	Box	1	p.	20)	or	 in	 three	 iterated	prisoner’s	dilemma	at	a	 time.	The	
precise	 endpoints	 of	 the	 interactions	were	unknown	 to	 participants.	 Results	 revealed	 that	
when	 interacting	 with	 multiple	 partners	 cooperation	 levels	 were	 on	 average	 lower.	
Participants	 in	 the	multiple‐games	 setting	 treated	 their	 partners	 quite	 differently,	 despite	
the	 fact	 that	 identical	 monetary	 incentives	 were	 used	 in	 each	 dyadic	 interaction.	 This	
contradicts	 the	assumption	of	game	 independence	of	 traditional	evolutionary	game	 theory	
(Maynard	 Smith	 1982;	 Nowak	 2006a)	 and	 experimental	 results	 in	 the	 context	 of	 groups	
(Falk	 et	 al.	 2010).	 Throughout	 three	 dyadic	 interactions	 participants	 were	 only	 able	 to	
establish	one	cooperative	relationship.	Here,	no	difference	in	cooperativity	compared	to	the	
single‐game	 setting	 could	 be	 found,	 additionally	 cooperation	 levels	 increased	 over	 time.	
Having	one	trustworthy	and	high‐income	relationship,	the	“temptation”	to	defect	seemed	to	
be	enhanced,	or	participants	are	more	strictly	reciprocating	defection.	This	resulted	 in	one	
rather	defective	relationship	where	cooperation	levels	remained	as	low	as	30%	to	40%	(the	
cooperation	 level	 of	 the	 third	 relationship	 was	 between	 the	 other	 two).	 Overall,	 I	
demonstrated	that	interactions	in	the	iterated	prisoner’s	dilemma	with	an	unknown	ending	
are	defined	by	reciprocal	behavior	based	on	reactive	strategies	close	to	generous	tit‐for‐tat,	
supporting	 the	 theoretical	 concept	of	direct	 reciprocity.	However,	 this	 is	 in	contrast	 to	 the	
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expected	win‐stay	lose‐shift	like	strategies,	which	is	superior	in	evolutionary	terms	and	was	
observed	 in	 previous	 studies	 (Wedekind	&	Milinski	 1996;	Milinski	 &	Wedekind	 1998).	 In	
sum,	 the	 classic	mechanism	of	 cooperation	 via	 direct	 reciprocity	 (cf.	General	 Introduction)	
does	not	always	lead	to	a	cooperative	outcome	when	simultaneously	interacting	in	multiple	
pairwise	games.	Therefore,	a	new	type	of	models	 is	required	which	account	 for	behavioral	
differences	 within	 the	 relationships	 of	 a	 single	 individual	 to	 better	 understand	 human	
cooperation	in	multiple	dyadic,	real‐life	interactions.	
The	study	of	Chapter	2	provided	first	insights	into	how	cooperation	is	influenced	by	the	
dynamic	structure	of	social	networks	in	experiments	with	humans.	Relative	to	reciprocity	in	
static	 relationships,	 the	 ability	 to	 change	 partners	 via	 an	 active‐link‐breaking	 mechanism	
(Pacheco	 et	 al.	 2006a,	 2006b,	 2008),	 and	 hence	 the	 generation	 of	 a	 dynamic	 network,	
enhanced	 cooperation.	This	 result	 is	 especially	 important	 since	 the	 theoretically	predicted	
cooperation	enhancing	effects	of	social,	static	structure	could	not	be	found	in	so	far	(Grujić	et	
al.	2010;	Traulsen	et	al.	2010).	Within	dynamic	networks	cooperative	links	were	maintained	
while	links	with	defectors	were	broken.	This	biased	link	breaking	resulted	in	an	assortment	
process	 between	 participants	 on	 the	 network.	 In	 fact,	 assortment	 occurred	 in	 the	 form	 of	
“cooperative	cliques”.	This	network	assortment	is	remarkable,	because	it	occurred	on	top	of	
behavioral	 assortment	 through	 direct	 reciprocity	 and	 was	 beyond	 the	 perception	 of	
participants.	The	formation	of	cooperative	cliques	occurred	at	a	higher‐level	and	represents	
a	 self‐organized	 pattern.	 Hence,	 biased	 link	 breaking	 generated	 an	 interaction	 between	
behavior	 and	 network	 structure	 (i.e.	 cooperative	 cliques):	 behavioral	 decisions	 affect	 the	
network	structure	(i.e.	clique	formation),	which	forms	the	social	ecology	of	participants	(i.e.	
cooperators	 interacting	with	cooperators)	and	this	feeds	back	again	on	behavioral	decision	
and	so	 forth.	 In	general,	 the	 results	highlight	 the	 importance	of	 co‐evolutionary	processes.	
Here,	behavior	(at	the	individual	level)	and	structure	(at	the	network	level)	both	evolve	and	
exert	 selective	 pressures	 on	 the	 other,	 and	 thus	 have	 to	 be	 considered	 as	 correlated	
evolutionary	processes.	
The	 central	 issue	of	Chapter	3	was	whether	punishment	 acts,	which	 are	not	protected	
from	retaliations,	can	still	promote	cooperation.	 In	accordance	with	previous	experimental	
findings,	participants	 frequently	punished	and	retaliated	(e.g.	Denant‐Boemont	et	al.	2007;	
Nikiforakis	2008).	Here,	I	extend	this	line	of	research	by	showing	that	acts	of	punishment,	in	
contradiction	 to	 evolutionary	 theory	 (Janssen	 &	 Bushman	 2008;	 Rand	 et	al.	 2009b;	Wolff	
2009),	 frequently	 escalated	 into	 cost‐intense	 vendettas.	 In	 fact,	 counter‐punishing	
participants	were	willing	to	match	up	their	punishment	fine,	making	the	proverb	an‐eye‐for‐
an‐eye	very	real	and	supporting	 theories	of	equity	 (e.g.	Adams	1965;	Stillwell	et	al.	2008).	
The	outbreak	of	vendettas	was	normally	triggered	by	unjustified	or	ambiguous	punishment.	
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In	 contrast,	 justified	 punishers	were	 largely	 protected	 from	 on‐going	 revenges,	 indicating	
underlying	rules	or	social	norms	for	punishment	behavior.	Remarkably,	by	quickly	adjusting	
to	 the	 given	 experimental	 set‐up	 some	 participants	 were	 able	 to	 avoid	 retaliation	 and	
occurrences	of	vendettas	by	delaying	their	punishment	to	the	very	last	moment.	The	social	
interaction	 in	 the	 public	 goods	 game	 was	 most	 relevant	 for	 the	 first	 punishment,	 i.e.	
defectors	attracted	the	highest	punishment	fines.	This	effect	of	coherent	punishment	seemed	
strong	 enough	 to	 raise	 cooperation	 levels	 over	 time.	 Overall,	 these	 results	 indicate	 that	
evolutionary	models	so	 far	neglected	 important	aspects	of	real‐life	 interactions,	 like	equity	
and	reputational	concerns,	as	vendettas	occur	across	human	societies.	
	
	
Conditions	that	help	to	solve	the	puzzle	
The	results	of	the	present	thesis	(in	line	with	former	experimental	evidence)	show	that	for	
cooperative	 behavior	 to	 prevail	 additional	 incentives,	 like	 conditional	 behavior	 or	
punishment,	 are	 needed.	However,	 some	mechanisms	of	 reciprocity	 are	 not	 as	 strong	 and	
universally	 applicable	 as	 formerly	 believed.	 In	 long‐lasting	 relationships	 cheating	 can	 be	
kept	 under	 control	 by	 using	 conditional	 strategies	 (Wedekind	&	Milinski	 1996;	Milinski	&	
Wedekind	1998),	though	this	is	not	always	successful	when	one	is	simultaneously	involved	
in	 more	 than	 one	 social	 relationship	 (Chapter	 1).	 Another	 cheater‐control	 mechanism	 is	
punishment.	Punishment	is	very	effective	in	group	endeavors	(e.g.	Fehr	&	Gächter	2002),	but	
also	 debated	 as	 a	maladaptation	with	 regard	 to	 cooperation	 (Dreber	 et	 al.	 2008).	 I	 could	
demonstrate	 that	 punishment	 remains	 effective	 even	 in	 light	 of	 costly	 conflict	 escalation	
(Chapter	3);	nevertheless,	this	brings	into	question	the	evolutionary	origin	of	punishment	in	
this	 scenario,	 because	 theory	 does	 not	 observe	 the	 emergence	 of	 vendettas	 (Rand	 et	 al.	
2009b).	In	sum,	in	Chapters	1	and	3	I	could	extend	our	understanding	of	cooperation	when	it	
faces	the	threat	of	exploitation	in	pairwise	interactions	and	exploitation	in	group	endeavors.		
Apart	 from	 further	 deepening	 the	 knowledge	 of	 these	 two	 known	 conditions	 for	
cooperation,	 I	 could	 also	 contribute	 empirical	 evidence	 for	 a	 novel	 condition.	 In	 models,	
dynamic	 networks	 have	 been	 shown	 to	 enhance	 cooperation	 (Perc	 &	 Szolnoki	 2010),	 but	
empirical	 support	was	missing	 so	 far.	Here,	 I	 demonstrated	 that	 the	 potential	 of	 rejecting	
partners	via	active	link	breaking	leads	to	assortment	of	cooperative	individuals,	and	that	the	
generated	 network	 structure	 greatly	 enhanced	 cooperation	 (Chapter	 2).	 This	 study	
demonstrated	how	two	mechanisms	for	the	evolution	of	cooperation	–	direct	reciprocity	and	
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network	 reciprocity4	 (cf.	 also	General	 Introduction)	 –	 can	 be	 integrated	 and	 it	 shows	 that	
interactions	between	mechanisms	can	arise.	Whereas	in	the	static‐network	condition	direct	
reciprocity	 could	operate	and	a	 cooperative	outcome	was	obtained,	 the	 comparison	 to	 the	
dynamic‐network	 condition	 allowed	 network	 reciprocity	 to	 have	 a	 cooperation	 enhancing	
effect	 on	 top	 of	 direct	 reciprocity.	 The	 relationship	 between	 different	 mechanisms	 in	
experiments	on	human	cooperation	has	not	been	investigated.	An	exception	is	the	study	by	
Rockenbach	 and	Milinski	 (2006)	where	 the	 combination	 of	 direct	 and	 indirect	 reciprocity	
enhances	cooperation	greatly.		
	
	
Outlook	–	evolutionary	solutions	to	cooperation	
This	 paragraph	will	 bring	 together	 the	 results	 of	 Chapters	 1	 to	 3	 and	based	 on	 that	 I	will	
outline	possible	future	research	questions	on	the	evolution	of	cooperation.		
A	link	between	results	of	this	thesis	can	be	found	if	punishment	is	seen	in	a	broader	light.	
One	way	of	punishing	is	by	imposing	a	costly	fine	on	someone	(see	Chapter	3).	Another	way	
to	carry	out	“punishment”	is	by	refusing	to	continue	a	relationship	and	rather	“try	one’s	luck”	
with	a	new	partner	(see	Chapter	2).	Here,	the	decision	for	a	new	partner	is	self‐serving	but	
can	reduce	the	defector’s	fitness	as	a	by‐product.	Depending	on	the	goal	an	individual	wants	
to	 accomplish	 with	 the	 help	 of	 a	 second	 party,	 and	 the	 number	 of	 alternative	 partners	
punishment	 via	 partner	 switching	 can	 either	 cause	 high	 or	 low	 costs.	 If	 the	 goal	 does	 not	
require	 special	 skills	 (i.e.	many	 individuals	 possess	 the	 skill)	 and	 thus	 various	 alternative	
partners	are	available,	then	punishment	costs	are	low	and	it	might	be	worthwhile	to	stop	a	
relationship	 which	 yields	 no	 good	 return	 and	 start	 one	 with	 another	 individual.	
Nevertheless,	 the	time	 frame	when	partner	switching	 is	still	 low	in	costs	might	be	narrow.	
Within	dynamic	networks	 (Chapter	2)	half	 of	 the	participants	demanded	a	new	partner	 at	
the	beginning	of	the	iterated	prisoner’s	dilemma.	Thus,	many	alternative	partners	where	in	
the	pool	of	participants	that	needed	to	be	assigned	a	new	partner	at	random.	However,	this	
changed	 rather	 quickly	 and	 participants	 looking	 for	 new	 partners	 towards	 the	 end	 of	 the	
game	were	confronted	with	the	fact	that	they	were	quite	likely	to	receive	their	old	partner	
again	simply	because	of	 lacking	alternatives.	 In	general,	partner	switching	 is	a	widespread	
control	 mechanism	 in	 animals.	 In	 interspecies	 mutualism,	 for	 instance,	 the	 clients	 (i.e.	
various	reef	fish	species)	of	the	cleaner	wrasse,	Labroides	dimidiatus,	switch	to	a	new	cleaner	
after	defection	by	their	current	one	(Bshary	&	Schäffer	2002).	This	forces	the	cleaner	to	be	
                                                 
4		 Note	 that	 network	 reciprocity	 was	 originally	 defined	 for	 static	 networks	 or	 spatial	 structures,	 like	 lattices	
(Nowak	 2006b).	 Here	 the	 idea	 that	 structure	 impacts	 the	 evolution	 of	 behaviour	 is	 applied	 in	 the	 context	 of	
dynamic	networks.	
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more	cooperative	(Bshary	&	Grutter	2005).	More	precisely,	in	cleaner‐client	interactions	so‐
called	 residents	 (reef	 fish	 that	 live	within	 defined	 territories	 and	 only	 have	 access	 to	 one	
cleaner	 fish)	 make	 use	 of	 punishment	 by	 chasing	 defective	 cleaners;	 whereas	 so‐called	
visitors	(pelagic	fish	that	travel	in	larger	areas	and	can	use	the	services	of	various	cleaners)	
make	 use	 of	 partner	 switching	 if	 exploited	 by	 a	 cleaner	 (Bshary	 2010).	 In	 conclusion,	 it	
seems	worthwhile	to	study	the	combined	effect	of	costly	punishment	and	partner	switching	
as	 conditions	 to	 achieve	 cooperation	 in	 humans5.	 Individuals	 can	 adjust	 their	 “punishing	
behavior”	according	to	the	costs	of	punishment	and	the	current	costs	of	partner	switching.	I	
conjecture	that	this	combination	leads	to	low‐cost	partner	switching	when	new	relationships	
are	still	being	established,	whereas	this	pattern	changes	as	soon	as	more	and	more	long‐term	
relationships	are	formed.	Defectors	would	now	be	“educated”	by	costly	punishment.	
The	 combination	 of	 the	 outcomes	 of	 the	 first	 two	 chapters	 shows	 that	 within	 flexible	
relationships,	 in	which	partners	can	be	exchanged	(if	necessary)	cooperation	prevails	even	
though	 individuals	 seem	 to	 be	 tempted	 to	 defect	 with	 some	 interaction	 partners.	 This	
highlights	the	importance	of	studying	cooperation	in	networks	or	structured	populations,	in	
particular	 in	 dynamic	 networks.	 In	 the	 last	 years,	 theoretical	 research	 on	 the	 evolution	 of	
cooperation	has	concentrated	on	structured	populations	(Nowak	&	May	1992;	Szabó	&	Fáth	
2007;	 Lion	 et	 al.	 2011)	 and	 dynamic	 networks	 as	 well	 as	 heterogeneous	 (i.e.	 in	 terms	 of	
social	connection	numbers)	networks	have	become	popular	topics	for	analyses	(e.g.	Santos	
et	al.	2006c;	Assenza	et	al.	2008;	Pacheco	et	al.	2008).	However,	empirical	evidence	is	lagging	
behind:	so	far	only	the	impacts	of	static	network	structure	(Cassar	2007;	Kirchkamp	&	Nagel	
2007;	 Traulsen	 et	 al.	 2010;	 Grujić	 et	 al.	 2010)	 and	 of	 dynamic‐homogeneous	 network	
structure	 (Chapter	 2)	 have	 been	 investigated.	 Hence,	 I	 in	 particular	 encourage	 future	
experimental	 research	 to	 include	dynamic‐heterogeneous	networks.	Within	heterogeneous	
networks	 so‐call	 hubs	 exist,	 i.e.	 individuals	 who	 have	 a	 high	 degree	 of	 connectedness	 in	
comparison	to	the	rest	of	the	population.	These	hubs	clear	the	way	for	cooperation	to	prevail	
(Santos	&	Pacheco	2005,	2006;	Santos	et	al.	2006c).	In	fact,	in	static‐heterogeneous	networks	
cooperators	occupy	hubs	and	defectors	can	only	survive	in	nodes	with	a	low	connectedness,	
which	 greatly	 reduces	 their	 exploitive	 opportunities	 (Santos	 et	 al.	 2006c).	 The	 reduced	
cooperation	 when	 having	 multiple	 relationships	 (Chapter	1)	 can	 be	 tackled	 by	 dynamic‐
heterogeneous	 networks6.	 In	 conjunction	 with	 the	 processes	 in	 static‐heterogeneous	
                                                 
5		 Straight	 forward	parallels	 to	 the	 idea	of	cost‐dependent	partner	switching	can	be	 found	 in	biological	market	
theory	(Noë	et	al.	1991;	Noë	&	Hammerstein	1995;	Bshary	&	Noë	2003)	where	supply	and	demand	affect	levels	of	
cooperation.	
6		 In	this	case	not	every	participants	would	receive	the	same	number	of	partners,	but	within	a	social	network	the	
number	 of	 partners	 would	 vary	 greatly	 between	 participants.	 However,	 having	 many	 interactions	 in	 real	 life	
causes	 higher	 costs	 of	 maintaining	 all	 relationships,	 for	 instances	 one	 has	 to	 invest	 in	meetings,	 phone	 calls,	
sending	 postcards	 when	 on	 holidays,	 and	 so	 on.	 Thus,	 additional	 constraints	 or	 costs	 arise	 that	 are	 usually	
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networks	 (Santos	 &	 Pacheco	 2006)	 and	 results	 of	 biased	 link	 breaking	 to	 defectors	 in	
dynamic	networks	(Chapter	2)	the	advantage	of	dynamic‐heterogeneous	networks	lies	in	the	
possibility	of	rapid	defector	exclusion	which	 is	additionally	supported	by	the	nature	of	 the	
network	structure.	Here,	selection	can	act	on	behavior	and	structure,	thus	generating	a	co‐
evolutionary	process.	In	general,	no	matter	what	the	behavioral	tendency	of	an	individual	is,	
it	is	best	to	have	many	links	to	cooperators.	The	arising	problem	is	that	defectors,	who	have	
many	 links	 to	 cooperators,	 fare	 very	 well	 and	 should	 dominate	 the	 population.	 However,	
cooperators	can	control	cheating	either	by	starting	to	defect	as	well,	or	by	breaking	the	link	
to	 defectors	 and	 seeking	 new	 partners.	 In	 consequence,	 defectors	 (i)	 end	 up	 in	 defector‐
defector	 relationships,	 which	 reduce	 their	 payoff	 compared	 to	 defector‐cooperator	
relationships,	or	(ii)	they	are	abandoned	by	their	partners.	If	cooperators	are	rare,	defectors	
most	 likely	 receive	 defectors	 as	 new	partners,	 or	 if	 partners	 are	 rare	 in	 general	 defectors	
might	 even	 be	 left	 with	 no	 new	 partner	 at	 all,	 both	 reduces	 their	 payoff.	 As	 a	 result,	
cooperators	are	provided	with	the	chance	to	positively	assort	themselves	and	hence	recover.	
Being	 a	 cooperator	 has	 the	 consequence	 of	 attracting	 many	 cooperative	 partners	 and	 to	
remain	 in	 cooperative	 long‐term	 relationships	 (cf.	 Chapter	2).	 This	 allows	 cooperators	 to	
become	a	hub.	Having	reached	this	stage,	two	scenarios	are	possible	in	an	experimental	set‐
up.	On	the	one	hand,	once	cooperators	became	hubs	who	are	linked	to	cooperative	partners,	
and	thus	they	have	a	very	high	payoff,	 it	becomes	particularly	hard	for	defectors	to	 invade	
due	 to	 the	 heterogeneous	 nature	 of	 the	 network,	 and	 cooperation	 prevails	 (this	 has	 been	
demonstrated	theoretically	for	static‐heterogeneous	networks,	Santos	&	Pacheco	2006).	On	
the	other	hand,	for	cooperative	individuals	on	hubs	the	“temptation”	to	defect	increases	and	
they	 lapse	 at	 least	 in	 parts	 into	 defective	 behavior	 (cf.	 Chapter	 1).	 If	 a	 cooperative	 hub	
individual	now	becomes	a	defector,	then	however	these	defective	hubs	would	soon	collapse	
(see	 above).	 As	 a	 consequence	 many	 individuals	 (possibly	 conditional	 cooperators)	 are	
seeking	 new	partners	 paving	 the	way	 for	 cooperation	 to	 rise	 again.	 As	 a	 result,	 a	 cycle	 of	
cooperative	 hubs	 and	 defective	 hubs	 emerges	 (J.	Pacheco,	 personal	 communication).	 As	
profound	 theoretical	 and	 empirical	 evidence	 is	 lacking,	 however,	 for	 the	 time	 being	 it	
remains	 elusive	 whether	 the	 mechanisms	 within	 dynamic‐heterogeneous	 networks	 can	
promote	cooperation	in	the	long‐run.	
	
	
In	 conclusion,	 in	 the	 present	 thesis	 I	 could	 demonstrate	 that	 many	 pairwise	 interactions	
reduce	cooperative	behavior	of	humans	(Chapter	1).	However,	when	social	partners	can	be	
                                                                                                                                                   
neglected	in	models	(e.g.	Nowak	&	May	1992;	Ohtsuki	et	al.	2006;	Santos	et	al.	2006c;	Pacheco	et	al.	2008;	Fu	et	
al.	2009;	but	for	an	experiment,	see	Ahn	et	al.	2009)	and	will	have	to	be	studied	in	the	future.	
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rejected	 –	 generating	 a	 dynamic	 network	 and	 resulting	 in	 assortment	 of	 individuals	 –	
cooperation	 can	 prevail	 (Chapter	 2).	 In	 addition,	 within	 group	 endeavors	 punishment,	
though	cost‐intense	escalations	of	 conflict	 can	arise,	 is	nevertheless	effective	 in	promoting	
cooperation	(Chapter	3).	One	next	and	logical	step	is	to	further	combine	these	new	pieces	of	
knowledge	 as	 outlined	 above.	 It	 stands	 to	 reason	 that	 reduced	 cooperation	 can	 easily	 be	
overcome	by	 combining	partner	 switching	 and	punishment,	 or	 by	dynamic‐heterogeneous	
networks	(all	 is	nonetheless	prevalent	 in	nature),	but	 this	possibly	results	 in	a	much	more	
effective	cheater	control.	To	do	so	only	a	 joint	way	of	both	 theoretical	and	empirical	work	
can	 broaden	 our	 knowledge	 on	 the	 evolution	 of	 cooperation	 in	 particular	 and	 prosocial	
behavior	in	general.	
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SUMMARY	
	
	
The	 general	 goal	 of	 this	 thesis	was	 to	 study	 conditions	 under	which	 prosocial	 behavior	 is	
established	 and	 maintained.	 I	 approached	 these	 questions	 by	 applying	 predictions	 and	
assumptions	 of	 evolutionary	 game	 theory	 to	 human	 cooperation	 within	 experimental	
settings.	Cooperative	behavior	is	an	evolutionary	puzzle,	because	over	time	natural	selection	
should	 favor	 cheating	 behavior.	 Nevertheless,	 cooperation	 is	 ubiquitous	 in	 nature.	
Cooperative	behavior	is	costly	and	provides	benefits	to	other	individuals,	whereas	cheating	‐	
or	defection	 ‐	does	not	 incur	costs	but	offers	benefits	allocated	by	cooperative	behavior	of	
others.	 Thus,	 cooperation	 cannot	 be	 an	 evolutionary	 stable	 strategy	 without	 special	
mechanisms	 that	 can	 reduce	 the	 chance	 of	 exploitation.	 In	 this	 thesis,	 I	 examined	 (i)	 the	
effects	of	multiple	interactions	on	reciprocal	behavior,	and	(ii)	the	impact	of	social	structure	
on	 dyadic	 relationships	 using	 the	 prisoner’s	 dilemma	 paradigm.	 Additionally,	 (iii)	 I	
investigated	the	effect	of	punishment,	which	can	trigger	conflict	escalation,	in	a	public	goods	
game.	
In	 Chapter	 1,	 I	 investigated	 whether	 and	 in	 which	 way	 different	 numbers	 of	 social	
interaction	partners	affect	cooperative	behavior	in	the	iterated	prisoner’s	dilemma	(IPD).	In	
line	with	 the	 concept	 of	 direct	 reciprocity,	 I	 found	 that	 participants	 in	 the	 traditional	 IPD	
with	 an	 unknown	 ending	 frequently	 cooperated.	 Overall,	 behavior	 most	 closely	 followed	
reactive	strategies	close	to	generous	tit‐for‐tat.	However,	when	participants	interacted	with	
multiple	 partners	 in	 three	 independent	 IPDs	 at	 a	 time	 average	 cooperativity	 decreased	
significantly.	 Further	 analyses	 showed	 that	 these	 participants	 had	 only	 one	 cooperative	
relationship	similar	to	the	relationship	 in	the	setting	of	a	single	IPD,	but	these	participants	
could	not	establish	cooperation	 in	a	second	relationship	(the	cooperation	 level	of	 the	third	
relationship	 was	 located	 between	 these	 two).	 These	 results	 contradict	 the	 traditional	
assumption	 of	 evolutionary	 game	 theory	 of	 game	 independence	 as	 there	 seems	 to	 be	 an	
enhanced	temptation	to	defect	in	some	relationships,	but	not	all,	when	interacting	with	three	
instead	 of	 only	 one	 social	 partner.	 Hence,	 theory	 needs	 to	 start	 modeling	 explicitly	 the	
impacts	 of	 different	 numbers	 of	 partners	 to	 account	 for	 behavioral	 differences	within	 the	
relationships	 of	 a	 single	 individual.	 Studying	 cooperation	within	 heterogeneous	 networks,	
where	the	number	of	partners	varies,	is	a	first	attempt.		
Further,	 in	 Chapter	 2	 I	 addressed	 the	 impact	 of	 social	 structure	 on	 cooperation.	
Relationships	were	characterized	by	an	underlying	network	structure.	Most	previous	models	
have	 neglected	 relationship	 networks,	 whereas	 within	 the	 recent	 decade,	 theoretical	
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research	 has	 started	 to	 include	 such	 structure.	 However,	 empirical	 evidence	 is	 lagging	
behind	 the	development	of	 theoretical	 insights.	Here,	 I	overcome	such	shortcomings	by	an	
experimental	set‐up	where	participants	 interacted	 in	multiple	but	 independent	IPDs	either	
within	a	static	or	dynamic	network.	In	the	latter,	participants	were	given	the	option	to	break	
their	 social	 links	 after	 each	 prisoner’s	 dilemma	 round.	 In	 accordance	 with	 theoretical	
predictions,	 cooperation	 levels	 were	 higher	 in	 dynamic	 networks	 compared	 to	 static	
networks.	Additionally,	participants	in	dynamic	networks	changed	their	social	environment	
by	biased	 link	breaking	 to	defectors.	Hence,	 an	assortment	on	 the	network	 took	place	and	
cooperative	clusters	emerged.	This	assortment	is	remarkable,	because	it	occurred	on	top	of	
behavioral	assortment	through	direct	reciprocity	and	beyond	the	perception	of	participants,	
and	 represents	 a	 self‐organized	 pattern.	 In	 sum,	 these	 results	 highlight	 the	 importance	 of	
dynamic	 social	 networks,	 show	 that	 higher‐order	 structures	 emerge	 above	 the	 individual	
level,	and	that	these	eventually	feed	back	on	selection	processes.	
In	Chapter	3,	I	examined	the	impact	of	costly	punishments	on	cooperative	behavior	where	
punishment	 acts	 can	 potentially	 escalate	 between	 participants.	 Groups	 of	 four	 played	 a	
public	 goods	 game	 which	 was	 followed	 by	 five	 rounds	 of	 punishment.	 Thus,	 whereas	
punishers	are	usually	protected	 from	retaliation	 this	was	not	 the	case	 in	 this	 study.	 In	 the	
experiment,	 I	 found	 that	 sequences	 of	 costly	 punishment	 between	 participants,	 so‐called	
vendettas,	 frequently	 occurred	 especially	 when	 punishment	 was	 unjustified	 or	 rather	
ambiguous.	 This	 finding	 contradicts	 theory	which	 shows	 that	 vendettas	 do	 not	 evolve,	 as	
they	 are	 too	 cost‐intense	 and	 reciprocated	 defection	 is	 the	 superior	 alternative	 strategy.	
Nevertheless,	cooperation	levels	increased	over	time.	This	is	presumably	due	to	the	fact	that	
early	punishment	was	mainly	directed	at	defecting	group	members,	which	seemed	to	have	
increased	their	motivation	to	contribute	 into	 the	public	good.	Moreover,	some	participants	
seemed	to	anticipate	the	outbreak	of	cost‐intense	vendettas	and	delayed	their	punishment	to	
the	last	possible	moment.	These	results	indicate	that	evolutionary	models	so	far	neglected	an	
important	aspect	of	real‐life	interactions,	as	animals	and	humans	frequently	retaliate	and	as	
vendettas	 occur	 across	 human	 societies.	 So	 far	 one	 can	 only	 speculate	 that	 equity	 and	
reputational	concerns	are	such	central	aspects.		
In	 conclusion,	 the	 present	 thesis	 successfully	 identified	 conditions	 under	 which	
cooperation	 between	 unrelated	 individuals	 can	 be	 established	 or	when	 cooperation	 levels	
remain	 low.	 On	 the	 one	 hand,	 this	 thesis	 provides	 empirical	 support	 for	 recent	models	 of	
dynamic	networks,	but	on	the	other	hand	limitations	of	other	models	could	be	pointed	out.	
In	 addition,	 the	 thesis	 contributed	 further	 knowledge	 to	 the	 understanding	 of	 costly	
punishment	and	direct	reciprocity	in	humans.		
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Das	 Ziel	 der	 vorliegenden	Arbeit	war	 es,	 Bedingungen,	 unter	 denen	 prosoziales	 Verhalten	
entsteht,	 zu	 untersuchen.	 Hierzu	 wurden	 Vorhersagen	 und	 Annahmen	 der	 evolutionären	
Spieltheorie	 auf	menschliches	Kooperationsverhalten	 angewendet.	 Kooperatives	 Verhalten	
wird	als	evolutionäres	Rätsel	betrachtet,	da	natürliche	Selektion	betrügerisches	Verhalten	im	
Laufe	der	Zeit	eigentlich	begünstigen	sollte.	Nichtsdestotrotz	 ist	Kooperation	überall	 in	der	
Natur	 vorzufinden.	 Per	 Definition	 ist	 kooperatives	 Verhalten	 kostenverursachend	 für	 den	
Handelnden	und	bietet	gleichzeitig	Vorteile	oder	Gewinne	für	andere	Personen.	Betrug	oder	
Defektion	 dagegen	 verursachen	 keine	 Kosten,	 aber	 die	 bereitgestellten	 Vorteile	 anderer	
können	dennoch	genutzt	werden.	Infolgedessen	ist	Kooperation	ohne	die	Unterstützung	von	
Mechanismen,	die	die	Gefahr	der	Ausbeutung	reduzieren,	keine	evolutionär	stabile	Strategie.	
In	 der	 vorliegenden	 Arbeit	 wurden	 nun	 folgende	 Aspekte	 untersucht:	 (i)	reziprokes	
Verhalten	 in	 multiplen	 paarweisen	 Interaktionen	 und	 (ii)	 die	 Auswirkung	 von	 sozialen	
Strukturen	 auf	 dyadische	 Beziehungen	 im	 Gefangenendilemma;	 und	 (iii)	 die	 Verwendung	
von	 Bestrafung	 unter	 Berücksichtigung	 der	 Möglichkeit	 von	 Konflikteskalation	 im	
öffentlichen‐Güter‐Spiel.	
In	Kapitel	1	wurde	untersucht,	ob	und	in	welcher	Weise	sich	unterschiedliche	Anzahlen	
von	Interaktionspartnern	auf	kooperatives	Verhalten	 im	wiederholten	Gefangenendilemma	
(kurz	IPD)	auswirken.	Gemäß	den	Annahmen	der	direkten	Reziprozität	zeigte	sich,	dass	die	
Versuchspersonen	 im	 traditionellen	 IPD	 mit	 unbekanntem	 Endpunkt	 mehrheitlich	
kooperierten.	 Insgesamt	 entsprach	 das	 Verhalten	 reaktiven	 Strategien	 ähnlich	 zu	
„großzügigem	Tit‐For‐Tat“.	Wenn	die	Versuchspersonen	mit	mehreren	Partnern	in	drei	IPDs	
gleichzeitig	 interagierten,	 sankt	 die	 durchschnittliche	 Kooperativität	 allerdings	 signifikant	
ab.	 Weiterführende	 Analysen	 zeigten,	 dass	 diese	 Versuchspersonen	 nur	 eine	 kooperative	
Beziehung	 ähnlich	 der	 Beziehung	 aus	 dem	 ein‐Partner	 IPD	 etablieren	 konnten,	 dass	 aber	
keine	 Kooperation	 in	 einer	 zweiten	 Beziehung	 aufgebaut	 werden	 konnten	 (das	
Kooperationslevel	 der	 dritten	 Beziehung	 lag	 zwischen	 diesen	 beiden).	 Diese	 Resultate	
widersprechen	 der	 traditionellen	 Annahme	 der	 evolutionären	 Spieltheorie,	 die	 eine	
Unabhängigkeit	von	Spielen	annimmt,	da	eine	erhöhte	„Versuchung“	in	einigen	Beziehungen	
zu	bestehen	scheint,	wenn	man	mit	drei	anstelle	von	nur	einem	Sozialpartner	interagiert.	All	
dies	deutet	daraufhin,	dass	Modelle	explizit	den	Effekt	von	unterschiedlichen	Anzahlen	von	
Partnern	mitaufnehmen	sollten,	um	so	dem	differenzierenden	Verhalten	eines	Individuums	
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gerecht	zu	werden.	Ein	Anfang	stellt	hier	die	Erforschung	von	Kooperation	 in	heterogenen	
Netzwerken	dar.	
Die	Auswirkung	von	sozialen	Strukturen	auf	Kooperation	wurde	in	Kapitel	2	betrachtet.	
Beziehungen	 können	 durch	 eine	 zugrundeliegende	 Netzwerkstruktur	 charakterisiert	
werden.	Bisher	wurde	diese	Gegebenheit	 in	 theoretischen	Überlegungen	 zumeist	 ignoriert	
und	 erst	 kürzlich	 fanden	 Netzwerkstrukturen	 Berücksichtigung	 in	 Modellen.	 Empirische	
Erkenntnisse	 zu	 diesen	 Modellen	 gab	 es	 bisher	 kaum,	 so	 dass	 sich	 dieses	 Kapitel	 genau	
dieser	Lücke	widmete.	Hier	interagierten	die	Versuchspersonen	in	mehreren,	unabhängigen	
IPDs	entweder	innerhalb	eines	statischen	oder	eines	dynamischen	Netzwerkes.	In	Letzterem	
hatten	 die	 Versuchspersonen	 die	 Möglichkeit	 ihre	 sozialen	 Verbindungen	 nach	 jeder	
Gefangenendilemma‐Runde	zu	verändern.	In	Übereinstimmung	mit	theoretischen	Modellen	
war	die	Kooperation	in	den	dynamischen	Netzwerken	höher	als	 in	den	statischen.	Darüber	
hinaus	veränderten	die	Versuchspersonen	der	dynamischen	Netzwerke	ihr	soziales	Umfeld	
durch	 ein	 bevorzugtes	 Beenden	 von	 Beziehungen	 zu	 Defektoren.	 Hierdurch	 fand	 eine	
Sortierung	 innerhalb	des	Netzwerkes	statt	und	es	bildeten	sich	kooperative	Cliquen.	Diese	
Selbstorganisation	 ist	 bemerkenswert,	 weil	 sie	 zusätzlich	 zum	 Effekt	 der	 direkten	
Reziprozität	auftrat	und	weil	die	Versuchspersonen	die	Cliquenbildung	auf	Netzwerkebene	
nicht	wahrnehmen	konnten.	Zusammenfassend	zeigen	diese	Resultate	die	hohe	Bedeutung	
von	dynamischen	sozialen	Netzwerken	auf	und	belegen,	dass	Strukturen	höherer	Ordnung	
neben	dem	Verhalten	 auf	 Individuumsebene	 entstehen	 können,	welche	dann	wiederum	 in	
Wechselwirkung	zum	Selektionsdruck	stehen	können.	
In	 Kapitel	 3	 wurde	 der	 Einfluss	 von	 kostenverursachender	 Bestrafung,	 die	 potentiell	
zwischen	 Versuchspersonen	 eskalieren	 kann,	 auf	 kooperatives	 Verhalten	 untersucht.	
Vierergruppen	 spielten	 das	 öffentliche‐Güter‐Spiel	 mit	 fünf	 aufeinanderfolgenden	
Bestrafungsrunden.	 In	 der	 Regel	 sind	 Bestrafer	 aufgrund	 des	 Experimentalaufbaus	 vor	
Vergeltung	 geschützt,	 hier	 war	 dies	 jedoch	 nicht	 der	 Fall.	 Tatsächlich	 entwickelten	 sich	
Sequenzen	von	kostenverursachender	Bestrafung	zwischen	Versuchspersonen,	 sogenannte	
Vendetten.	 Sie	 traten	 besonders	 häufig	 auf,	 wenn	 die	 Bestrafung	 als	 ungerecht	 oder	 als	
beliebig	 eingestuft	 wurde.	 Diese	 Resultate	 stehen	 im	 Widerspruch	 zu	 theoretischen	
Modellen,	in	denen	Vendetten	nicht	evolvieren,	da	sie	zu	kostenintensiv	sind	und	Defektion	
die	bessere	Verhaltensalternative	darstellt.	Nichtsdestotrotz	stieg	die	Kooperation	im	Laufe	
der	Zeit	an.	Dies	ist	vermutlich	darauf	zurückzuführen,	dass	die	Bestrafung	der	ersten	Runde	
noch	 auf	 defektierende	 Gruppenmitglieder	 gerichtet	 war,	 welches	 ihre	 Motivation	 in	 das	
öffentliche	 Gut	 einzuzahlen	 letztlich	 erhöhte.	 Ferner	 schienen	 einige	 Versuchspersonen	
sogar	 den	 möglichen	 Ausbruch	 von	 kostenintensiven	 Vendetten	 zu	 antizipierten	 und	
verzögerten	 ihre	Bestrafung	 bis	 zum	 letztmöglichen	 Zeitpunkt.	 Diese	Resultate	 zeigen	 auf,	
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dass	 Modelle	 einen	 wichtigen	 Aspekt	 bisher	 vermissen	 lassen,	 da	 sowohl	 Tiere	 als	 auch	
Menschen	häufig	Vergeltung	üben	und	sich	gerade	in	menschlichen	Gesellschaften	Vendetten	
finden	lassen.	Spekulativ	ist	anzunehmen,	dass	Equity	und	Reputation	gerade	solche	Aspekte	
dar	stellen.	
Zusammenfassend	konnten	mit	 dieser	Arbeit	Bedingungen	 identifizieren	werden,	 unter	
denen	 Kooperation	 zwischen	 nicht‐verwandten	 Personen	 entsteht	 und	 unter	 denen	
Kooperation	niedrig	 ausfällt.	Auf	der	 einen	 Seite	 konnten	neuere	Modelle	 zu	dynamischen	
sozialen	 Netzwerken	 empirisch	 untermauert	 werden	 ‐	 auf	 der	 anderen	 Seite	 wurden	
Schwachpunkte	 in	 anderen	 Modellen	 ausgewiesen.	 Zusätzlich	 trug	 diese	 Arbeit	 weitere	
Erkenntnisse	 zum	 Verständnis	 der	 kostenverursachenden	 Bestrafung	 und	 der	 direkten	
Reziprozität	beim	Menschen	bei.	
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